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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the connection between rhetoric and military culture in the early 
Roman Empire.  Despite obvious references to the military and martial virtues, little scholarly 
attention has been directed to exploring the possibilities located within this connection.  This 
dissertation is an alternative cultural history of rhetorical theory and pedagogy that draws on 
close reading and philology, as well as performance and metaphor theory.  In building on the 
cultural history of Rome, I introduce a concept of “military virtue” that expands on 
understandings of the Roman notion of virtus (virtue) found in recent scholarship.  Since virtue 
in the ancient world is both embodied and enacted, military virtue, as this dissertation presents it, 
is informed by theories of performance and gender.  Since tradition is propagated through 
education, I will also explore the rhetorical education system at Rome during the late Republic 
and early Empire giving special attention to how teachers modeled a certain culturally accepted 
character for their students.  In addition to the physical models of teachers, students interacted 
with historical, mythical, and cultural models of character through rhetorical exercises.  Through 
close readings and philological analyses of culturally important texts such as the epics of Homer, 
the Aeneid, and Roman historians, this dissertation will show instances of military virtue and 
explore the ways it was habituated through rhetorical education.  Along with the physical work 
of rhetorical education, military virtue can also be found in rhetorical treatises.  By using 
metaphor theory and close reading to examine the conceptualization of rhetoric as martial in 
Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria and the anonymous Rhetorica ad Herennium, I will show how, 
even at the level of theory, military virtue and character informed a cultural understanding of 
what an orator should be.  This dissertation speaks to several conversations about ancient Roman 
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culture and the history of rhetoric, including discussions of virtue, education, ethics, and the 
importance of rhetoric as a sustaining or disruptive cultural force 
!v
Table of Contents 
Introduction 1 ................................................................................................................................
Summary of Chapters 4 ...................................................................................................
Chapter 1: Character, Virtue, and the Heroic Tradition 11 ...........................................................
Background and Introduction 11 .......................................................................................
Methodology 12 ................................................................................................................
The Heroic Tradition 16 ....................................................................................................
Earned Character through Performed Virtue 19 ...............................................................
Culture, Gender, and Virtue 29 .........................................................................................
Towards Military Virtue 36 ...............................................................................................
Chapter 2: All I Learned, I Learned from Soldiering: Military Virtue at Rome 38 ......................
Action and Habit: How Virtue Exists 42 ..........................................................................
Aretē and Virtus: Distinguishing Greek and Roman Action 46 ......................................
The Four Cardinal Virtues and the Military Commander 56 ............................................
Conclusion: The Crisis of Military Virtue in the late Republic 63 ...................................
Chapter 3: Models of Character, Teachers of Language 66 ..........................................................
The Traditions of Early Roman Education 66 ..................................................................
The Pedagogue: Leading the Student in Learning 81 .......................................................
Literature and Customs:  The Grammaticus and the Grammar School 83 .......................
The Rhetorician: The Living Voice of Virtue 89 ..............................................................
!vi
Chapter 4: Progymnasmata: What Would Achilles Do? 94 ..........................................................
Introduction to the Progymnasmata 94 .............................................................................
Chreia and a Conversation with the Past 101 ...................................................................
Refutation and Confirmation: Interacting with Epic Figures 104 ....................................
Prosopopoeia: Bringing Life to Tradition 109 ..................................................................
The Work of the Progymnasmata 116 ...............................................................................
Chapter 5: Defending Character: The vir fortis in Declamation 118 ............................................
Roman Declamation as Exercise and Performance 118 ...................................................
The Figure of the Vir Fortis in Declamation 124 ..............................................................
The Hero Without Hands: Virtue, Action, and Responsibility 126 ...................................
Claiming Military Virtue: Arms and Hero 131 .................................................................
The Responsibilities of a Soldier: Becoming a Hero by Defending Tradition 133 ..........
The Naturalness of Military Virtue and the Compulsion to Serve 139 .............................
Chapter 6: The Orator is a Warrior: Metaphor in Rhetorical Theory 147 .....................................
Adversarial Metaphors 154 ...............................................................................................
Arming Metaphors 159 .....................................................................................................
Orator as Commander Metaphors 164 ..............................................................................
A New Understanding of “Argument is War” 172 ............................................................
Chapter 7: Rhetoric as Leadership at Rome 174 ..........................................................................
Commanding the Body and Leading Corps 182 ...............................................................
Building a Self-Confident Leader 187 ..............................................................................
!vii
Rhetorical Prudence and Leadership 192 .........................................................................
Conclusion 199 .............................................................................................................................




 The prevalence of warfare in antiquity is undeniable.  The Homeric epics particularly— 
and heroic cultural generally — revolve around and shape the cultural understanding of war and 
the military.  The Roman Republic was in a constant state of war for more than 500 years, until 
the reign of the Emperor Augustus in the first century CE.  But despite the everyday reality of 
warfare and the cultural emphasis on the the virtue associated with military action, the link 
between the military and rhetoric has been neglected by scholars.  In antiquity both military and 
rhetorical action were among the most important manifestations of civic responsibility as well as 
means of demonstrating virtue, excellence, and skill.  In our modern and postmodern world it is 
hard to understand how important the two were to the identity, the agency, and the character of 
the individuals who lived within antique cultures.   
 This dissertation attempts to restore a dimension of what I am calling martial virtue to the 
domain of rhetoric.  This dimension reveals the deep cultural connection between the military, 
leadership, ethics, and rhetoric and demonstrates how particularly significant cultural mores of 
Rome were habituated through rhetorical education and through rhetorical theory.  In doing so, I 
touch, ever so lightly, on the long history of liberal education and its purposes.  Bruce Kimball 
develops his history of liberal education around the competing ideas of orators and philosophers.  
Kimball traces the distinction back to the difference between the educational philosophies of 
Plato and of Isocrates.  Plato formulated an educational philosophy directed towards the 
contemplation of truth through reason and as Kimball says, “translated Homeric aretē into the 
pursuit of highest knowledge through dialectic, an endeavor that liberates the mind from the 
chains of its shadowy cave of ignorance” (17).  Isocrates, on the other hand and followed by 
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Cicero and Quintilian much later, saw education as the development of a certain character, a 
character drawn from the cultural traditions of the past.  As Janet Atwill has observed, “Isocrates 
outlines neither a subject of virtue nor a subject of knowledge but rather a rhetorical ethos 
constructed by the shifting fortunes of honor, which the polis can both confer and withhold” (45).    
The basis on which the polis evaluates the rhetorical ethos is that of tradition and the virtues 
associated with that tradition.   
 If it were a contest between Isocrates and Plato, in the Greek and Roman worlds  
Isocrates’ method emerged victorious (Marrou 194).  As Kimball observes though, there is a 
weakness in an educational system based on the Isocratean model.  Eloquence, the marriage of 
thought and expression according to Cicero, functions to enhance virtue by persuading others.  
Kimball points out that the question raised by philosophers is: “But what is virtue?  And the 
orators will make only dogmatic, a priori appeals and not be induced into analysis and 
speculation.  That is the orators’ weakness: reliance upon unexamined appeals to a tradition of 
noble virtue” (35).  My formulation of military virtue addresses this weakness by demonstrating 
that the tradition of noble virtue can indeed be examined.  The practice of declamation at Rome, 
for example, allowed for the critical examination of military virtue while at the same time 
habituating aspects of that virtue. 
 My purpose in this dissertation then is to trace the manifestations of military virtue in 
rhetorical education and theory at Rome from the first century BCE to the first century CE and to 
demonstrate how it worked to habituate a character consistent with the cultural traditions 
accepted by Romans.  Understanding military virtue as a critical dimension of rhetoric provides a 
richer understanding of the possibilities associated with rhetoric in education both in antiquity.  
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An education in rhetoric was more than just an education in how to speak well.  It was, rather, an 
education in how to be a culturally acceptable person.  In other words, it was an education in 
how to perform a particular virtue well.  As I argue, we can examine this particular virtue 
because it existed both inside and outside of literature, myth, and tradition.  As cultural tradition, 
military virtue is the mythic history of the past.  From the Homeric epics through the legendary 
figures of Greek and Roman history to Virgil’s Aeneid, military virtue was transmitted in an ideal 
state through literature and myth.  However, apart from the exemplars of the past, military virtue 
was also performed and represented every day in Roman antiquity through actual warfare.  Those 
who had fought in and returned from the wars were everywhere and their stories of combat and 
courage were as much a part of the fabric of Roman culture as the exploits of Hector or Aeneas.  
In fact, Quintilian emphasizes the importance of real examples over precepts in shaping students’ 
characters: 
Could there be any better teachers of courage, justice, loyalty, self-control, 
frugality, or contempt for pain and death than men like Fabricius, Curius, 
Regulus, Decius, Mucius, and countless others?  Rome is as strong in examples as 
Greece is in precepts; and examples are more important (Institutio Oratoria 
5:236-237; bk. 12, ch. 2, sec. 30). 
The emphasis on examples as appropriate and useful means of shaping character is an important 
element of Roman education.  As I argue, the meticulous choice and use of exemplars of 
character in rhetorical education reveals a connection between the military, rhetoric, and ethics.   
 Because of the prevalence of martialness in Roman society it is inaccurate to say that 
martial action or military virtue is appropriated by rhetorical scholars and teacher as a means of 
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teaching their subject.  Instead, as I will demonstrate, the military is inevitably intertwined with 
rhetoric on a deep, cultural level.  Rather than pointing to instances of the military as evidence 
for its utility in rhetorical education and theory I will trace manifestations of the cultural 
conceptualizations of military virtue as it appears in educational practice and rhetorical theory.  
In doing so, my approach to the subject in this dissertation is much more inductive rather than 
deductive.  I will follow aspects of military virtue as they appear throughout the educational 
practices at Rome and as they are conceptualized in rhetorical treatises in an attempt to uncover 
how they interact with and shape the Roman habitus.       
Summary of Chapters 
 The first chapter provides an explanation of the methodology of the dissertation and also 
provides the cultural backdrop through which I trace the place and function of military virtue.  
The methodology involves close readings of primary texts informed by Pierre Bourdieu’s 
concept of the habitus as well as theories of cognitive linguistics and more commonly known as 
metaphor theory.  These readings also are informed by the cultural fabric in which the texts were 
written and read.  This is specifically a Roman culture that revolved around concepts of 
auctoritas, dignitas, and virtus which also was informed by the Greek heroic tradition.  
Embedded in this discussion is the exclusivity of those concepts and the Greek counterparts that 
influenced those concepts.  Particularly antique cultures gendered these concepts in a way that 
apparently excluded women as well as non-aristocrats.  As I demonstrate, however, women were 
extremely operative in education and were capable of modeling virtue in a way that transcended 
the apparent limits of cultural understandings of gender.  To a large extent military virtue, 
although commonly gendered masculine, allowed for this transcendence of gender because the 
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performance of virtue could and did exist apart from masculinity.         
 The second chapter will work through the concept of military virtue which will then 
inform the subsequent discussions of rhetorical exercise and treatises, of practice and theory.  In 
it I examine the implications of Marius’ statement “quae illi litteris, ea ego militando didici 
(What they [the established men of senatorial rank] learned in books, I learned by performing 
military service” (Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum 312-315; ch. 85, sec. 13).  Specifically I will make 
a distinction between the Greek concept of aretē and the Roman virtus.  This distinction leads to 
a discussion of the importance of habituation to the Roman concept of virtus.  Because of the 
importance of models over precepts in the Roman mind, the military commander, as a model of 
the four cardinal virtues, became an important figure to students who were being habituated into 
those virtues.  It is on this model that elites based their representation and performance of virtue, 
even when that performance was in the forum instead of on the battlefield. 
 The third chapter examines how the habituation of this type of virtue appeared in the 
education system at Rome, specifically through the physical models of character to which 
students were exposed.  Following the work of Cribiore, this chapter is concerned with the role 
and actions of those who had the most influence on the young students: their teachers.  Quintilian 
demands that students be exposed to only those who will model the best types of character, 
language, and behavior (Institutio Oratoria 1: 66ff; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec 4ff).  Plutarch’s biography of 
the elder Cato provides a wonderful example of what the early education involved and, most 
importantly, what it produced..  The education the younger Cato received, an education in 
military skill and virtue, molded him into a person who won distinction on the battlefield and the 
respect of his commander (Cato Major 2: 362-365; ch. 20, sec. 7-8).  As the Roman’s 
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begrudgingly ceded control of education to private tutors, it became paramount that those tutors 
model the same character and traditions as that of the family.  The chapter examines the roles of 
those most influential of models, the pedagogues, the grammarians, and the rhetors.  So 
important were these figures that Quintilian requires of a paedogogus, for example, an education 
or at least a modesty in recognizing a lack of education.  He even attributes some faults of the 
adult Alexander to failings of his paedogogus (Institutio Oratoria 1: 56-57; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 9).  
Along with the paedogogi, teachers of grammar and rhetoric served as models of both learning 
and virtue.  Robert Kaster titles his book about the grammaticii Guardians of Language because 
these primary teachers guided both their students’ appreciation and use of language.  Although 
not elites themselves, these figures played a significant role in the cultivation of the virtue of the 
elite Roman habitus.   
 Chapter four explores the role in habituating military virtue of the first of two practical 
rhetorical exercises confronting students in the rhetorical schools.  The progymnasmata 
(preliminary rhetorical exercises) consisted of a series of assignments that required students to 
demonstrate increasingly advanced mastery of both language and performance.  The traditional 
place for these exercises was early in the rhetorical school, but Stanley Bonner observes that by 
the early Empire these exercises were appropriated by the grammaticii as part of the grammar 
schools.  Quintilian was quite annoyed by this and saw it as a symptom of a general laziness in 
teachers in rhetorical schools (Institutio Oratoria 1: 262-263; bk. 2. ch. 1, sec. 1).  While the 
histories of education at Rome recognize that these exercises were a part of a student’s progress 
through the system, most treat them as practical and even stifling.  Most do not recognize, or at 
least neglect to address, any value in these exercises outside of a mechanical, preparatory 
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function.  David Fleming, however, points to an ethical dimension of the progymnasmata that 
this chapter will expand.  To Fleming these exercises provide a means to develop a rhetor as 
rhetorical person, or a person who has internalized rhetorical skills that are useful in forming a 
postmodern agent.  But where Fleming must talk about character development within a 
postmodern framework that rejects any normalizing ideal, I discuss the progymnasmata within 
the confines of Roman conceptualizations of character, specifically how these exercises serve to 
cultivate a sense of military virtue as part of the necessary character of a public figure.  The 
progymnasmata existed within Roman rhetorical education as opportunities for the interplay 
between students and embodiments of military virtue. 
 Chapter five examines military virtue in the more advanced practical exercise of 
declamation.  As the Republic declined and the Empire came into existence declamation became 
a performance done by professionals for a public audience.  Stanley Bonner explains that the 
fiction commonly associated with declamatory themes and the spectacle of performance 
associated with declamation was a direct result in the lack of opportunity for “genuine public 
speech” under the early Empire (Declamation 43).  This is why the exercises themselves have 
been criticized as lacking serious argument (Clarke 94), of being too far removed from real life, 
and for being overly stylistic (Institutio Oratoria 2: 462-463; bk. 5, ch. 12, sec. 17).  Regardless 
of these apparent shortfalls, declamation excelled at providing opportunities for students to turn 
over and play both with models of character and with themes constructed around concepts that 
were vital to the ruling elite.  Specifically these characters and themes modeled and interrogated 
traditional representations of authority, liberty, obedience, and a masculine sense of virtue, as 
scholars like Erik Gunderson, Maud Gleason, and Neil Bernstein have shown.  A particular 
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configuration of these traditional concepts is revealed through the representation located in the 
body, character, and actions of soldiers and generals, the configuration of military virtue. 
 Chapter six explores the possibilities located in the military metaphors and examples 
within the Rhetorica ad Herennium and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.  Using the concepts 
developed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Zoltán Kövecses, and other scholars in 
metaphor theory, this chapter will look at how the presence of military metaphors in rhetorical 
theory structures understanding of both oratory and the orator.  The fundamental principal 
underlying and informing the entire Institutio Oratoria is the humanist notion that the perfect 
orator must be a good vir bonus (good man).  M.L. Clarke observes that Quintilian’s work, more 
than others who used this formulation, focuses on the orator and not oratory (115ff).  Oratory is a 
means of demonstrating the virtue of the orator, not of obtaining it, much like war is the means 
of demonstrating the courage and fortitude of a vir fortis, not as the place where those virtues are 
created.  Early in the Institutio, Quintilian uses the example of generals as compared to 
philosophers to demonstrate this inherent goodness of character: “because they [generals] have 
always preferred to do right rather than to profess it” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 58-59; bk. 1, ch. 
proem, sec. 14-15).  It is in the general’s action that character is revealed, not in the 
philosopher’s contemplation of character, and this analogy begins the combination of military 
virtue (in this case embodied in the general) with the orator and oratory.  The orator as military 
commander is a persistent metaphor throughout the Institutio Oratoria which serves to reinforce 
the definition of the orator as a vir bonus by using the cultural acceptance of the military 
commander as embodying certain lauded virtues.  A Roman military commander, especially the 
incredibly successful ones such as Scipio Africanus, Pompeius Magnus, and Julius Caesar, 
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carried with him at all times a cultural admiration grounded in the virtues that military successes 
demonstrated and he assumed almost mythic symbolic qualities.  To associate the orator 
metaphorically with military commanders is to connect the two on a deep, cultural and 
metaphoric level.  This conceptualization places the vir bonus in the same cultural sphere as 
those whose accomplishments and character earned triumphs and memorialization. 
 To conclude I will examine the implications of the presence and cultivation of military 
virtue in rhetorical education.  Specifically, I look at how rhetorical education and its association 
with military virtue offers an education in ideal leadership. In The Political Mind Lakoff 
suggests that the recent and overwhelming failure of liberal political discourse is a result of a 
reliance on Old Enlightenment thinking.  He holds that while liberal discourse relies on the 
Enlightenment view of universal reason, successful conservative discourse accepts and speaks to 
a twenty-first century model of the plural brain.  This contemporary discourse, as Lakoff implies, 
replaces certainty with probability and therefore reaches back to classical (as opposed to 
Christian or Enlightenment) rhetoric.  In re-emphasizing some of the classical aspects of rhetoric 
Lakoff’s study fails to notice the subject of most Roman rhetorical treatises: the orator.  Roman 
education presented rhetoric in much the same way as Lakoff presents successful contemporary 
political discourse, but Roman rhetorical education also emphasized the development and 
embodiment of a particular type of character —the character of a leader — informed by a sense 
of military virtue, in other words, the “vir bonus dicendi peritus.”  By reclaiming a sense of 
military virtue in rhetoric we can explore different possibilities located within the character (or 
the multiple characters) of the orator and reexamine the role of orator as leader and rhetorical 
education as education in leadership.
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 Scholarship focused on the interaction between leadership and rhetoric has typically 
focused on the rhetorical nature of leadership.  There are concerns with the trickery and 
deception involved in associating rhetoric with leadership and, as Leroy Dorsey notes, they 
constitute a complex dynamic that is the subject of current scholarship (9).  The dynamic only 
exists in one conceptualization though, that of “rhetorical leadership” or the rhetorical nature of 
leadership.   Dorsey explains this as the necessity of communication to leadership.  By seeing 
military virtue as embodied in military leaders associated with rhetorical virtue, we can begin to 
examine the possibility of rhetoric as leadership, not the rhetorical nature of leadership.  Military 
virtue includes the ability to command and control a corps (or body) of soldiers, to see the 
available means toward success, and to have the self-confidence to make the prudent decision the 
situation requires.  This same virtue exists in the rhetorical theory and training of the late 
Republic and early Empire.  While the scope of this dissertation is necessarily limited to rhetoric 
at Rome, the understanding of rhetorical virtue as martial virtue also allows for future research 
into the possibility of understanding contemporary composition education as the education of 
prudent leaders whether they be leaders of others or leaders of themselves because in this sense 
rhetorical education is always leadership education.  
!10
Chapter 1: Character, Virtue, and the Heroic Tradition 
Background and Introduction 
 The quest for glory, honor, and power at Rome during the late Republic (and even in the 
early Empire) followed two apparently different paths.  First, a young Roman could demonstrate 
character through military prowess.  Bravery, strength, and military success all could lead to a 
character worthy of respect and therefore political power.  Second, a young Roman could earn 
the same sort of respect and power through eloquence.  Through participation in debates at the 
forum and in the law courts, a Roman patronus (advocate) could demonstrate a character that 
garnered the same political clout as that of military service.  Although scholars frequently treat 
these two paths as separate, this dissertation argues that they are intricately connected through 
both rhetorical education and theory.  Because Roman traditions link power, authority, 
leadership, and virtue to military action, other paths to power and influence were also 
contextualized as martial.  “Martial” in the sense that it is used in this dissertation involves a 
combination of the real and mythic actions individuals undertake in war as well as the particular 
character that the ancient world associated with those individuals who performed those actions 
well.  This project is concerned specifically with how Roman rhetorical education and theory, 
which was directed towards the production and cultivation of leaders as well as speakers, used 
martial conceptualizations to produce public figures who embodied traditional and accepted 
virtues. 
 I was inspired to pursue this project after reading the Rhetorica ad Herennium, Cicero’s 
De Oratore, and Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria.  In all three I found consistent use of both 
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military metaphors and examples.  So I began by questioning the connection between the 
military and rhetoric at Rome.  In doing so, I was inevitably led to questions about Roman 
education in general and, specifically, about the relationship between education, virtue, rhetoric, 
and the military.  Because education at Rome, at least by the late Republic and most certainly by 
the early Empire, meant a rhetorical education, and a rhetorical education was a means to 
establishing a public reputation and a public presence, I intend to explore the possibility of 
rhetoric as a method of cultivating leadership.  To what extent did rhetorical educational 
practices and theory develop leadership?  Can, for example, declamation (an educational practice 
often criticized for its lack of realistic content) be considered as part of a real attempt to develop 
those who would eventually exercise public power and authority?  In attempting to formulate 
answers to these questions, this dissertation examines a particular formation of virtue that I call 
“military virtue” in rhetorical education.  This military virtue is located in the Roman education 
system, the practical exercises that composed a large portion of rhetorical education, and the 
rhetorical treatises that formed the foundation of rhetoric at Rome. 
Methodology 
 The primary methodology for this dissertation is close reading of culturally important 
texts such as the epics of Homer, the Aeneid, rhetorical treatises, collections of rhetorical 
exercises, and Roman historians.  This close reading is informed by a philological analysis of 
such important Latin terms as vir (including the formulations vir bonus and vir fortis), ludus,  
and virtus.  The Romans saw literature as the depository for the mos maiorum (ancient 
traditions), and instruction at the level of the grammarian was directed towards an understanding 
of the cultural significance of particular works of literature.  Because of the significance of these 
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ancient traditions and the history that established them, the history of Roman culture and 
education informs a great deal of the work in this dissertation.  I therefore draw heavily on the 
works of Henri Marrou, Stanley Bonner, Robert Kaster, Raffaella Cribiore and others that focus 
on the historical context of education and rhetoric at Rome as well as others such Eric 
Gunderson, Maud Gleason, and Neil Bernstein who attempt to recontextualize rhetorical 
exercises and performances.  The analysis of the collections of rhetorical exercises, for example, 
provides insight into the cultural work of rhetorical education.  Gunderson sees declamation as 
“a key venue for the analysis of the production, reproduction, and circulation of the rhetoric of 
psychic life at Rome specifically as a rhetoric” (Declamation 18).  These exercises and 
performances reveal aspects of Roman culture and identity.  Close reading of both declamation 
and progymnasmata then can reveal the production and reproduction of that identity in the 
Roman schools.     
 Cognitive linguistic theory informs this dissertation’s treatment of rhetorical treatises.  
The cultural and cognitive work of metaphors is useful in examining the conceptualization of 
rhetoric as martial in Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria and the anonymous Rhetorica ad 
Herennium.  I will show how, at the level of theory, military virtue and character informed a 
cultural understanding of what an orator should be.  Metaphor provides a means of 
understanding the interaction of epic traditions (especially conceptualizations of virtue) within 
rhetorical theory.  The military metaphors that fill the pages of the Rhetorica ad Herennium and 
the rhetorical treatises of Cicero and Quintilian are more than mere ornament. Lakoff and 
Johnson have shown that metaphors structure understanding by making a correspondence to 
“natural kinds of experience” (118).  Vital to this idea is that “natural experiences” can be limited 
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to a certain culture.  Especially important in the work of Lakoff and Johnson is the idea that 
metaphors are more than ornament or comparison; rather they are matters of thought and action.  
Metaphors are constructed from our interaction with and experience of the world and at the same 
time structure our understanding of that world.  They explain: 
Our experiences will (1) differ from culture to culture and (2) may depend on our 
understanding one kind of experience in terms of another, that is, our experiences 
may be metaphorical in nature.  Such experiences determine the categories of our 
conceptual system.  And properties and similarities, we maintain, exist and can be 
experienced only relative to a conceptual system.  Thus, the only kind of 
similarities relevant to metaphors are experiential, not objective, similarities 
(154).   
The use of military metaphors in rhetorical treatises, then, does not suggest an objective 
similarity between rhetorical and military action or skill.  Rather, this particular usage suggests a 
means of structuring rhetoric in a conceptual frame and therefore bestowing on it some martial 
properties.  The metaphor structures our understanding and experience of rhetoric as martial.   
 Zoltán Kövecses’s work has shown how metaphors are realized in other than linguistic 
ways, such as cultural symbols (57-59).   Kövecses points to instances where metaphors are 
reinforced through physical representations.  In movies, for example, a love scene is set in front 
of a fireplace, realizing the “Sexual Desire is a Fire” metaphor.  He also explains how 
interpretations of history realize certain metaphors.  For example, historical agents have 
conceptualized their actions on particular source domains.  Kövecses explains how the Mormons 
framed their movement towards Utah in a Biblical frame and how early historians used the same 
!14
Old Testament frame to conceptualize the settlement of North America by the Europeans.  The 
idea that metaphoric conceptualization exists outside of language while still structuring our 
understanding of the world is evident in discussions of the body in rhetorical theory.  
Recommendations for bodily presence and deportment maintain a “Body as Army” metaphor 
that requires a military command.  Demonstration of this type of command over the body implies 
a readiness and capability to lead in public life.  
 Underlying this study is the assumption that habitual exposure to exemplars and practices 
associated with a culture’s sense of virtue establishes within a student a sense, appreciation, and 
realization of that virtue.  Both Aristotle and Quintilian recognize that virtue is learned through 
habit (Nicomachean Ethics 70-71; bk. 2, ch. 1, sec. 1-4, Institutio Oratoria 1: 86-87; bk. 1, ch. 2, 
sec. 8).  The French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus is extremely useful in 
this regard.  Bourdieu explains:  
The habitus, a product of history, produces individual and collective practices — 
more history — in accordance with the schemes generated by history.  It ensures 
the active presence of past experiences, which deposited in each organism in the 
form of schemes of perception, thought, and action, tend to guarantee the 
‘correctness’ of practices and their consistency over time (54).   
The habitus’ interaction with history both produces more — and different — history as well as 
maintains and reinforces the validity of histories.  Particularly, the exposure to past actions, 
especially those actions that are valued by the community (those that result in the accumulation 
of symbolic capital), results in a continued reproduction and performance of those actions.  In 
this sense, history and past actions are always available for interaction because they inform the 
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habitus which then dictates current practices and influences future actions.  This is in 
contradistinction to Mikhail Bakhtin’s conceptualization of the epic as being closed off in time 
and space from any and all contemporary access.  According to Bakhtin the epic is epic precisely 
because it denies access.  He explains: “Epic discourse is a discourse handed down by tradition.  
By its very nature the epic world of the absolute past is inaccessible to personal experience and 
does not permit an individual, personal point of view or evaluation” (16).  Of course Bakhtin is 
working towards a definition and understanding of the novel as compared to the epic, but his 
point about the inaccessibility of the epic is important to an understanding of the accessibility of 
Roman tradition.  Instead of being inaccessible, as Bakhtin sees it, the epic past is open to the 
student of rhetoric.  Rhetorical exercises provide a means of interaction with the epic past in the 
way Bourdieu describes.  Interaction with the epic past both informs the habitus as well as 
creates a slightly different, new epic.   
The Heroic Tradition 
 The heroic tradition of Homer is an inescapable part of Roman culture, especially after 
the conquest of Macedon in 146 BCE.  Henri Marrou explains that it is impossible to exaggerate 
the importance of Homer in Greek education and that Homer was the “outstanding interpreter” of 
the Greek knightly ethic (9).  The reliance on Homer as educational material was imported into 
Rome as a result of the employment of Greek teachers from the second half of the second 
century BCE onward.  The heroic ideal of which Homer is interpreter is significant to the 
discussion of the Roman sense of military virtue, the habitus, and their relationship to rhetoric 
and rhetorical education that I develop in this dissertation.   
     The heroic ideal conveyed by Homer is complex, but at its core are the actions of the 
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aristocratic warrior.  As Marrou summarizes, these actions are directed towards that which was at 
the heart of the aristocratic ideal: “the love of glory” (11).  He explains that this love of glory 
constructs the most important aspect of the hero: “The ideal value, to which even life itself must 
be sacrificed, is aretē — an untranslatable expression, which it is ludicrous to call ‘virtue’ …. 
The Homeric hero lived and died in an effort to embody a certain ideal, a certain quality of 
existence, summed up in this word aretē.” (11).  Building on Marrou, it is possible to see that 
aretē is more than just a quality; it is a constant becoming that is enacted human excellence.  As 
an integral structure of the habitus, aretē must be constantly renewed.  One must perform and re-
perform certain, but ever-evolving, actions within a certain, but constantly changing framework 
in order to demonstrate aretē. 
 Alasdair MacIntyre also develops a concept of the heroic self in order to demonstrate 
certain aspects of the modern self and modernity in general.  MacIntyre explains that “identity in 
heroic society involves particularity and accountability.  I am answerable for doing or failing to 
do what anyone who occupies my role owes to others and this accountability only terminates 
with my death” (After Virtue 119).  Thus the hierarchy of the heroic society is integral to action 
in that society, and aretē is also the excellent performance of one’s place in society.  MacIntyre 
goes on to demonstrate how the fabric of a heroic society mirrors the narrative structure of the 
epic itself.  The heroic self is defined by its place in society and evaluates itself against the ideal 
representation of that place.  So Achilles acts as one in his position should act — and performs 
this position extremely well.  His virtue is tied to the performance of his role, and his wrath is 
likewise connected with others’ denial of his role. 
 The Greek heroic tradition firmly establishes the martial environment as the preferred 
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place in which to demonstrate virtue.  For the aristocratic warrior such Achilles, battle is the only 
place suitable for the realization of aretē.  Of course the Iliad is filled with other manifestations 
of the agōn such as races, boxing, wrestling, and other games, but these are not suitable places 
for one such as Achilles to participate.  For instance, the funeral games held for Patroclus in 
Book XXIII of the Iliad allow other, lesser warriors to demonstrate aretē in a lesser agōn, but 
Achilles does not participate, nor does he claim any prize.  This is in contrast to Agamemnon 
who jumps at the opportunity to compete at the javelin.  Achilles, who recognizes Agamemnon’s 
superior skill at the javelin, awards the son of Atreus the prize without contest (Iliad 2: 560-561; 
bk. 23, line 890).  Even Agamemnon needs a lesser agōn than battle to demonstrate aretē, but the 
ideal to which all strive, the embodiment of pure heroic virtue Achilles, only demonstrates his 
aretē in battle. 
 This heroic tradition continues in Virgil’s Aeneid but in slightly altered form.  Aeneas 
follows Achilles in his prowess as a warrior, thus the first and probably most famous lines of the 
Aeneid establish the importance of the titular character’s martial qualities.  In the Latin he is 
physically connected to his arms as the poet introduces the narrative: “Arma virumque cano (Of 
arms and a man I sing).”  Throughout the rest of the epic, Aeneas struggles between his 
immediate desires and the obligations of his duty (and destiny) to begin the legacy of Rome.  The 
moments in which he begins to feel complacent with the situation, his relationship with Dido, for 
example, end with reminders of his duty.  This is demonstrative of the Roman concept of pietas.  
As for many ancient ethical concepts, pietas is difficult to literally translate, but it is affiliated 
with a deep sense of duty, obligation, and responsibility.  One can, and Aeneas does, demonstrate 
pietas towards friends, family, and —most significantly in the Aeneid— country.  It is his pietas 
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that distinguishes Aeneas from his counterparts and precursors in Homer.  So fundamental to his 
character is this concept that he even introduces himself to his mother, Venus, as pius Aeneas 
(Aeneid 1: 288; bk. 1, line 378).  His travels, which mirror the Odyssey, are not to a home but to 
another war and ultimately to the yet-to-be city of Rome.  As a demonstration of the fully 
developed Roman identity, the Aeneid illustrates the responsibility Roman’s felt towards their 
duty to fight on behalf of Rome.  The poem also establishes the history of an already significant 
figure in Roman culture: the vir fortis (hero).  Virgil presents Aeneas as the proto-Roman and as 
such he stands as the exemplar of this character. 
Earned Character through Performed Virtue 
 The military was such an important part of Roman custom that for the majority of the 
Republican period every Roman citizen was required to spend ten years in its service.   While it 1
is significant that every citizen served in the military, the requirement was especially important 
for Roman noble families, those families that supplied leaders to the Republic.  For the young 
aristocrats, serving in the military was an obligation and an honor that they had been prepared for 
their entire lives.  Plutarch explains how the elder Cato trained his son for his role in public life.  
Most of the lessons passed from father to son that Plutarch describes are those that prepare the 
boy for his martial obligations: javelin throwing, fighting in armor, riding a horse, boxing, and 
swimming (Cato Major 363-363; ch. 20, sec. 4).  No leader in the Republic, no public figure 
who demonstrated considerable dignitas and auctoritas, could have achieved these without 
serving in the military. 
 See Book 6 of The Histories by Polybius, in which the historian explains that Romans were required to serve 10 1
years in the cavalry or 20 years in the infantry.  The requirement for 10 years of service before a citizen would be 
eligible to hold a state office reaffirms the distinction between the nobility serving in the cavalry and the average 
citizen’s role as a member of the infantry (1: 474; bk. 6, ch. 19).  
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 Dignitas, which has no literal equivalent in English, involves the concepts of prestige, 
charisma, and public significance.  It is an extremely personal concept that is inseparable from 
individual character.  One possessed and projected dignitas by one’s own actions and the actions 
of one’s ancestors (May 7).  Auctoritas is intimately connected with power and influence.  While 
etymologically connected with the English “authority,” individual auctoritas is much more a 
matter of character than of position or role.  Both dignitas and auctoritas are matters of character 
that are demonstrated through action.  In the Aeneid, Virgil explains how the presence of a 
person of this character influences an audience: 
As when, with not unwonted tumult, roars 
in some vast city a rebellious mob, 
and base-born passions in its bosom burn, 
till rocks and blazing torches fill the air 
(rage never lacks for arms)—if haply then 
some wise man comes, whose reverend looks attest 
a life to duty given, swift silence falls; 
all ears are turned attentive; and he sways 
with clear and soothing speech the people's will  
Ac veluti magno in populo cum saepe coorta est 
seditio, saevitque animis ignobile volgus, 
iamque faces et saxa volant—furor arma ministrat; 
tum, pietate gravem ac meritis si forte virum quem 
conspexere, silent, arrectisque auribus adstant; 
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ille regit dictis animos, et pectora mulcet,— 
sic cunctus pelagi cecidit fragor, aequora postquam (Aeneid 1: 272-273; bk. 1, 
lines 148-156). 
Virgil’s forte virum is a person who has accumulated both dignitas and auctoritas through pietate 
(as Williams’ translation captures: a life of duty).  The vir fortis is able to quell a violent mob 
with words because they are words that are supported by character.  As Virgil poetically 
immortalizes, this character is traditionally established through military service.  In declamation 
vir fortis is the descriptor of an individual who is distinguished for an act of courage or heroism 
on the battlefield.  This person’s particular virtue, as demonstrated through military action, 
earned a public reward and therefore a certain amount of public respect, similar, I think, to the 
respect that Virgil implies in this passage.  The difference is that Virgil’s vir forte is also a leader 
whose character is established through military action but whose effectiveness as a leader is 
rhetorical.  As Cicero advises: “the first thing to recommend to a young man in his quest for 
glory is that he try to win it, if he can, in a military career (ex bellicis rebus).  Among our 
forefathers many distinguished themselves as soldiers; for warfare was almost continuous 
then” (De Officiis 214-215; bk. 2, sec. 45).  Cicero connects the manner in which a young 
Roman demonstrates dignitas and auctoritas (in this case through earning glory) with the way 
that it was earned in the past. 
 While it was the preferred path to demonstrating one’s character, military action alone did 
not necessarily lead to dignitas and auctoritas, especially as the Republic matured and declined 
and the opportunity for elite Romans to participate in military action diminished.  Cicero 
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recognized this and explained that at the time of the Civil War between Caesar and Pompey even 
great military deeds went unnoticed if they were in service of the Republic (De Officiis 214-215; 
bk. 2, sec. 45).  The other path to greatness, as Cicero explains, is through oratory (De Officiis 
196-197; bk. 2, sec. 28).  If military service and oratory both lead to the same end, in this case 
the attainment of glory and the accompanying auctoritas and dignitas, then the action of each 
must in some way reflect the same type of character.   
 The relationship between the military and rhetoric is similar to Debra Hawhee’s work in 
Bodily Arts on the historical connection between athletics and rhetoric in ancient Greek culture.  
Hawhee observes that these two arts, representing body and mind, are culturally and historically 
linked.  Connected at the level of training and of practice, these arts complimented each other in 
a variety of ways from providing a shared language of faculties — of which mētis and kairos are 
two examples — to attending to the development of a whole person.  For Hawhee, the 
intersection of athletics and rhetoric demonstrates rhetoric’s corporeal nature and the importance 
of the body to rhetorical function and performance.  It also positions the ancient Greek notion of 
aretē, as Hawhee translates it, “virtuosity,” as a function and result of rhetorical performance.  
Through examining the agōn (contest) as a mode of virtue production and analyzing the 
performative nature of the agōn, she demonstrates how rhetorical performance provides a similar 
site for the cultivation of aretē.   
 Fundamental to Hawhee’s project is the Greek respect for athletics, a respect that was not 
present at Rome, at least not to the extent that it was present in the Greek world.  For example, a 
Greek athlete who was killed during a competition because he would not yield or stop playing 
received as much acclaim as one who achieved victory.  Philostratus narrates the story of 
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Arrichion, who died while competing in and winning the pankration: “Though it is indeed a great 
thing that he already won twice at the Olympics, what has just now happened is greater: he has 
won at the cost of his own life and goes to the land of the Blessed (sic) with the very dust of the 
struggle” (Imagines 149, bk. 2, ch. 6).   In the twenty-third book of the Iliad athletics are 
activities that seem to bestow an honor equal to the honor earned in battle.  Epeios boasts that his 
ability as a boxer is equivalent to others’ achievements on the battlefield (and also explains his 
lack of prowess as a soldier):   
Let the man who is to have the cup come hither, for none but myself will take the 
mule. I am the best boxer of all here present, and none can beat me. Is it not 
enough that I should fall short of you in actual fighting? Still, no man can be good 
at everything. I tell you plainly, and it shall come true; if any man will box with 
me I will bruise his body and break his bones; therefore let his friends stay here in 
a body and be at hand to take him away when I have done with him (Iliad 2: 
542-545; bk. 23, lines 667-675). 
And Plutarch expresses the Roman contempt for Greek sport by explaining that competition in 
athletics inhibits the path to Roman aristocratic honor and virtue: 
For the Romans used to be very suspicious of rubbing down with oil, and even 
today they believe that nothing has been so much to blame for the enslavement 
and effeminacy of the Greeks as their gymnasia and wrestling-schools, which 
engender much listless idleness and waste of time in their cities, as well as 
paederasty and the ruin of the bodies of the young men with regulated sleeping, 
walking, rhythmical movements, and strict diet; by these practices they have 
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unconsciously lapsed from the practice of arms, and have become content to be 
termed nimble athletes and handsome wrestlers rather than excellent men-at-arms 
and horsemen (Moralia 4: 68-71; sec. 274D-E).   
Hawhee’s work offers a point of departure for a discussion of military virtue and its relationship 
to the history of rhetoric by linking the cultural emphasis of a site of honor and achievement with 
rhetorical education and performance.  As Hawhee’s book is necessarily concerned with bodies 
(and as Greek athletics demonstrate, bodies in their ideal form), my project is concerned with a 
particular and ideal character and its formulation and cultivation in rhetorical education. 
 As James May explains in Trials of Character, this character is performed through 
oratory.  May is clear that the Roman conception of ethos was not derived from the Aristotelian 
entechnic pisteis, but instead relied on the reputation and accomplishments of the person similar 
to the ethos that Isocrates develops.  He points out that Cicero uses, as a defense for his clients,  
the “assumption that character was for the most part permanent and unchanging and that it was 
very difficult, if not impossible, for a man to perform actions inconsistent with or outside his 
previously manifested ethos” (26).  This is what I mean by through his oratory.  Using Cicero’s 
speeches as examples, May demonstrates how oratory provided a means for a novus homo (a 
person who is not privileged to a character based on family tradition) to demonstrate an ethos 
worthy of auctoritas and dignitas and therefore worthy and capable of a public life.  According 
to May, Cicero was able to perform the acceptable ethos while at the same time building that 
ethos through rhetorical performance.  Cicero’s pre-consular speeches, for example, “show us the 
efforts of an orator, lacking an ethos of auctoritas and gratia, to mold a persona as persuasive as 
possible” (May 14).   
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 May’s treatment of character and demonstrated virtue illustrates the complexities of 
Roman identity and self-presentation.  While it is generally agreed that it was necessary to 
perform an identity that conformed to understandings of ideal character, how that character was 
cultivated is still a relatively open area of inquiry.  Marrou, in his seminal and comprehensive 
study of education in antiquity, observes that Roman education was designed to initiate a child 
into the traditional way of life (231).  He sees Roman education as a practical means to 
accomplish this initiation as well as to prepare the young Roman for a place in public life.  
Because education was practical, Marrou explains that Romans “could not imagine any kind of 
moral training as being separate from real life and its responsibilities” (238).  Practical exercises, 
such as the progymnasmata and declamation, had an ethical as well as practical end.  They 
exposed students to examples of virtue and vice and provided practice for the law courts.   
 Of course an education that sought to cultivate a particular character in particular 
individuals was exclusionary by nature.  At Rome the access to education was limited and 
produced an educated elite who monopolized knowledge and the communication.  Eugene 
Garver, addressing the conflict between democratic egalitarianism and cognitive elitism, 
concludes that the association of rhetoric and virtue in Plato’s Protagoras demonstrates the deep 
problem in distinguishing between manipulative and sincere forms of communication.  It is 
possible in a democracy, Garver suggests, that one can be “eloquent and virtuous” and still unjust 
because one’s individual skill reduces the ability of others to participate (“Can Virtue be 
Bought?” 378).  It is precisely this skill that is one product of a Roman rhetorical education.  
Because the Romans were not concerned with equality for all, a rhetorical education was 
designed to prepare a student to become a leader within the state and to make just decisions on 
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behalf of all citizens.  Quintilian explains the product of such an education:  
I am proposing to educate the perfect orator, who cannot exist but in the person of 
a good man.  We therefore demand of him not only exceptional powers of speech, 
but all the virtues of character (animi virtutes) as well …. The man who can really 
play his part as a citizen, who is fit for the management of public and private 
business, and who can guide cities by his counsel, give them a firm basis by his 
laws, and put them right by his judgements, is surely no other than our orator 
(Institutio Oratoria 1: 56-57; bk. 1, ch. prooem, sec. 10-11).  2
Quintilian suggests that the product of rhetorical education — his perfect orator — will possess 
all of the virtues necessary for successful and effective public life and more importantly that the 
public will defer to the perfect orator for public decisions.  Character, as demonstrated through 
performance and action and as measured against tradition, is representative of the people.  This is 
why Virgil’s murderous mob will be calmed by the words of the forte virum, because character 
and eloquence together are necessary for the orator.   
 Recent studies of rhetorical education during the Roman period have tended to focus on 
those on the edges of the empire, mostly because these borders provide a rich ground in which to 
discover tensions between the established traditions of the empire and the cultures living under 
imperial rule.  Cribiore, for example, focuses on Roman Egypt in Gymnastics of the Mind and 
Roman Antioch in The School of Libanius.  For Cribiore, the eastern world provides a place 
 Oratorem autem instituimus illum perfectum, qui esse nisi vir bonus non potest, ideoque non dicendi modo 2
eximiam in eo facultatem sed omnis animi virtutes exigimus.  Neque enim hoc concesserim, rationem rectae 
honestaeque vitae, ut quidam putaverunt, ad philosophos relegandam, cum vir ille vere civilis et publicarum 
privatarumque rerum administrationi accommodatus, qui regere consiliis urbes, fundare legibus, emendare iudiciis 
possit, non alius sit profecto quam orator. 
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where Greeks were struggling to maintain an Hellenic identity while at the same time living 
under Roman Imperial rule (Gymnastics 9).  What is unique about Cribiore’s work is that she 
focuses on the day-to-day activities of school work.  She is concerned with not just how students 
learned and how teachers taught, but she also devotes a significant amount of time to details such 
as where they learned, the sounds they heard, the seats they used (or didn’t use), and the daily 
obstacles that informed how they functioned within the educational system.  This is in 
contradistinction to other scholars who tend to focus more on the overall effects of education on 
the culture (Marrou, Gwynn, and Bonner).  While Cribiore acknowledges that education served 
those in power by maintaining the status quo, she is more concerned with how that education 
system affected those who existed on the fringes of society.  This dissertation examines how 
those who were about to assume power and authority negotiated an educational system in the 
heart of Rome.  I am not concerned with how the system maintained the status quo so much as 
how the system created individuals who could successfully function within that status quo.   
 It is only recently, with the work of Cribiore and others, such as Yun Lee Too, that the 
study of education in antiquity has opened up to possibilities ignored by the earlier histories.   In 
the introduction to Education in Greek and Roman Antiquity, Too explains that twenty-first 
century questions require a rethinking and rewriting of the history of antique education.  For 
example, she describes previous histories as seeing education as a particular time of life, a 
“prepolitical time,” during and through which children were prepared for adulthood and 
therefore for a public life (10-11).  In contrast, contemporary thought has opened the possibilities 
of seeing education as a socialization process that was (and is) intricately tied to structures of 
power.  It can be understood as a process that was exclusionary and that functioned in a way that 
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maintained those power structures.  In this sense, student life was always already political and by 
participating in the educational system those children were participating in political processes of 
power formulation and maintenance.  Too describes this system as “training the rulers to rule and 
the ruled to be ruled” and that education “created the empowered as empowered” (13).   
 This is not to say that power and leadership at Rome was capricious, arbitrary, or always 
despotic.  Power and leadership were derived from centuries of tradition and culture, the mos 
maiorum, and education at Rome was necessarily tied to those traditions.  Anything new, even 
skills such as learning rhetoric in Latin , was initially treated with suspicion and even contempt.  3
Effective civic responsibility and leadership had to be linked fundamentally to those traditions.  
This even extended to the Emperor Augustus himself.  John Lobur’s work, Consensus, 
Concordia, and the Formation of Roman Imperial Ideology, examines how Octavian, upon 
assuming the name and role of Augustus, had to formulate imperial power in a way that was 
acceptable to the Roman people.  Just as May’s study interrogates Cicero’s management and 
accumulation of auctoritas as a statesman and political leader, Lobur argues that Augustus was 
faced with a similar requirement in order to legitimately rule the empire.  Lobur’s study 
demonstrates the deep cultural and traditional appeals that Augustus made in order to build an 
imperial ideology.  These included upholding the mos maiorum and formulating all actions in 
republican terms and concepts.  While it could be successfully argued that later imperial power 
was lacking any controlling force and therefore completely at the mercy of the emperor’s will, 
early emperors were restricted to a sense of character, leadership, and duty that was bound by 
traditions and that were reinforced during every moment of a Roman’s life. 
 See the edict of 92 BC in Suetonius that forbid teachers establishing schools of Latin rhetoric.  3
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Culture, Gender, and Virtue 
The conceptualization of rhetoric as martial and the cultivation of military virtue in 
Roman education reveals a rich area of inquiry into the rhetorical nature of culture.  It also 
permits an investigation of the production and reproduction of identity and power through 
(re)presentations of tradition.  However, as Lakoff and Johnson have reminded us when 
something is revealed, other possibilities are by default concealed.  To Lakoff and Johnson a 
metaphoric framework conceals other possibilities of understanding by framing our perception of 
the subject.  Lakoff goes even further in The Political Mind to demonstrate how our neural 
pathways are shaped by modes of thinking and these worn pathways deny us the opportunity to 
understand the world in other ways.  By shaping the understanding of rhetoric as martial and 
through developing a character informed by military virtue in students, this particular 
formulation may seem to call for the performance of a certain masculinity which then conceals 
aspects of femininity as well alternate masculinities.  While cultural norms may have inevitably 
concealed femininity and alternate masculinities, the concept of military virtue that I am 
developing reduced the exclusivity that was part of Roman culture.  
 The heroic tradition presents a particular masculinity that presupposes virtue.  Myles 
McDonnell’s book length treatment of virtus argues that the two concepts are inseparable in the 
culture of the Roman Republic.  According to McDonnell, semantically and culturally, “virtus 
characterizes the ideal behavior of a man” (2).  Informing this cultural understanding, the 
paragon of Greek, heroic virtue, Achilles, embodies a masculinity and his wrath is a result, in 
part, of Agamemnon’s assaulting that masculinity:  
But I will threaten you thus: as Phoebus Apollo takes from me the daughter of 
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Chryses, her with my ship and my companions I will send back, but I will myself 
come to your tent and take the fair-cheeked Briseis, your prize, so that you will 
understand how much mightier I am than you, and another may shrink from 
declaring himself my equal and likening himself to me to my face.” So he spoke. 
Grief came upon the son of Peleus, and within his shaggy breast his heart was 
divided, whether he should draw his sharp sword from beside his thigh, and break 
up the assembly, and slay the son of Atreus, or stay his anger and curb his spirit 
(Iliad 1: 16-17; bk. 1, lines 181-190). 
By seizing what in the heroic tradition was due Achilles, Agamemnon asserts his dominance over 
the warrior, but more than that, he takes from Achille’s the object of his masculine affections.  
Achilles’ subsequent wrath is an attempt to regain the masculinity that Agamemnon’s action calls 
into question.  It is, ironically, through the action of inaction that Achilles performs his virtue, 
first by exercising restraint and not killing Agamemnon and then by refusing to fight, even as the 
Achaeans are continually beaten by the Trojans and his friends implore him to come to their aid.    4
 The example of the Iliad above serves as one important cultural instance of the 
connection between heroic notions of masculinity and virtue.  As McDonnell explains: “in any 
particular society there is likely to be a dominant, or ‘hegemonic masculinity,’ exercised by an 
economic, social, and political elite” (166).  According to McDonnell, the “hegemonic 
masculinity” that dominated Roman society was influenced by the social value of virtus and this 
was mostly exclusive to male Roman citizens.  Male slaves, for example, even after they had 
 As I noted above, this is virtue in the heroic, Greek sense.  A Roman who refused to fight and risked the success of 4
a military operation would be punished by death, not celebrated as possessing some great virtue.  What is significant 
about the example of Achilles here is that it, and the Iliad as a whole, exists as a foundation of the masculine nature 
of military virtue.  See Thomas Van Nortwick’s Imagining Men: Ideals of Masculinity in Ancient Greek Culture for a 
detailed analysis of masculinity in Greek epic.
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been manumitted, were not referred to by the Latin word vir, nor were they capable of possessing 
virtus (McDonnell 159-160).  I will treat the etymology and linguistic significance of vir in more 
detail later, but here it is useful to understand that vir is a Latin word for man that carries with it 
martial connotations as well as suggests an authority not connected with the more general Latin 
word homo. The exclusivity, even to the extent of this restrictive language, of the hegemonic 
masculinity demonstrates that gender was and is a part of cultural norms.  This of course is 
consistent with the heroic tradition and the hierarchy that it established. 
 Roman culture and tradition worked to maintain the exclusivity of both masculinity and 
virtus.  Seneca the Elder, in the preface to his collection of Controversiae, attributes the decay of 
eloquence to the lack of displayed masculinity during his day: 
Libidinous delight in song and dance transfixes these effeminates.  Braiding the 
hair, refining the voice till it is caressing as a woman’s, competing in bodily 
softness with women, beautifying themselves with filthy fineries, this is the 
pattern our youths set themselves.  Which of your contemporaries — quite apart 
from his diligence and talent — is sufficiently a man (immo quis satis vir est) 
(Controversiae 1: 8-9; bk. 1, ch. pref, sec. 8-9).   
The question immo quis satis vir est is an important one, for Seneca sees no hope in the 
fulfillment of Cato’s definition of an orator as a vir bonus decendi peritus without individuals 
who can sufficiently embody masculinity.  The good and the man are linked in the Roman 
tradition, one cannot be an orator without being good and one cannot be considered good without 
the capacity to demonstrate the hegemonic masculinity.  As Gunderson explains: “The positing 
of a prior and virtuous presence to the orator has a profound consequence for the orator’s body: 
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this body must represent the virtue of the character who bears it” (Staging 61).  This is evident in 
the emphasis on deportment and physical bearing found in many rhetorical treatises and 
handbooks. 
 Contrary to the heroic tradition and to Roman culture, however, there was a path in 
Roman antiquity through which these cultural norms could be transgressed and a means by 
which those who were typically excluded from virtus (and the hegemonic masculinity) could 
come to possess it.  That which was the exclusive to elite males in the heroic tradition became 
more widely available to others in the Roman world because of the emphasis on the well-being 
of the state.  McDonnell explains that, in the case of certain slaves who volunteered for military 
service during the Punic Wars (volones), military action was the means to demonstrate the virtus 
that was normally denied to those not considered to be a vir.  To McDonnell, virtus is always 
grounded in martial action and prowess. Livy explains that only in the interest of the state did the 
Senate and consuls offer the following: 
He [Tiberius Gracchus] announced that the time had come for them to gain the 
freedom for which they so long had hoped; that the next day he would fight, 
standards against standards, in a clear and open field, where without any fear of 
ambush the battle could be fought with pure courage (vera virtute). Whoever 
should bring back the head of an enemy would by his order be a free man at once 
(The Histories of Rome 6: 218-219; bk 24, ch. 14, sec. 6-7). 
Rather than being the exclusive domain of the elite, virtus here is accessible to any person 
engaged in military action, especially when that action is necessary for the survival of the state. 
The standard to standard battle, one in which no trickery or dishonesty is employed, is the perfect 
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venue for the demonstration of vera virtute, and it is this type of virtue that distinguishes the 
slave and the citizen.  There is no shortage of examples of women who engaged in and excelled 
at warfare as well, and these examples demonstrate that while virtus may have been gendered 
masculine, it was not necessarily limited to anatomical males.  Plutarch describes an encounter 
with the women of the Ambrones tribe: 
Here the women met them, swords and axes in their hands, and with hideous 
shrieks of rage tried to drive back fugitives and pursuers alike, the fugitives as 
traitors, and the pursuers as foes; they mixed themselves up with the combatants, 
with bare hands tore away the shields of the Romans or grasped their swords, and 
endured wounds and mutilations, their fierce spirits unvanquished to the end 
(Gaius Marius 9: 514-517; ch. 19, sec. 7). 
These women are more courageous in battle than the men.  They not only fight the Romans, but 
they also fight their own men who are fleeing from the battle; they punish cowardice with their 
own bravery.  To the Romans this action was as demonstrative of vera virtute as much as the 
action of the volones during the Punic War was.   
 The example of three mothers described in Tacitus who raised their children without 
fathers serves to demonstrate that women also performed other traditionally male roles, even that 
of father: 
Religiously and with the utmost delicacy she regulated not only the serious tasks 
of her youthful charges, but their recreations also and their games. It was in this 
spirit, we are told, that Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, directed their 
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upbringing, Aurelia that of Caesar, Atia of Augustus:  thus it was that these 5
mothers trained their princely children (produxisse principes liberos accepimus). 
The object of this rigorous system was that the natural disposition of every child, 
while still sound at the core and untainted, not warped as yet by any vicious 
tendencies, might at once lay hold with heart and soul on virtuous 
accomplishments, and whether its bent was towards the army, or the law, or the 
pursuit of eloquence, might make that its sole aim and its all-absorbing interest 
(Dialogus 1: 306-307; ch. 28, sec. 4-6). 
These mothers take an active role in their sons’ lives, including directing their recreational 
activities; they assume the traditional role of the father and they also demonstrated the 
hegemonic masculinity by actively directing their children’s lives.  The mothers each habituated 
their “princely children” in military virtue, directing the young leaders’ interest and effort 
towards glory and service to the state.  Tacitus goes on to lament the state of rhetoric and 
attributes its decline to the passivity of the young men of his time.  Cornelia, Aurelia, and Atia 
did not demonstrate a passive character, but instead, for the sake of their boys and of Rome, 
filled an absent role in the home through performing a masculine domination of their children.   
It is interesting to note that the person who offered and granted full citizenship and virtus to the 
volones in the Punic War was Tiberius Gracchus, son of Cornelia.  As I will explain in detail in 
Chapter 3, mothers served an important traditional role in the education of children, but the three 
examples above go beyond that traditional role to encompass the role of the paterfamilias as 
 The Gracchi brothers, Tiberius and Gaius, served as tribunes in the early second century BCE and lost their father 5
at a young age (Plutarch Lives Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus 10: 144-147; ch. 1, sec. 3).  Julius Caesar’s mother 
Aurelia lost her husband and Caesar’s father (Suetonius Divus Julius 1: 2-3; ch. 1, sec. 1), and Octavian’s father died 
when the future emperor was 4 years old (Suetonius Divus Augustus 1: 130-131; ch. 8, sec. 1).
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well.  At Rome the paterfamilias (family patriarch) possessed absolute authority over all 
members of the family.  This authority, which was established by tradition and codified by the 
legal power of the patria potestas (power of the father), gave the father unlimited power over 
every member of the family.  Even anatomical males who could not actively claim the role of 
paterfamilias were unable to demonstrate the dominium necessary to embody complete and 
traditional masculinity.  However, that the Gracchi, Julius Caesar, and Augustus were raised by 
women who fulfilled the traditional role of the paterfamilias and became, in turn, models of 
military virtue and masculinity demonstrates that women could be and were extremely operable 
and effective in habituating military virtue. 
 McDonnell’s formulation of virtus as manliness is particular in that it does not include 
aspects of sexuality.  Rather than seeing male sexual prowess or the procreative urge as 
manifestations of power and therefore demonstrative of virtus, McDonnell’s extensive textual 
research demonstrates that virtus is almost always associated with courage, especially martial 
courage (167ff).  This of course is in contradistinction to the complaint of Achilles in the Iliad, 
who was denied further sexual encounters with Briseis.  As the examples above demonstrate, 
because there is a lack of sexuality associated with virtus, it is not as exclusive as it at first 
appears.  Both non-elites and women were capable of earning and did demonstrate and possess 
virtus by engaging in military action and women were capable of assuming the auctoritas 
associated with the most exclusive of roles, the paterfamilias.  As this dissertation works through 
the idea of military virtue and applies it to both rhetorical education and theory, it is important to 
recognize that even in the face of the exclusionary reality of the culture at Rome, conceptualizing 
rhetoric as martial subtly works against that reality. 
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 That exclusionary reality, however, is unavoidable and while the ability to possess and 
demonstrate virtus through military action or the opportunity to wield the auctoritas of the 
paterfamilias may have been available to women, these opportunities were extremely limited.  
Warfare, and more importantly the virtus associated with warfare, had long been associated with 
elite men and so most discussions of these rely on language that is gendered masculine and is 
connected in some way with the hegemonic masculinity that existed in the fabric of Roman 
culture.  While others such as Gleason, Bernstein, and Gunderson attempt to disrupt this 
hegemonic masculinity or to demonstrate how alternate notions subverted the dominant cultural 
understanding, this dissertation will work within that dominant framework.  Because I am 
interested in how notions of military virtue, notions that were formed through tradition and 
culture, functioned to shape rhetorical education and theory, it will be necessary to use and 
explore to a certain extent the accepted language of the culture.  What I have shown, however, is 
that virtus, in its martial conceptualizations, was not as exclusionary as language and history may 
suggest.  The possession of military virtue was available to and the demonstration of the same 
was possible for those who at first may seem excluded.  Being included in the world of military 
virtue though meant that one was also included in a very particular habitus.   
Towards Military Virtue 
 Bourdieu makes a distinction between the individual habitus, which structures present 
experiences of the individual through past experiences (60) and a class habitus, considered a 
system of dispositions that has the same set of social conditionings (59).  He explains further that 
“Though it is impossible for all (or even two) members of the same class to have had the same 
experiences in the same order, it is certain that each member of the same class is more likely than 
!36
any member of another class to have been confronted with the situations most frequent for 
members of that class” (59-60).  An aristocratic Roman, for example, was far more likely to 
experience combat than a non-aristocrat and so that experience can be associated as a structuring 
structure of the habitus of the elite class.  As portions of the history informing the habitus I have 
been developing in this chapter, the heroic tradition, the requirement of military action in the 
demonstration of virtue, and the cultural emphasis on masculinity all structure the class habitus 
of the elite Roman male.   
 It is this class habitus that both structures and is structured by the particular concept of 
military virtue that I will develop in the next chapter.  Furthermore this dissertation will show 
that it is this class habitus that, as Bourdieu describes, is in a dialectic with the institution of 
rhetorical education at Rome (57).  I will refer to this class habitus as the habitus informed by 
military virtue, not to be exclusionary but rather to capture the history developed here.  The 
Romans held on dearly and tenaciously to those cultural traditions that they considered integral 
to their identity, of which one is described by the concept of military virtue.  It is possible to see 
the development of the habitus informed by military virtue through the particular characteristics 
of this concept.   
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Chapter 2: All I Learned, I Learned from Soldiering: 
Military Virtue at Rome 
 “quae illi litteris, ea ego militando didici.  (What they [the established men of senatorial 
rank] learned in books, I learned by performing military service)” (Sallust Bellum Jugurthinum 
312-315; ch. 85, sec. 13).  These words capture the nature of the virtue that is at the center of this 
dissertation.  Sallust attributes these words to the Gaius Marius, savior of Italy and renowned 
military commander, as the latter argues against members of the Senate for an increase in the size 
of the army.  These few words perfectly articulate the Roman conceptualization of virtus; it 
exists through action, not through intellectual understanding.  Just as significantly, this virtus can 
be learned, but it must be learned through action.  In other words, it must be performed.  This 
chapter will develop a sense of what this virtus involves and its place and importance in Roman 
society.   
In the Protagoras, Socrates and Protagoras discuss the problem of whether or not the 
virtues are unified: 
You said that Zeus had sent justice and respect to mankind, and furthermore it was 
frequently stated in your discourse that justice, temperance, holiness and the rest 
were all but one single thing, virtue: pray, now proceed to deal with these in more 
precise exposition, stating whether virtue is a single thing, of which justice and 
temperance and holiness are parts, or whether the qualities I have just mentioned 
are all names of the same single thing. This is what I am still hankering after (2: 
152-155; sec. 329c-d).   
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Protagoras explains that the each must be independent and not unified, like the parts of a face.  
As Eugene Graver explains, for Protagoras’ claim to teach the virtues to be realized, they cannot 
be unified, especially since some virtues, like courage, are easily distinguished and knowable 
(“Can Virtue be Bought?” 370).  The problem, though, is not resolved in the dialogue, and 
Protagoras abandons his position and quickly moves on to another issue.  The sophists can claim 
to teach virtue, especially virtue in the Greek sense of aretē, because this type of virtue and the 
corresponding virtuosity that it creates for an individual is performed in an agōn.  Hawhee 
develops this idea as she works through the relationship between athletic and rhetorical prowess, 
and Michael Poliakoff illustrates it in his examination of the Greek obsession with competition.  
Aretē is located and realized in an individual who is competing for individual accomplishment, 
and who demonstrates the idea of human excellence as determined through competition.  Roman 
virtus, on the other hand, is realized through action directed towards the benefit of the state.  As 
an integral part of the state, the performance of virtus also is always informed by and directed 
towards the mos maiorum.  Rhetorical practice and theory both allow for the action necessary to 
perform virtus.  Students in the rhetorical schools were given opportunities to engage with and 
perform virtus through practical exercises.  Although students were taught the rules for these 
exercises and directed by their teachers to an understanding of, say, the canons of rhetoric, 
rhetoric did not teach virtue.  Rather, rhetoric and rhetorical education participated in the 
complex process of the habituation of virtue. 
 My concept of military virtue slightly alters the common understandings of virtus.  As the 
chapter will show, military virtue is found in active performances that are directed towards the 
welfare of the state and towards the preservation of the mos maiorum.  Like Greek aretē, 
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however, Roman virtus has been interpreted as an individual attribute or one particular aspect of 
character. One can demonstrate virtus, for example, without necessarily performing other virtues 
like justice or temperance.  Following the Platonic schema illustrated by the Protagoras above, 
the virtues do not necessarily exist in unity, but instead they exist in independent plurality.  
Military virtue, however, is embodied in an ideal individual, the military commander, and as 
such is always a performance of unified virtues.  Through the actions particular to a military 
commander, each of the cardinal virtues (prudence, temperance, justice, and fortitude) are 
realized and demonstrated.  It is this embodied unity of virtue that Roman rhetorical education 
aims at reproducing.  It is also this unity of virtue that partly structures the habitus.  Because of 
its active and practical nature, it is difficult for military virtue to be taught as an art, but it can be 
habituated through interaction. 
 McDonnell’s treatment of virtus is invaluable to understanding its place and importance 
to the ruling elite of Rome.  He charts the Romans’ shifting understanding of virtus by exploring 
the changing role of the aristocratic man through Roman history.  To McDonnell, virtus is 
manliness and is therefore always gendered and also always martial.  It is the relationship of the 
performer of virtus to military action that defines the manliness of the performer.  In the late 
second century, as the aristocracy began to abandon their role as warriors, McDonnell explains, 
the nature of virtus began to change (241ff).  McDonnell sees the performance of virtus as tied 
directly to the possibility and necessity of military action, but I see the nature of that virtue and 
therefore its performance as more complex. While aristocrats may have slowly pulled away from 
serving the state in a military capacity, they still recognized the need for a virtue grounded in 
military tradition.  Tradition itself played such a role in the daily lives of Roman citizens that the 
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nature of virtus could not completely change.  Even if the elite could not traditionally perform 
that virtus (that is perform virtue through direct military action), there was a traditional and 
cultural need for people who would perform in a similar manner.   
 This chapter attempts to explain the nature of this Roman concept of virtus as it is 
performed by individuals and received and recounted by historians as well Roman rhetorical 
theorists.  In doing so, I plan to examine explanations of how virtue exists and how it is learned.  
Unlike arts or technē, which can be explained and taught through rules or maxims,  according to 6
Aristotle virtue exists by action and through performance.  Aristotle explains: “It is by taking part 
in transactions with our fellow-men that some of us become just and others unjust; by acting in 
dangerous situations and forming a habit of fear or of confidence we become courageous or 
cowardly” (Nicomachean Ethics 72-75; bk. 2, ch. 1, sec. 7-8).  Later he explains that a person, 
accordingly, is only virtuous in that they perform virtuous actions: “It is correct therefore to say 
that a man becomes just by doing just actions and temperate by doing temperate 
actions” (Nicomachean Ethics 86-87; bk. 2, ch. 4, sec. 5).  This is why modeling is such an 
important part of Roman education. One can examine the performance of virtue in others and 
attempt to perform it in a similar way, but one cannot be taught particular rules for virtuous 
behavior.  Learning virtue is possible; however, teaching virtue as an art is not possible.  This is 
true for both Greek and Roman understandings of the nature of virtue.  Where these differ though 
is in the underlying reason for the performance of virtue.  For the Greeks, as I will demonstrate, 
 Aristotle makes the distinction that virtues require much more than knowledge: “acts done in conformity with the 6
virtues are not done justly or temperately if they themselves are of a certain sort, but only if the agent also is in a 
certain state of mind when he does them: first he must act with knowledge; secondly he must deliberately choose the 
act, and choose it for its own sake; and thirdly the act must spring from a fixed and permanent disposition of 
character. For the possession of an art, none of these conditions is included, except the mere qualification of 
knowledge; but for the possession of the virtues, knowledge is of little or no avail” (Nicomachean Ethics 84-85; bk. 
2, ch. 4, sec. 3).  
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aretē is ethical.  It is concerned with human excellence and therefore individual character.  For 
the Romans, on the other hand, virtus is political or social in the sense that its performance is 
directed towards service to the state.  McDonnell sees this same distinction, but emphasizes that 
the Greek ethical nature of aretē begins to overtake the social end of virtus (271ff).  I contend 
that the Romans, even during the early Empire, do not lose the social foundation of virtue 
because it was too deeply ingrained in the mos maiorum.  I will then explain how the unity of the 
four cardinal virtues is embodied in the military commander.  Virtus is at the same time a single 
function of action and a collection and unity of the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, 
temperance, and fortitude.  The fundamental problem with a unity of the virtues is that one action 
does not necessarily perform all of the virtues simultaneously.  In the descriptions and actions of 
Roman military commanders though we can glimpse the ideal combination of these separate 
virtues in one body.  It is this sense of virtue that will inform the discussions of Roman rhetorical 
education and theory that follow. 
Action and Habit: How Virtue Exists 
 In his prefatory remarks to De Re Publica, Cicero asserts: “Nature has implanted in the 
human race so great a need of virtue and so great a desire to defend the common safety that the 
strength thereof has conquered all the allurements of pleasure and ease.  But it is not enough to 
posses virtue, as if it were an art of some sort, unless you make use of it” (De Re Publica 14-15; 
bk. 1, sec. 1-2).  For Cicero, virtue cannot exist without action; knowledge of virtue is not 
enough to ensure its existence.  Virtue has to be embodied and enacted, and it cannot exist 
otherwise.  The actions that can lead to the performance of virtue can be taught.  Rhetorical 
exercises are actions that lead to the performance of virtue and were taught in schools, but the 
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demonstration of virtue itself is habituated through rhetoric, not taught through rhetoric.  This is 
why when we ask the question can virtue be taught, the answer must necessarily be no.  Steven 
Tigner interrogates this question by examining Plato’s Meno and arrives at the conclusion, along 
with Socrates, that while virtue cannot be taught, it can be learned (11-12).  Embodiments, such 
as moral virtue, can be modeled, imitated, and learned through actions that are and can be taught. 
 This is building on the Aristotelian division of virtue into moral and intellectual virtue. 
According to Aristotle, the potential for virtue is natural and is formed through habit much like 
the arts.  Aristotle explains the habitual formation and development of moral excellence in the 
Nicomachean Ethics, and the passage is worth quoting in full: 
Virtue being, as we have seen, of two kinds, intellectual and moral, 
intellectual virtue is for the most part both produced and increased by instruction, 
and therefore requires experience and time; whereas moral or ethical virtue is the 
product of habit (ethos), and has indeed derived its name, with a slight variation 
of form, from that word.  And therefore it is clear that none of the moral virtues 
formed is engendered in us by nature, for no natural property can be altered by 
habit.
Moreover, the faculties given us by nature are bestowed on us first in a 
potential form; we exhibit their actual exercise afterwards. This is clearly so with 
our senses: we did not acquire the faculty of sight or hearing by repeatedly seeing 
or repeatedly listening, but the other way about—because we had the senses we 
began to use them, we did not get them by using them. The virtues on the other 
hand we acquire by first having actually practiced them, just as we do the arts. We 
learn an art or craft by doing the things that we shall have to do when we have 
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learnt it: for instance, men become builders by building houses, harpers by 
playing on the harp. Similarly we become just by doing just acts, temperate by 
doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts  (Nicomachean Ethics 70-73; bk. 
2. ch. 1, sec. 1-4).
Aristotle’s distinction between moral and intellectual virtue describes the existence of both 
theory and practice, technē and praxis, phronesis and sophia while not privileging one over the 
other.   But habitual maturation of virtue does require a disposition that is amenable to its 7
reception.  Eugene Garver explains this crucial distinction in Aristotle’s apparent defense of 
slavery in the Politics.  For Garver, Aristotle’s defense is less about the historical and cultural 
situation in which Aristotle was writing and thinking than it is about the philosophical 
conceptualization of the human function (ergon).  Garver explains that a slave is incomplete — 
and therefore slavish — because he acts for “something outside the action” (Politics 20-25).  A 
complete human, on the other hand, acts for the sake of the action: an essential human function is 
engaging in praxis. 
 Quintilian sees this habitual cultivation of virtue as a function of every aspect of a child’s 
life.  Indeed, he blames poor family upbringing for the apparently low morals of schools:  “They 
see our mistresses, our boy lovers; every dinner party echoes with obscene songs; things are to 
be seen which it is shameful to name.  Hence first comes habit, then nature” (Institutio Oratoria 
1: 86-87, bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 8).  But at Rome there was also a deep, traditional (re)collection of 
 Of course, in the Metaphysics Aristotle does seem to privilege sophia over phronesis to a certain extent.  In the first 7
book, he explains that because wisdom is knowledge of first principles, it is more valuable than other forms of 
knowledge: “Moreover, knowledge and understanding which are desirable for their own sake are most attainable in 
the knowledge of that which is most knowable. For the man who desires knowledge for its own sake will most 
desire the most perfect knowledge, and this is the knowledge of the most knowable, and the things which are most 
knowable are first principles and causes; for it is through these and from these that other things come to be known, 
and not these through the particulars which fall under them. And that science is supreme” (Metaphysics 10-13; bk. 1, 
ch. 2, sec. 6-7).
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instances of virtue that served as model and inspiration to the young, aspiring citizens.  Polybius, 
a Greek historian who wrote about Roman customs and culture, dwells on the funeral ceremonies 
for those citizens whose distinguished actions earned glory and honor because they are instances 
in which Roman tradition exposes young citizens to physical and rhetorical (re)presentations of 
virtuous conduct.  In a martial context in particular, character and virtue are embodied in the 
scars that are marks of significant accomplishments.  The martial body itself is displayed as the 
physical reality of honor.  A relative, typically the son, delivered a speech over the body, which 
was propped up in a standing position in all of its paraphernalia and accouterments.  This 
connected the physical embodiment of virtue with the rhetorical representation of that virtue.  
Afterwards, a mask fashioned in the likeness of the deceased was displayed in the house for all to 
see, and these masks were worn, along with the ceremonial dress of the deceased, at all 
subsequent family funerals (Polybius 1: 503; bk. 6, ch. 53).  This collection of embodied virtue 
demonstrated a physical link between tradition, generations, and virtuous action.  Polybius 
concludes his discussion of these funeral ceremonies with the observation that “Many Romans 
have volunteered to decide a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted 
certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest, some in time of peace to 
preserve the safety of the commonwealth” (1: 504; bk. 6, ch. 54). They have been moved to 
virtuous action by living within and through these traditions and through interaction with those 
who also performed virtuous actions. 
 Polybius’ observations on the funeral ceremonies and the effect they have on future 
virtuous behavior are similar to Aristotle’s conceptualization of the habitual nature of virtue and 
Cicero’s requirement that virtue exists only in action.  The services involve a plurality of action 
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and embodiment that are fused by rhetorical performance.  The speaker, the son or other close 
relative, functioned as the typical physical presence associated with rhetorical performance.  
Through bodily action the speaker gave life to the speech and at the same time performed virtue 
rhetorically.  While the performance and subsequent habituation of virtue through declamatory 
exercises is the subject of chapter 5, here it is important to note that virtue is brought into 
existence in the speech act itself as much as the subject of the speech is about the virtuous 
actions of the deceased; form and subject are merged.  The corpse, standing at its own funeral, 
becomes the embodied symbol of virtue.  More than a mere prop, the corpse stands silent and yet 
speaks through its past actions, and it speaks of the virtue brought into existence by those 
actions.  The procession of masks recollects the acts of the entire family in an unbroken like of 
virtue and the living relative, the speaker, performs a speech act that serves as an instance of 
habitual reinforcement of that virtue. 
Aretē and Virtus: Distinguishing Greek and Roman Action 
 The Homeric epics, particularly the Iliad, serve as the definitive guides for virtue in the 
Greek world.  Greek sport, and the aretē that participation in that sport both demonstrated and 
garnered, was representative of the same virtue that Homer describes on both sides of the Trojan 
War.  This heroic virtue manifests in the individual combat that occurs on the Homeric 
battlefield.  For an example, in a brief scene in Book 5 of the Iliad in which Diomedes (Tydeus’ 
son) kills Pandarus (Lycaon’s son) and Aeneas offers the subsequent defense of the corpse:  
He [Pandarus] poised and hurled his far-shadowing spear, and smote upon the 
shield of Tydeus' son; and straight there through sped the point of bronze and 
reached the corselet. Then over him shouted aloud the glorious son of Lycaon: 
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“Thou art smitten clean through the belly, and not for long, methinks, shalt thou 
endure; but to me hast thou granted great glory.” Then with no touch of fear spake 
to him mighty Diomedes: “Thou hast missed and not hit; but ye twain, I deem, 
shall not cease till one or the other of you shall have fallen and glutted with his 
blood Ares, the warrior with tough shield of hide.” So spake he and hurled; and 
Athene guided the spear upon his nose beside the eye, and it pierced through his 
white teeth. So the stubborn bronze shore off his tongue at its root, and the spear-
point came out by the base of the chin. Then he fell from out the car, and his 
armour all bright and flashing clanged upon him, and the swift-footed horses 
swerved aside; and there his spirit and his strength were undone. But Aeneas leapt 
down with shield and long spear, seized with fear lest perchance the Achaeans 
might drag from him the dead man. Over him he strode like a lion confident in his 
strength, and before him he held his spear and his shield that was well balanced 
on every side, eager to slay the man whosoever should come to seize the corpse, 
and crying a terrible cry (Iliad 1: 214-217; bk. 5, lines 280-300). 
There are three acts of potential, individual valor located within this scene.  First, if Pandarus 
does succeed in killing Diomedes then he has demonstrated his own virtue and earned glory 
through defeating the Achaean’s third best warrior.  Second, Diomedes reinforces his own virtue 
by both exhibiting no fear at how close he came to death and instantly and instinctively throwing 
his spear and killing Pandarus.  Third, and probably most significant, is Aeneas’ defense of the 
corpse of his comrade.  The imagery of Aeneas pacing protectively over the corpse like a lion 
evokes a sense not only of confidence but of supreme loyalty and bravery.  These are exemplars 
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of traditional, epic virtue, evidenced by the presence and interference of the goddess Athena at 
the scene.   They are individuals who exhibit individual bravery, participate in individual 8
combat, and earn individual glory through their individual achievement. 
 This sense of virtue is transferred to or relived in Greek sport, the combat variety of 
which provided access to participate in the heroic and mythic tradition.  Stephen Miller explains 
that the Greek notion of aretē “existed, to some degree, in every ancient Greek and was, at the 
same time, a goal to be sought and reached for by every Greek” (vii).  As much as the deeds 
immortalized by Homer could be claimed by every Greek, so too could latent aretē be assumed 
to exist within each individual.  Miller explores instances of aretē only within the bounds of 
athletic competition (although he does acknowledge that aretē was in no way limited to athletes).   
Similar to the definitions of virtue from both Aristotle and Cicero above, Hawhee explains that 
“one cannot not just be virtuous, one must become virtuosity itself by performing virtuous 
actions in public” (18). Greek athletics provides a means for this constant becoming because it 
allowed for the display of human perfection as demonstrated by the agōn. 
 Michael Poliakoff asserts that the ancient Greeks exceeded all other ancient civilizations 
in their obsession with competition.  He traces this obsession through the extremes of potential 
competition, citing the contests the Greeks held for pottery, medical treatises, plays, eating, 
drinking, and kissing (104).  It is the individual nature of those sports that reflects the Homeric 
tradition and reveals the nature of Greek notions of virtue.  It is no surprise in this extreme 
agonism that sport was regarded as a means to become virtuous.  Poliakoff observes that only a 
few instances of collective sport existed in ancient Greece (105).  Most of the sports were 
 Seth Schein explains that the presence of a god or goddess at an individual instance of combat is a poetic device 8
that signifies the greatness of the struggle itself and the glory associated with the contestants (58).
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individual contests, and the most honored of these sports were wrestling, boxing, and the 
pankration.  These fulfilled a need of the ancient Greek psyche to continually attempt to achieve 
the cultural expectations created by the Homeric tradition (Poliakoff 112-115).  It was difficult, if 
not impossible, for individual combat to occur in battles between phalanxes, and so sport 
replaced combat as the opportunity to demonstrate the mythic virtue of the Iliad (and to a lesser 
extent, the Odyssey).  For example, Poliakoff observes that wrestling requires both skill and 
science and it “tests an array of martial virtues: cunning, boldness, courage, self-reliance, and 
perseverance” (23).  If one wins a wrestling match, then one has performed aretē and is 
deserving of honor, glory, and recognition.  Victory is a mark of individual achievement and 
human perfection. 
 Only in Spartan education does a collective sense of accomplishment and virtue appear in 
place of individual achievement.  First this extends beyond the boundaries of gender established 
in other Greek cities.  Jean Ducat points to the unanimity of opinion in the classical world that 
the most original and characteristic element of the education of women at Sparta was physical 
(227ff).  Spartan women trained their bodies in a similar manner to men and Ducat points to 
several sources that recall the women participating in athletic contests including wrestling, ball 
games, racing, and even some martial events like the discus and the javelin (228-229).  This 
physical training was the responsibility of a Spartan woman to her community because strong 
women bore strong children.  Second, the Spartan ball games demonstrated another collective 9
accomplishment.  These ball games were the culmination of an ephebe’s time in the agōgē and 
 Here Ducat draws from the earliest reference to the Spartan physical training of women, Critias’s Lakedaimonion 9
Politeia.  In it the author answers the question of how the city provides itself with the strongest possible children.  
The answer, as Ducat translates, is: “That the mother of the child to be born should strengthen her body and practice 
physical education” (227-228).  
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were a gripping attraction for spectators.  Nigel Kennell observes that “winning teams would 
have to rely on a combination of individual agility (to catch and return the ball) and cooperative 
mass strength (to push the opposing team back)” (61).  The team secures the victory, not the 
individual, and Spartans felt a lifelong attachment to their ephebic tribe and to their boyhood ball 
team because of the shared glory achieved through the competition.  It is this sense of collective 
accomplishment that provides a transition from the Greek sense of aretē to a defining aspect of 
Roman virtus.  The Romans did not share the same passion for sport and competition as the 
Greeks.  While Greek games did continue in the Roman period and the gladiatorial games did 
play a large part in the social fabric of Rome, one did not demonstrate or perform Roman virtus 
by competing in the games.  In fact, Roman elites held gladiators in contempt partly because 
their actions were for mere entertainment and did not contribute to the commonwealth. 
 The distinction between the individual and the collective can be seen on artistic 
depictions of war from both the archaic and Roman period.  Tonio Hölscher suggests that the 
character and cultural understanding of warfare appears on the artwork depicting battle scenes.  
For example, Hölscher equates the emphasis of the individual, nude body in Greek art with the 
Greek idealization of the body in both war and athletics, while Roman monuments depict only 
barbarians as naked and the Roman soldiers clothed in their military armor (7-8).  This, Hölscher 
explains, changes values: “pure physical strength has a low valuation, and high esteem is 
reserved for superior technical skill and static dignity” (8).  At first this appears to suggest that 
there is no room for individual achievement.  Instead individuals become nameless and — clad 
in helmets and armor— faceless members of a crowded formation.  However, the “technical skill 
and static dignity” that Hölscher notes of the Roman monument does have a name and a face in 
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the emperor that leads the charge (6).  Virtue at Rome is embodied in the general who is capable 
of achieving victory by leading the army, not by defeating a single opponent. 
 Stoic philosophy also informs this sense of virtue as embodied in an individual yet 
directed towards the state.   Seneca the Younger explains the Stoic understanding of virtue as 
follows: 
We have separated this perfect virtue into its several parts. The desires had to be 
reined in, fear to be suppressed, proper actions to be arranged, debts to be paid; 
we therefore included self-restraint (temperantiam), bravery (fortitudinem), 
prudence (prudentiam), and justice (iustitiam) – assigning to each quality its 
special function. How then have we formed the conception of virtue? Virtue has 
been manifested to us by this man's order, propriety, steadfastness, absolute 
harmony of action, and a greatness of soul that rises superior to everything. 
Thence has been derived our conception of the happy life, which flows along with 
steady course, completely under its own control. How then did we discover this 
fact? I will tell you: that perfect man, who has attained virtue, never cursed his 
luck, and never received the results of chance with dejection; he believed that he 
was citizen and soldier of the universe (civem esse se universi et militem), 
accepting his tasks as if they were his orders (Epistles 3: 388-389; Epistle 120, 
sec. 11-12).  
The attributes that Seneca describes are not unfamiliar; they are the four cardinal virtues.  It is in 
the Stoic formulation of what we now refer to as cosmopolitanism that the individual virtue is 
action directed at and for the collective.  The vir perfectus (perfect man) is both a citizen of the 
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universe and a solider, participating in the collective human experience as well as defending it 
through action that performs virtue.  Elizabeth Asmis sees Seneca’s virtuous person as a hero 
who actively defies Fortune while at the same time submitting to the orders of an imperator, god 
or fate.  In keeping with the directed exercise of virtue for the collective, Asmis explains that 
Seneca sees defense of the state from internal enemies as the most heroic and virtuous act (132).  
Cato the Younger’s relentless opposition to Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey demonstrates virtue in 
the Stoic mold, that is virtue not performed for personal glory or gain, but instead for the state, or 
in more general Stoic terms, the universe.  The character of Cicero fulfills a similar role in 
declamations during the empire; he serves as a model of Stoic virtue in his defiance of tyranny 
and relentless support of the Republic.      10
 The Stoic sense of virtue and the support of the state provide the action necessary to 
perform virtue in a way that is different from the agonism so important to the Greek concept of 
aretē.  Achilles did not fight for anything outside of himself and, in contrast, each Roman legion 
carried with it a standard bearing the letters SPQR, reminding themselves and their enemy that 
they fought for the entire Roman state (Senatus Populusques Romanus).  Garver explores the 
relationship between internal and external ends as a part of his analysis of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.  
He concludes that practical arts, such as rhetoric, are defined by the relationship between their 
internal and external ends.  Indeed, Garver’s treatment of The Rhetoric highlights the importance 
of the internal end of rhetoric as a means of determining success or failure.  He articulates two 
ways in which rhetoric can fail to make speakers effective.  The first deals with a failure of the 
 This idea of individual virtue performed for the cosmic good is a theme on which modern cosmopolitans such as 10
Anthony Appiah draw.  Appiah uses this idea to demonstrate how patriotism and cosmopolitanism can exist within 
the same individual (Cosmopolitan Patriots).  For Seneca there is no tension to begin with because Rome is the 
world.
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art to define its internal end.  The second failure occurs if “political circumstances prevent the 
achievement of the internal end from leading regularly to accomplishing the external 
end” (Garver Aristotle’s Rhetoric 235).  This does not mean that the speaker must always achieve 
the external end, but that there is always a possibility of achieving the external end by 
successfully meeting the internal end.  Garver explains that to Aristotle the virtues always avoid 
this failure because virtue always can achieve its external end (performing a function well) by 
meeting the internal end (being in a good state) (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 235).   11
 Significantly though, Garver sees Aristotle as describing a rhetoric that is more like virtue 
than art (technē) and explains that the lack of a politics that permits the unity of internal and 
external ends is why this conception of rhetoric cannot be viable today.  Garver even uses a 
military analogy to explain this: “Subduing one’s fear of death in battle is its own end; subduing 
one’s fear of death by climbing Mount Everest without oxygen is in Aristotle’s eyes pointless.  
Virtue becomes virtuosity” (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 238).  Virtuosity here suggests an action 
performed for its own sake and not for any external end.  This explanation illuminates the unity 
of internal and external ends within the broader context of virtue.  The aretē demonstrated in 
Greek sport is of the Everest variety.  For example, Philostratus describes the victory and aretē of 
Arrichion, a competitor in the pankration: 
You have come to the Olympic games themselves and to the noblest of the 
contests held at Olympia; for this is the pancratium—of men, Arrichion is being 
crowned for winning this event, having died just after his victory…Is anyone so 
without feeling as not to applaud this athlete? For after he had already achieved a 
 Garver here points to the statement in the Nicomachean Ethics that virtue “causes its possessors to [both] be in a 11
good state and to perform their functions well” (90-91; bk. 2, ch. 6. sec. 3).
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great deed by winning two victories in the Olympic games, a yet greater deed is 
here depicted, in that, having won this victory at the cost of his life, he is being 
conducted to the realms of the blessed with the very dust of victory still upon him. 
Let not this be regarded as mere chance, since he planned most shrewdly for the 
victory (Imagines 149; bk. 2, ch. 6).   
The idea of winning two victories at the Olympic Games is by any standard a feat worthy of 
admiration, but Arrichion’s willingness not only to risk death, but to win and die that is the 
“greater deed.”  Agains, this is virtuosity as Garver sees it, performed for its own sake, not for 
any real, external end.   
 Roman virtus on the other hand, while most certainly similar in both its attributes and in 
its performance, differs in that its internal end is connected to the accomplishment of a real, 
external end.  The important distinction between Greek and Roman external ends is qualitative.  
Garver’s explanation of Aristotle suggests that in the best of all possible states the internal end 
of, say, making a “virtuous” speech was enough to achieve the external end of persuading the 
audience.  However, the Roman external end must be more than just to persuade.  Rather it must 
be to persuade for the purpose of supporting or protecting the interests of the state.  For example, 
to introduce and explain the character of Publius Scipio Africanus, Polybius describes the actions 
of the young soldier in his first battle during the Punic Wars.  Having been given command of a 
cavalry squadron by his father, the young Scipio witnessed his father surrounded and wounded.  
Having failed to persuade his squadron to go to his father’s aid, Polybius recounts the younger 
Scipio’s actions: 
He appears to have plunged himself with reckless courage into the midst of the 
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enemy; whereupon his comrades being forced to charge also, the enemy were 
overawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and Publius the elder, being 
thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to address his son as his preserver in the 
hearing of the whole army.  Having gained an acknowledged reputation for 
bravery by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself to every sort of 
personal danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on him (Polybius 
2: 4; bk. 10, ch. 3). 
Of particular note in this description are the two external ends to which Scipio directs his 
performance of virtue.  First, and most evident, is rescuing his father.  This is reminiscent of the 
scene from the Iliad above in which Aeneas defends the corpse of Pandarus, even to the point of 
being severely wounded.  However, the elder Scipio has a more significant role in the Punic War 
than that of Pandarus in the Trojan War because Scipio senior was consul and imperator.  The 
younger Scipio’s performance of virtue then was not only personal in saving his father, but also 
directed at service to the state by saving the consul.  Second, Scipio’s performance of virtue 
inspired his squadron to act as well.  In this sense, the external end is both to lead others to 
virtuous action that is performed for the same external end above, namely to rescue the consul 
and to secure his own place as a leader within the Roman army.  This is the end for which he 
continually performed virtue according to Polybius: to serve his country.  In all of these instances 
the internal end, that is the virtuous act itself, is directed towards accomplishing an external end.  
Garver concludes that “seeing something as good means seeing it as something more that just 
one’s own preferences” (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 238).  In other words, there has to be some standard 
on which to evaluate an action.  For Aristotle’s practical art of rhetoric that standard, according to 
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Garver, is political, for the Roman performance of virtue, it is traditional.  It is found in the 
cultural fabric informed by the mos maiorum.   
The Four Cardinal Virtues and the Military Commander 
 Livy describes the deeds of a Roman soldier named Horatius Cocles, who, during the war 
with Clusium in 508 BCE, single-handedly defended a bridge over the Tiber until it could be 
destroyed.  Because Livy’s description articulates examples of virtuous action, specifically the 
four cardinal virtues, it is worth quoting in full: 
He therefore warned and commanded them to break down the bridge with steel, 
with fire, with any instrument at their disposal; and promised that he would 
himself receive the onset of the enemy, so far as it could be withstood by a single 
body (corpore uno). Then, striding to the head of the bridge, conspicuous amongst 
the fugitives who were clearly seen to be shirking the fight, he covered himself 
with his sword and buckler and made ready to do battle at close quarters, 
confounding the Etruscans with amazement at his audacity.  Yet were there two 
who were prevented by shame from leaving him. These were Spurius Larcius and 
Titus Herminius, both famous for their birth and their deeds. With these he 
endured the peril of the first rush and the stormiest moment of the battle. But after 
a while he forced even these two to leave him and save themselves, for there was 
scarcely anything left of the bridge, and those who were cutting it down called to 
them to come back. Then, darting glances of defiance around at the Etruscan 
nobles, he now challenged them in turn to fight, now railed at them collectively as 
slaves of haughty kings, who, heedless of their own liberty, were come to 
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overthrow the liberty of others. They hesitated for a moment, each looking to his 
neighbor to begin the fight. Then shame made them attack, and with a shout they 
cast their javelins from every side against their solitary foe. But he caught them 
all upon his shield, and, resolute as ever, bestrode the bridge and held his ground; 
and now they were trying to dislodge him by a charge, when the crash of the 
falling bridge and the cheer which burst from the throats of the Romans, exulting 
in the completion of their task, checked them in mid-career with a sudden dismay. 
Then Cocles cried, “O Father Tiberinus, I solemnly invoke thee; receive these 
arms and this soldier with propitious stream!” So praying, all armed as he was, he 
leaped down into the river, and under a shower of missiles swam across unhurt to 
his fellows, having given a proof of valour which was destined to obtain more 
fame than credence with posterity. (The History of Rome 1: 248-253; bk. 2, ch. 10, 
sec. 5-11). 
After delaying the entire enemy force at the bridge until it was destroyed, Cocles, as the story 
goes, leapt —armor and all—into the Tiber and swam across to the other side.   Livy explains 12
that “he was the bulwark of defense on which that day depended the fortune of the City of 
Rome” (The History of Rome 1: 248-249; bk. 2, ch. 10, sec. 2).  In recognition of his actions, the 
state commissioned a statue of Cocles, a representation of the body that acted in defense of the 
state. 
 We can see at work in this story manifestations of the four cardinal virtues: prudentia 
(practical wisdom), iustitia (justice), fortitudio (courage), and temperantia (temperance).  First, 
 Polybius has Cocles drown in the river (1: 505; bk. 6, ch. 55).12
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Cocles makes the prudent decision of saving Rome by destroying the bridge and preventing the 
enemy from crossing.  This is practical reasoning in that the decision was contingent on the 
situation and not prescribed by any art or general maxim.  Destroying a bridge is not advisable in 
every situation, but in this particular case it was an effective decision as it prevented the sack of 
Rome.  Next, he demonstrates justice by both fulfilling his obligation to defend the city of Rome 
from attack and in dismissing the two soldiers who remained with him when their obligation was 
complete.  Third, every aspect of his action demonstrates his fortitude, from defending the bridge 
to taunting the enemy nobles into fighting.  Finally, Cocles demonstrates temperance in the self-
control he displays.  Every aspect of his defense had been performed in complete control.  He 
knowingly taunted the enemy into fighting, he challenged them to use their spears on him first, 
and once the bridge was destroyed, he abandoned the fight he had initiated and jumped into the 
river.  There was very little uncontrollable passion in his actions; instead there was complete self-
control.  In this body and its actions, then, are combined the prudence, justice, fortitude, and 
temperance of a virtuous person and the civic responsibility that gives that virtue the critical 
martial aspect that I am working towards. 
 Cocles acted in the instance described above as a leader in a time of crisis.  While even 
Livy seems skeptical of the veracity of the events, as a narrative example of the military virtue 
that characterized leaders in Roman society the story provides a cultural ideal to which young 
Romans could aspire.  It also provides a model of virtuous action that ultimately leads to lasting 
glory.  Cocles is immortalized in art, in Roman histories, and in Roman culture because of 
actions that performed the cardinal virtues.  This example demonstrates the characteristics and 
actions necessary for a military commander at Rome.  Even more though, the military 
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commander at Rome served as the exemplar of the cardinal virtues and also demonstrated the 
end to which the performance of those virtues ought to be directed.  Cicero explains: 
All that is morally right rises from some one of four sources,: it is concerned 
either (1) with the full perception and intelligent development of the true; or (2) 
with the conservation of organized society, with rendering every man his due, and 
with the faithful discharge of obligations assumed; or (3) with the greatness and 
strength of a noble and invincible spirit; or (4) with the orderliness and 
moderation of everything that is said and done, wherein consist temperance and 
self-control” (De Officiis 16-17; bk. 1, ch. 5, sec. 15).   
This passage describes the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.  
All other virtues, Cicero explains, are derived from these and that these are at the same time 
interrelated and individual.  In a way of closing this chapter, I would like to examine the 
recorded actions of military commanders that demonstrate the interrelated and individual nature 
of these virtues and also to expose the importance of the form in which they are enacted, 
specifically through the body of a military commander.  Understanding how these virtues are at 
play within this particular individual type — that is in a martial body in action, in fulfillment of 
civic responsibility and as judged by the traditions and culture in which it functions— will serve 
as a foundation for the subsequent discussions of how Roman rhetorical education supported the 
cultivation of this articulation of virtue.  
 The embodiment of the cardinal virtues in the military commander physically represents 
the Aristotelian view that one must possess all of the virtues at the same time.  Even though 
Aristotle categorizes phronesis as an intellectual virtue and others like courage and temperance 
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as virtues of character, he insists that the presence of phronesis marks the presence of the other 
virtues as well (Nicomachean Ethics 368-371; bk. 6, ch. 13, sec. 1-5).  Alasdair MacIntyre uses 
the Aristotelian unity of the virtues to explain how communities evaluate individuals and 
individual action.  MacIntyre’s formulation is useful to understanding how the military 
commander, as the embodiment of the cardinal virtues, came to be so lauded in Roman culture.  
For MacIntyre this interrelation of virtues denies the possibility of a plurality of criteria that can 
be used to measure an individual.  He explains instead that they provide one measure: 
The application of that measure in a community whose shared aim is the 
realization of the human good presupposes of course a wide range of agreement in 
that community on goods and virtues and it is this agreement which constitutes 
the kind of bond between citizens (After Virtue 146).   
MacIntyre’s formulation suggests that it is, in part, the agreement on what virtue is and how it is 
enacted and embodied that allows for a political community.   Political participation and 13
leadership then must be preceded by successful performance of the virtues as they are recognized 
by a particular community.  The following example of Scipio Africanus demonstrates how the 
military commander successfully performs the accepted cardinal virtues in the Roman world.       
 Publius Cornelius Scipio earned the cognomina ex virtute “Africanus” by defeating 
Hannibal and wining the second Punic War.  He also served as consul from 205-202 BCE.  
Scipio entered the realm of legend with his victories during the Punic wars, but secured his place 
as a hero much earlier in his youth.  I have already discussed the significance of his first act of 
 MacIntyre explains that the bond that Aristotle sees is that of friendship, which was a very different concept than 13
it is today.  Friendship at Athens and to Aristotle was “a relationship defined in terms of a common allegiance to and 
a common pursuit of goods” (After Virtue 146).  It is the shared responsibility for the community, and in the case of 
the military commander at Rome, that responsibility becomes the primary and immediate reason to perform virtue 
and at the same time the ultimate expression of that virtue.    
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heroism, the rescue of his father and consul on the battlefield, as an action demonstrative of the 
military virtue.  It is worth examining how each of the cardinal virtues interact in the character of 
Scipio during that first martial action.  While it is clear from the discussion above that the future 
Africanus was fulfilling his civic responsibility in saving his consul and general, he was also 
serving as a good son in aiding his paterfamilias.  Both actions are manifestations of justice as 
described above by Cicero.  Recall that the paterfamilias was the foundation of Roman society 
and all family member were obligated to live under his dominium until he died.  Even marriage 
and a family of one’s own did not relieve a son of his subjugation to the paterfamilias (Gwynn 
12ff, Bonner Education 4-5).  Scipio’s demonstration of justice as a virtue then serves both the 
Republic and the underlying cultural fabric of the society.  Interwoven with the demonstration of 
justice is Scipio’s courage and temperance.  He could not have acted justly in this instance had he 
not been brave as well.  Nor could he have acted bravely had he not been in control of himself.  
Finally, his actions, as Polybius notes later, were prudent in that they were not impetuous, but 
instead calculated to inspire his comrades to help his father.  This one action then demonstrates 
Scipio’s virtuous character, not just to those immediately around him, but to all of those who 
became aware of the action.  In this way, his action is rhetorical by articulating through action a 
way that people ought to act and persuading those same people to act in a way that demonstrates 
this interplay of the virtues and civic responsibility. 
 The military commander’s actions also demonstrate the Aristotelian connection between 
the internal and external ends of virtue.  Returning for a moment to Garver’s explanation that the 
virtues have internal ends that define and offer means of evaluation, he goes on to explain that 
“aiming at such an internal, constitutive end” does not preclude “having a further end in mind.  
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To act virtuously is not to be a narcissist or aesthete, or to value formal, procedural goods of 
following rules at the expense of desirable results” (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 217).  Virtuous action is 
virtuous and at the same time can be directed toward an end independent of that virtue.  In the 
case of the military virtue I have been describing as present at Rome though, there is an 
additional aspect of the internal end.  Civic responsibility is always a part of the internal end of 
virtuous action, whereas to Garver and Aristotle, that responsibility is assumed in the natural 
polis.  Another example from Scipio’s life illuminates this distinction. 
 While in Spain, Scipio’s soldiers brought him, as a prize, a beautiful woman.  Instead of 
viewing the woman as his due as a warrior and commander (as Achilles does),  Scipio sees her 14
as both a person and as a woman.  Through conversation he discovers that the woman is engaged 
to a leading man in a Spanish tribe named Allucius.  After a long, emotional discussion of love, 
or as Livy describes it “in more studied language,” Scipio restores the woman to Allucius 
without ransom.  In fact, Scipio gave Allucius, as a wedding present, the ransom that the 
woman’s family begged him to accept (Livy The Histories of Rome 7: 190-195; bk. 26. ch. 50).  
In that “studied language,” Scipio explains to Allucius:  
Your betrothed has been in my camp with the same regard for modesty as in the 
house of your parents in law, her own parents.  She has been kept for you, so that 
she could be given you as a gift, unharmed and worthy of you and of me. This is 
 MacIntyre explains that in the Homeric tradition and in heroic cultures in general, the one’s place in society 14
determined what was due that individual.  The idea of receiving one’s due then was a question of honor and the 
recognition of one’s place.  Receiving one’s due, according to MacIntyre, is one example of the recognition and 
acceptance of dikê (order of the universe) (After Virtue 126).  So, for example, when Agamemnon forces Achilles to 
give up Briseis, the king violates the order of the universe by not recognizing what Achilles is due and so Achilles’ 
anger is justified.  Scipio, on the other hand, is not concerned with what he, individually, is due, but instead with 
what is beneficial to Rome.  Thus MacIntyre’s statement that “In Homer the question of honor is the question of 
what is due to a king in Sophocles the question of honour has become the question of what is due to a man” can be 
extended to include the Roman question of what is due to the community (After Virtue 124-125).
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the only price that I stipulate in return for that gift: be a friend to the Roman 
people (Livy The Histories of Rome 7: 190-193; bk. 26, ch. 50, sec. 6-7).   
The Roman’s apparent temperance, the self-control that allowed him to resist his personal desire 
for this beautiful woman, is not guided merely by an internal end.  Instead, it is guided by his 
understanding of the needs of the Roman people and his civic responsibility.  His virtuous act 
secures friendship and 1,400 picked horsemen from the Spanish tribe.  There is a subtle 
difference between this action and what Garver describes as a moment when the achievement of 
an internal end also accomplishes an external end.  Scipio, according to Livy, does not act until 
he understands the complete situation.  His temperate act, while still virtuous, is virtuous because 
it is done to help the state, not because it is done out of an individual desire for virtue alone.  He 
secures friendship for the Roman people and horsemen for the Roman army.  
Conclusion: The Crisis of Military Virtue in the late Republic 
 The examples of Horatius Cocles and Scipio Africanus serve as traditional manifestations 
of Roman virtus.  As I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this particular formulation of 
virtus as military virtue was constructed by the acts of Roman elites during the early and middle 
Republic when the Roman army consisted of those same elites.  By the time of the late Republic, 
however, the possibility for young Roman elites to act similarly was next to nothing.  McDonnell 
explains that by the middle to end of the second century BCE, the active participation of the 
Roman elite in warfare declined tremendously.  Young, upper-class, Roman citizens looked for 
ways to avoid military service instead of seeking out opportunities to demonstrate virtus in its 
martial conceptualization.  As McDonnell concludes: “Certainly, some Romans would continue 
to establish martial reputations as mounted warriors — Scipio Aemilianus and Marius are two 
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famous examples—but this would now be the choice of an individual, rather than the 
responsibility of a social group” (247).  In removing the responsibility of martial service and 
replacing it with choice there is a subsequent shift in the demonstration of virtus.  Rather than 
serving as a cultural marker of the elite, virtus becomes more ethical and more political.  Martial 
virtue had always been a requirement for political success, but every elite male, according to 
McDonnell, had by merely belonging to that social group fulfilled that requirement.  With 
limited opportunity to perform this particular type of virtue, the few successful performances 
demonstrated unique and laudable individual character that carried with it significant political 
influence.  
 The resistance to and absence from military service of elite Roman citizens in the late 
Republic led to a concern for the future of both that class and the Republic itself.  I have already 
mentioned the elder Seneca’s contempt for the youth of his time.  Sallust records Marius’s attack 
on his noble opponents as an attack on political incompetency that is a result of their not having 
served in combat:   
I know some, my fellow-citizens, who, after they have been elected consuls, have 
begun to read the acts of their ancestors, and the military precepts of the Greeks 
(acta maiorum et Graecorum military praecepta); persons who invert the order of 
things; for though to discharge the duties of the office is posterior, in point of 
time, to election, it is, in reality and practical importance, prior to it.  Compare 
now, my fellow-citizens, me, who am a new man, with those haughty nobles. 
What they have but heard or read, I have learned by serving as a soldier (ego 
militando didici) (Bellum Jugurthinum 312-315; ch. 85, sec. 12-13) 
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In contrasting the access that the nobles have to military virtue, that is their reliance on the acts 
of their ancestors and the acts of the Greeks, and his actual performance of virtue, Marius 
demonstrates the problem facing the ruling class of the Republic.  With no access to the 
possibilities to perform virtus, and with virtus understood to be a fundamental requirement of 
their class, elite Romans were forced to discover other ways in which to perform the virtue 
necessary to be a vir bonus in the strictest sense of that formulation as a person who 
demonstrates virtus.  As the rest of this dissertation will show, it is through educational and 
discursive practices that these elites were able to (re)present and perform that virtue. 
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Chapter 3: Models of Character, Teachers of Language 
The Traditions of Early Roman Education 
 One of the first lessons a new student in a Roman school would experience was learning 
how to write letters.  Students used wax tablets on which the teacher inscribed the letter to be 
learned.  The student would trace a stylus along the groove made by the teacher and would 
emulate the movements and the marks.  After practicing in this way, the student would be 
prepared to attempt to make the letter without the teacher’s model, but these attempts were 
subject to the intense scrutiny of the teacher. It was the responsibility of the teacher to ensure that 
the student’s work matched traditional models as closely as possible.  These early lessons are a 
useful analogy to Roman education as a whole.  At each level of education, from primary school 
to the school of rhetoric, students were presented models of correctness that they were expected 
to imitate.  These models extended far beyond correct handwriting and even far beyond correct 
or appropriate composition, although these were indeed modeled.  Like the impressions on the 
wax tablets, teachers were the grooves of character and virtue for their students.  Worn deep by 
tradition, students quickly learned that to be successful one must follow and imitate the 
indentations of those influential models.  Because of its significance in Roman tradition, the 
military served as an ideal model.  Although military virtue is of particular importance to models 
of character, the Roman military also provided examples of efficiency, practicality, and strategy 
on which educators drew.  This chapter discusses the models found in Roman education by first 
examining what early education at Rome was like and then tracing that influence as it interacted 
with and molded the Greek system of education that arrived at Rome in the second century BCE.  
Always underlying this discussion is the traditional place and respect for the military and 
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military service at Rome. 
 Marrou sees early Roman education based in the peasant culture of the Italian 
peninsula.   To Marrou peasant or rural education is defined by its reliance on a traditional way 15
of life (231).  Children are indoctrinated into this way of life through a practical education 
designed to prepare them for their roles in peasant society.  Marrou observes that the 
fundamental idea of early Roman education “was respect for the old customs — mos maiorum 
—  and to open the eyes of the young to these, to get them to accept them unquestioningly as the 
ideal” (231).  Modeling the mos maiorum was a family affair, and both the child’s mother and 
father played an important role in early education.  It is generally accepted though that Roman 
culture, tradition, and law situated the paterfamilias at the center of the family.   
 Because the father was such a significant figure, not only in a very real way for a young 
Roman, but symbolically and rhetorically in school exercises, it is useful to go into some detail 
regarding the implications of this part of Roman tradition.  The jurist Gaius explains that this 
authority was unique to Roman culture (Institutes bk. 1, ch. 55).  All property of the entire family 
belonged to the paterfamilias, and he could sell his children into slavery or even have them 
executed if he so chose (Gwynn 13).  The patria potestas endured until the death of the 
paterfamilias, at which time each male child who had his own family became his own 
paterfamilias.  Until then male children, their wives, their children, and all of their property were 
subject to the authority of the paterfamilias. 
 Authority over the entire family carried with it a great responsibility.  However, educating 
 By early Marrou and most other historians of Roman education mean the sixth century BCE, which is well before 15
any indication of structured, public education is found at Rome.  Education here is most certainly just the process of 
raising a child, but what is significant is that the role of tradition in this early education and its role in later Roman 
education is much the same.  
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children was a family affair and was a shared obligation of fathers and mothers.  While the 
children were extremely young the mother served the role of educator, as Tacitus explains: 
Thus it was, as tradition says, that the mothers of the Gracchi, of Caesar, of 
Augustus, Cornelia, Aurelia,  Atia, directed their children's education and reared 
the greatest of sons. The strictness of the discipline tended to form in each case a 
pure and virtuous nature which no vices could warp, and which would at once 
with the whole heart seize on every noble lesson (Dialogues 306-307; ch. 28). 
The mothers’ roles in the lives of children are significant.  It is from the mother’s model that the 
child learns a discipline and respect that shapes a virtuous life.  Tacitus specifically notes that it 
is the mother, not a nurse, who is responsible for this early model of virtue, a sentiment that 
Quintilian echoes in the Institutio Oratoria.   Bonner sees the early education as a sort of 16
cooperative effort among all family members, but he also highlights the significance of the 
mother (Education 14ff).  According to Bonner, the mother’s role became even more important if 
the father had died.  The three examples Tacitus points to above, Cornelia, Aurelia, and Atia all 
lost their husbands and therefore assumed the responsibilities of raising and educating their 
children (Bonner Education 15).   
 At a certain point in the child’s life the father became the primary role model and 
educator.  As Gwynn notes, at this point the father and the child became inseparable, the latter 
following the former and observing every aspect of Roman life.  Gwynn explains:  “Constantly 
at his father’s side and with few other companions, he learnt to see in his parent the living 
 Quintilian says: “As to the parents, I should wish them to be as highly educated as possible. (I do not mean only 16
the fathers. We are told that the eloquence of the Gracchi owed much to their mother Cornelia, whose highly 
cultivated style is known also to posterity from her letters; Laelia, Gaius Laelius’ daughter, is said to have echoed 
her father’s elegance in her own conversation” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 66-67; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 6).
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representation of Roman tradition, the personification of Roman authority (1).   As Gwynn so 
aptly puts it, the father became the model of what it meant to be a Roman man and demonstrated 
not only Roman tradition but the ethos of the elite Roman.  Plutarch, in his Cato Major, captures 
the significant role of the father in education and in tradition.  Because it demonstrates the 
practical education in which young Romans were involved and also illustrates a certain character 
found through the demonstration of military virtue, this chapter is worth quoting in full.  In it we 
can see not only how a father educated his son and to what end that education was directed, but 
we also can see the development of the habitus informed by military virtue and the character 
associated with it.  It is not enough for Plutarch to describe the education, he must also 
demonstrate that the son fully manifests the habitus by becoming a well respected military 
figure: 
He was also a good father, a considerate husband, and a household manager of no 
mean talent, nor did he give only a fitful attention to this, as a matter of little or no 
importance. Therefore I think I ought to give suitable instances of his conduct in 
these relations….  He used to say that the man who struck his wife or child, laid 
violent hands on the holiest of holy things. Also that he thought it more 
praiseworthy to be a good husband than a good senator, nay, there was nothing 
else to admire in Socrates of old except that he was always kind and gentle in his 
intercourse with a shrewish wife and stupid sons. After the birth of his son, no 
business could be so urgent, unless it had a public character, as to prevent him 
from being present when his wife bathed and swaddled the babe. For the mother 
nursed it herself, and often gave suck also to the infants of her slaves, that so they 
!69
might come to cherish a brotherly affection for her son.  As soon as the boy 
showed signs of understanding, his father took him under his own charge and 
taught him to read, although he had an accomplished slave, Chilo by name, who 
was a school-teacher, and taught many boys. Still, Cato thought it not right, as he 
tells us himself, that his son should be scolded by a slave, or have his ears 
tweaked when he was slow to learn, still less that he should be indebted to his 
slave for such a priceless thing as education. He was therefore himself not only 
the boys' reading-teacher, but his tutor in law, and his athletic trainer, and he 
taught his son not merely to hurl the javelin and fight in armour and ride the 
horse, but also to box, to endure heat and cold, and to swim lustily through the 
eddies and billows of the Tiber. His History of Rome, as he tells us himself, he 
wrote out with his own hand and in large characters, that his son might have in his 
own home an aid to acquaintance with his country's ancient traditions. He 
declares that his son's presence put him on his guard against indecencies of speech 
as much as that of the so-called vestal Virgins, and that he never bathed with him. 
This, indeed, would seem to have been a general custom with the Romans, for 
even fathers-in-law avoided bathing with their sons-in-law, because they were 
ashamed to uncover their nakedness. Afterwards, however, when they had learned 
from the Greeks their freedom in going naked, they in their turn infected the 
Greeks with the practice even when women were present. 
So Cato wrought at the fair task of moulding and fashioning his son to 
virtue, finding his zeal blameless, and his spirit answering to his good natural 
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parts. But since his body was rather too delicate to endure much hardship, he 
relaxed somewhat in his favour the excessive rigidity and austerity of his own 
mode of life. But his son, although thus delicate, made a sturdy soldier, and 
fought brilliantly under Paulus Aemilius in the battle against Perseus.  On that 
occasion his sword either was smitten from his hand or slipped from his moist 
grasp. Distressed at this mishap, he turned to some of his companions for aid, and 
supported by them rushed again into the thick of the enemy. After a long and 
furious struggle, he succeeded in clearing the place, and found the sword at last 
among the many heaps of arms and dead bodies where friends and foes alike lay 
piled upon one another. Paulus, his commander, admired the young man's exploit, 
and there is still extant a letter written by Cato himself to his son, in which he 
heaps extravagant praise upon him for this honourable zeal in recovering his 
sword. The young man afterwards married Tertia, a daughter of Paulus and a 
sister of the younger Scipio, and his admission into such a family was due no less 
to himself than to his father. Thus Cato's careful attention to the education of his 
son bore worthy fruit (Cato Major 2: 358-369; ch. 20, sec. 1-8) 
This chapter captures the educational responsibilities of a father, especially an aristocratic father.  
Gwynn argues that it demonstrates early Roman educational ideals exceedingly well (19) and 
Bonner says that enough evidence exists that we can safely assume that this system was fairly 
common for upper class children (Education 12).  It does indeed demonstrate the authority of the 
paterfamilias as it extends into education and how that education molds an obedient subject who 
embraces authority, tradition, and the authority of tradition.  Cribiore observes of antiquity in 
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general: “education served well the interests of the elite and the preservation of the hierarchical 
status quo” (Gymnastics 9) and this passage demonstrates that even the very informal 
educational setting of the home in the early Republic worked to “fashion young men to virtue.”   
 Gwynn is correct in observing that this passage, and other sources, reflect an extremely 
utilitarian approach to education.  Bonner shows, for example, that Cato’s program lacked an 
important intellectual component, namely the study of the Greek language (12).  However 
utilitarian the approach may be, scholars have overlooked the connection this passage establishes 
between education and the utilitarian actions of Cato’s son on the field of battle.  To think that 
the recovery of one’s sword in the midst of battle is utilitarian or practical is absurd.  Instead this 
action betrays a deeper commitment to a sense of tradition and honor that is part of Roman 
idealism and a manifestation of the habitus informed by military virtue.  A favorite theme of 
declamation is one in which a general, caught in a hopeless situation surrenders to the enemy in 
order to save his soldiers’ lives and then is subsequently brought to trial for treason (as it was 
customary for Roman generals to never surrender their arms).  To recover one’s sword then is not 
a matter of utility especially since the passage clearly says that there were arms scattered all over 
the battlefield and that Cato’s son had to look through these piles of lost weapons and bodies to 
locate his sword.  Instead, this action is a matter of upholding a tradition located at the center of 
the elite, Roman identity, a tradition formed and reinforced, as Plutarch suggests, through the 
habit of educational practices.   
 But even more a part of the elite Roman identity is the leadership Plutarch hints at in the 
chapter.  To begin with, the boy, even before he is aware of his hereditary role as a leader, is 
exposed to techniques designed to gain the trust and goodwill of others.  His mother feeds the 
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children of slaves from her own breast “that so they might come to cherish a brotherly affection 
for her son.”  Rather than nurturing the slave children, this reversal of a traditional wet nurse’s 
function was thought to foster in the slave children a fondness for the son.  This, in turn, modeled 
for the boy the power one has over others when one secures their loyalty.  As Quintilian suggests 
later, it is the combined efforts and examples of the father and the mother that provide the earliest 
and most important influences for a student (Institutio Oratoria 1: 66-67; bk. 1. ch. 1, secs. 6-7).  
The correlation to this lesson appears in the second part of the chapter.  The boy does not regain 
his sword on his own, but instead he relies on his comrades’ help.  What is significant here is that 
he inspires his comrades to follow him into battle on this personal mission.  He has somehow 
gained enough trust and respect from these men to convince them to risk their lives to find his 
sword.  It is hard to tell for what part of the action he gains both his commander’s and his 
father’s praise, for finding and regaining his sword or for leading others in that task.  In both 
instances the boy demonstrates the clear, ideal result of education: to embrace and support 
tradition at the risk of all else and to fulfill his traditional role as a leader.  
 Most scholars agree that by the middle of the second century BCE Rome began to be 
Hellenized (Marrou 242, Bonner Education Chapter 3, Gwynn Chapter 3).  After the conquest of 
Macedon, educated people from Greece began to arrive at Rome.  They brought with them Greek 
methods of education including the idea that children could be educated outside of the home by a 
professional teacher.  Most scholarship tends to address the additions, always conceptualized as 
improvements, Hellenic educational philosophy brought to Rome.  Marrou, for example, sets the 
tone of his chapter by quoting Horace: “Captive Greece took captive her savage conqueror, and 
brought civilization to barbarous Latium” (Horace, Epistles 2.1.156, qtd in Marrou 242).  Horace 
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claims that Rome was uncivilized without Hellenic attention to education and the arts.  Marrou 
sees Greek influence in much the same way, characterizing the pure Roman education described 
by Plutarch above as peasant as compared to the early Greek education of knights and aristocrats 
(229ff).  The rest of this chapter examines how the Roman emphasis on character and models 
discussed above shaped the acceptance and use of the Greek educational concepts.  Instead of 
completely accepting the Greek intellectual model, the Roman’s unquestioning devotion to 
ancient traditions created a new system that was heavily reliant on embodied models of character 
as well as mythic and historic models of character. 
 Cato’s son’s embodiment of his education on the field of battle draws an important 
connection between education at Rome and the city’s martial culture.  Even after military service 
ceased being compulsory, the Roman elite associated themselves with military service.  At the 
very least they associated themselves with the military service of their ancestors.  Plutarch, for 
example, has Romulus’ first action after founding the city to be selecting those for military 
service and then for public service in the senate (Romulus 1: 122-123; ch. 13, sec. 1).  Even the 
common name for a school brings with it a military flavor.  Bonner explains:  
The native Latin word for ‘school’ is ludus.  It has always been something of a 
puzzle as to why the Roman word ludus, which meant ‘play’, should have come 
to be used to mean a ‘school’.  Perhaps a new explanation may commend itself, 
namely, that the word ludus, which came to be applied to various kinds of 
training-establishment (reading and writing, music, dancing, acting — even a 
rhetoric school could still be called a ludus dicendi) originally existed in a 
military context; the training exercises of young recruits were called ‘play’, or just 
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a ‘game’, in contrast to the stern reality of battle.  The most ancient form of 
organized youthful training, revived by Augustus and described by Virgil, was 
called lusus Troiae, ‘The Game of Troy’, and Virgil makes Ascanius say that in 
sport (ludo), he ‘aroused the mimicry of war’ (belli simulacra).  Furthermore, the 
words proludere and prolusio (which Cicero jestingly uses as a play on ludus, 
‘school’) retained a particularly military connotation, that is, preliminary practice 
for battle (Education 56-57).  
Even the common name for school semantically links education at Rome to the martial traditions 
of the country.  Sparta is the only Greek city-state that could also claim such an intimate 
connection between education and the military.  The educational system to which Spartan youths 
were subjected, the agōgē, was an extreme example of a practical and utilitarian education.   17
Through its seemingly barbarous exercises such as forcing initiates to steal food to survive and to 
risk severe punishment if caught, the agōgē produced loyal, courageous, and obedient citizen-
soldiers. The difference between Spartan education and early Roman education was the 
organized place of the state.  Consistent with Hellenic thinking, Spartan education, however 
barbaric, was the responsibility of the state.  As we have already seen, at Rome this responsibility 
belonged to the family.  The Romans begrudgingly accepted the idea that others could teach 
children as well as the family.  To transfer that responsibility was also to transfer the traditional 
role of character model to the teachers as well.  Teachers had to model character as much as they 
had to develop the intellectual faculties of their students if they had any chance of preparing their 
 See Nigel Kennell’s The Gymnasium of Virtue and Jean Ducat Spartan Education for detailed analyses of 17
education at Sparta.  The agōgē functioned as a sort of basic training that lasted the majority of childhood and 
developed both an unquestioning loyalty to the Spartan way of life and an unbending obedience to authority.  
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charges for success at Rome. 
 In the late Republic, three professions were open to a man from a good family, that of an 
orator, a professional lawyer, or a soldier.  As it had evolved from the early, utilitarian form, 
education was directed towards the practical preparation for these positions.  Each, for example, 
required some training particular to the profession; an orator or lawyer would serve a sort of 
apprenticeship to an established person of high rank (the tirocinium fori) while one who chose to 
be a soldier would serve in a similar tirocinium militiae (Bonner Education 84).  This 
apprenticeship exposed the youngster to models worth emulating.  Although distinguished by the 
masters to whom the youth was apprenticed, these three professions were connected in the 
honors they promised.  Whereas the acts were different, the resulting character created by those 
acts were the same.  In describing the problems of ethos confronted by the young novus homo 
Cicero, May writes: “With no ancestral deeds to commend his character or waxen images to 
decorate his halls, the virtus and industria of the fledgling orator were made to bear the 
responsibility for establishing a reputation” (13).  The deeds and waxen images that Cicero 
lacked were those celebrated by Polybius.  In order to gain the auctoritas that was typically 
established by traditional, military success, Cicero had to demonstrate a similar virtue as an 
orator.  He did, of course, have models on which to draw, which were presented throughout his 
early education. 
 A Roman youth was inundated with models to emulate, from the paterfamilias himself, to 
the great orator or officer with whom he served his tirocinium, to the heroes of the past.  Polybius 
describes the funeral ceremony of a man who had a reputation for valor.  After describing the 
extravagance of the ceremony, including the funeral oration and the masked representation of 
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great men, Polybius observes: “There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for 
a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations.  For can we conceive any one to be 
unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses collected together of the men who have earned glory, 
all as it were living and breathing?” (1: 504; bk. 6, ch. 53).  Polybius attributes the superiority of 
the Romans in both physical strength and courage, in part, to ceremonies and cultural practices 
because these inspire and train youths to emulate the celebrated behavior.   
 But the tendency to venerate the mos maiorum, to rely on models suitable for emulation, 
and the strict adherence to the absolute authority of the paterfamilias does not mean that Romans 
saw the education of their youth as rigid and systematic.  The edict issued by the censors  Gnaeus 
Domitius Ahenobarbus and Lucius Licinius Crassus in 92 BCE which chastised the Latin 
rhetoricians, repudiates the attempt to systematize education: 
It has been reported to us that there be men who have introduced a new kind of 
training, and that our young men frequent their schools; that these men have 
assumed the title of Latin rhetoricians (Latini rhetores), and that young men spend 
whole days with them in idleness. Our forefathers determined what they wished 
their children to learn and what schools they desired them to attend. These 
innovations in the customs and principles of our forefathers (mos maiorum) do not 
please us nor seem proper. Therefore it appears necessary to make our opinion 
known, both to those who have such schools and to those who are in the habit of 
attending them, that they are displeasing to us (Suetonius De Rhetoribus 2: 
412-414; sec. 1).   
 Taken with Cicero’s observation that “our people have never wished to have any system 
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of education for the free born youth which is either definitively fixed by law, or officially 
established, or uniform in all cases, though the Greeks have expended much vain labor on this 
problem” (De Re Publica 232-233; bk. 4, sec. 3), this edict allows Gwynn to conclude that 
Roman education, at least in the Republic, was dependent almost entirely on tradition, home life, 
and example (25).   The Roman reliance on these three factors, as we will see, manifests in even 18
the systematic educational format of the progymnasmata and declamation.  An important point of 
criticism of this reliance is the exclusive nature of this type of education.  Tradition, home life, 
and example reflected the male and aristocratically dominated society and culture of the period.  
While this may have been the cultural paradigm, Quintilian recognized the importance of women 
both in character and education.  He refers to Cornelia, the mother of the Gracchi, who took on 
much of their education herself (Institutio Oratoria 1: 66-67; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 6).  Bonner also 
discusses the importance of female models to the Gracchi, Julius Caesar, and Octavian 
(Education 15-16), and as I observed above, the importance of the mother’s role in early 
education cannot be understated.  Tradition and example may have worked towards the exclusion 
of women, but the reality of education could not deny the importance of female influence.  
 Along with women, the lower classes were excluded from participation in education.  
Gwynn and others have argued that even the edict of 92 BCE was an attempt by the optimates to 
deny the lower classes the power of the spoken word (or at least the public, rhetorical word) and 
the manifestations and possession of virtue that go along with that spoken word.  Gwynn argues 
 Gwynn contrasts this lack of formal systematized education with the passage in Plato’s Protagoras, which he 18
claims expresses the “fundamental ideas common to all Greek theories of education” (24).  In that long passage, 
Protagoras describes the systematic education of mind and body that produces a person of virtue.  When we look at 
these together, we are able to see two distinct ways that a particular sort of virtue is modeled and acted.  Later 
Gwynn demonstrates this difference at the level of language, contrasting the Greek notion of παιδϵία and the Latin 
educatio.  See also Clarke 11-12 and Bonner Education 71-74).
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that the edict was politically motivated and designed to prohibit the teaching of rhetoric in Latin 
to the lower classes (60-65).   Although attractive for its politics, this argument is shaky at best, 19
and Bonner offers a more pragmatic rationale for the edict, arguing that the censors were 
working to preserve the integrity of the Roman courts and of oratory itself.  While this may still 
be elitist and exclusive, Bonner’s argument subtly places the emphasis on the type and quality of 
the oratory and not on the individual (71-75).  George Kennedy’s comments on this edict 
corroborates Bonner.  Kennedy draws attention to the responsibility to maintain traditions and 
oppose innovation that Crassus bore as censor (The Art of Rhetoric 95).  Again, this places 
emphasis on the integrity of the system and of Roman tradition more than on a concerted, 
conscious effort to exclude.   In other words, it was the teachers who modeled poorly and the 
schools that provided a lesser quality education (lesser quality in the sense that the new Latin 
rhetoricians were not traditional) to which the censors objected, not the class of people educated 
in those schools.  Poor models lead to poor performance and as Crassus explains in De Oratore: 
“we are not seeking some pettifogger (rabulam), declaimer or ranter (clamatorem), but that man 
(virum) who, to begin with, is a high priest (magnam homini) of that art … and secondly can 
abide unharmed even on the field of battle, through the respect felt for his title of orator rather 
than any heraldic staff” (1: 140-141; bk. 1, sec. 202).  The Latin rhetoricians who earned the 
censors’ displeasure were despoiling the art, reducing it to crass, rough ranting, while the true 
education of an orator would create a virum whose ethos as an orator would protect him even on 
the battlefield.  Crassus also maintains the emphasis on the quality of the orator and of the 
 C.f. Corbeill, “Education in the Roman Republic: Creating Traditions,” who summarizes the recent scholarly 19
attention towards the edict as being a representation of the struggle to maintain a dominant cultural elite whose 
power resided in part, in its relationship with the Greek language, instead of a politically motivated move to 
maintain some type of class dominance (272).  
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oratory by suggesting that it is accomplishments that earn respect, not heredity.  The implication 
here is that the orator has the respect attributed to a leader who secures the protection and 
devotion of soldiers.  This is in contradistinction to a rough, unpolished clamatorem who the 
censors believe are created in the schools of the Latin rhetoricians. 
 Quintilian stresses the importance of modeling from the very beginning because children 
are more perceptive and capable than adults realize.  He attributes failure, not to ability, but to 
care:  “The proof of this is that the promise of many accomplishments appears in children, and 
when it fades with age, this is plainly due to the failure not of nature but of care 
(curam)” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 64-65; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec. 1).  The potential to learn that Quintilian 
recognizes in children leads him to require models suitable for cultivating that potential.  
Recognizing again the operative influence of women in education, he says that nurses must be of 
good character and must speak properly, and parents (both mothers and fathers) should be well 
educated and eloquent.  Even the slaves to whom the child is exposed should be well spoken, or 
someone competent should be present to correct any misuses of languages that a child may hear.  
What is interesting in Quintilian’s treatment of early childhood education is that the child was 
not corrected, but instead those using the faulty expressions were corrected “in the pupil’s 
presence” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 70-71; bk. 1, ch. 1, sec.11).  The student, when exposed to poor 
models, had to witness those models being corrected.  As we will see later, this became a 
fundamental part of the student’s future lessons.  As declamations were read aloud in front of 
peers, family members, and friends, teachers meticulously corrected any faults in the work.  This 
practice not only corrected deficiencies in declamation but also modeled leadership, as the 
teacher (or in the early child’s case, the one competent person) managed those in subordinate 
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positions. 
 Quintilian was drawing on a long history of Roman dependence on the family as the 
initial and most important source of education.  The family was the central component of all that 
was culturally and politically Roman.  As discussed above, the child learned the mos maiorum 
through the lived experience of the family and through the authority and leadership of the 
paterfamilias.  The boy who was to become a public man learned how to live a public life from 
his father.  Into the late Republic and early Empire the active role a father took in his children’s 
education diminished.  Teachers of grammar and rhetoric took on the responsibility of education, 
but as we can see from Quintilian, the family’s passive role as a model of character and virtue 
remained a fundamental part of a child’s education.   
The Pedagogue: Leading the Student in Learning 
 The first of many influential educational figures in the young student’s life was the 
pedagogue.  This individual served as an attendant to a young child and was not necessarily a 
formal teacher.  In the early Republic, the rudimentary functions of the pedagogue were 
generally performed by a native-born slave (verna).  As the Republic expanded into Greek 
territories, as Bonner notes primarily following the third Macedonian War in 168 BCE, families 
began to acquire Greek slaves and the pedagogue as known in the Greek world took center stage 
in a child’s life.  As Cribiore has shown, the pedagogue’s influence extended well beyond merely 
caring for a child or children: “they functioned as links between students and families, 
supervised the process of learning, and provided a sense of balance and continuity as male 
youths progressed in their education” (Gymnastics 48).  Praise abounds of pedagogues who 
inspired in their charges a love of learning and a balance between the distractions of youthful 
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curiosity and the discipline required of a student.   
 The pedagogue steered the youth in directions conforming to the desires of the family 
and “took over from the parents the general training in manners, and inculcated the traditional 
properties of behavior in the home and out of doors (Bonner Education 42).   The pedagogue 
also ensured that the parents were aware of the quality of the education their child was receiving, 
especially in the late Republic and early Empire, when students, such as Cicero’s son Marcus, 
traveled to study.  They went so far as to help their charges find new teachers when their current 
teachers were of questionable quality (Cribiore Gymnastics 49).  But this influential figure was 
not a teacher.  Quintilian even accuses poor teachers who take on only one student of being 
content with merely acting like a pedagogue (fungi quodam modo paedagogorum) (Institutio 
Oratoria 1: 86-87; bk. 1, ch. 2, sec. 10).  A pedagogue modeled and enforced behavior, inspired 
and instilled a love of learning, assessed and reported the quality of education, but remained 
inferior to the teacher because, according to Quintilian, teachers managed many students at once 
(and always think they deserve a bigger stage).  While pedagogues modeled one on one 
interaction, it was the teacher who modeled a form of leadership. 
 At the same time the vernae of the early Roman times were supplanted by the Greek 
pedagogues (verna, again meaning native born slave, is the root of our English word vernacular), 
the first formal teachers began arriving at Rome in the middle of the second century BCE.  These 
Greek pedagogues and teachers introduced the new concept of a bilingual education.  Along with 
the addition of a new language, Gwynn describes the shift towards a more Greek model of 
education as inevitable once Rome began to expand beyond the confines of a handful of cities 
(34).  Cribiore has observed that “education provided people with a Greek identity to be used as 
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a badge of belonging to a world of culture and privilege” (“Euripides” 246).  The exposure 
created by expansion and conquest that resulted in a new, Graeco-Roman culture demanded a 
new, educated Roman citizen, and the scholarly consensus is that it was the visit of Crates of 
Mallos in 168 BCE to Rome that helped set the conditions for a new educational paradigm.   20
However, the establishment of the schools took some time.  Roughly seven years after the visit 
of Crates, Suetonius tells us that in 161 BCE the Senate passed a decree banishing teachers of 
philosophy and rhetoric from Rome: 
In the consulship of Gaius Fannius Strabo and Marcus Valerius Messala the 
praetor Marcus Pomponius laid a proposition before the Senate. As the result of a 
discussion about philosophers and rhetoricians, the senate decreed that Marcus 
Pomponius, the praetor, should take heed and provide, in whatever way seemed in 
accord with the interests of the State and his oath of office, that they be not 
allowed to live in Rome (De Rhetoribus 2: 412-413; sec. 1). 
The interests of the state, however, were changing, and the desire for teachers of grammar, 
literature, philosophy, and rhetoric were a force that even the empowered praetor could not 
banish.   
Literature and Customs:  The Grammaticus and the Grammar School 
 Primary education at Rome during the late Republic and early Empire consisted of basic 
language formation (understanding syllables, sounds), reading, writing, and basic mathematics 
(see Bonner Education chapter 13 and Cribiore Gymnastics chapter 6).  As Bonner concludes: 
 The visit is reported by Suetonius in de Illustribus Grammaticis.  Gwynn says that the importance of this visit is 20
enormous (36-37) and Bonner concludes that the lectures of Crates revolved around Homer and both sparked an 
interest in literary scholarship and inspired the Romans to hear and appreciate their own poets (Education 53).  This 
visit, then, inspires a demand for the services of a new kind of teacher, the grammaticus.
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“There was nothing about it which was not designed to meet the practical needs of life, and, in 
reading and writing, it managed to combine a moral element as well” (Education 188).  Bonner’s 
idea of a  “moral element” here consists of those traditional virtues discussed in chapters 1 and 2 
which were derived from both the epic tradition as well as Roman culture.  This was the only 
education available to most, and it was valuable.  Those soldiers, for example, who could read or 
write or do math were identified with and belonged to a different class in the legions (Bonner 
Education 188).  But for those who were able, specifically those children of upperclass families 
who were to be leaders and people of political significance, the next level of education, the 
school of the grammaticus, was the first step on the road to gratia, dignitas, and auctoritas.    
 Initial grammatici, who were typically freedmen or freeborn, were private tutors who 
instructed their charges on both grammar and literature (Bonner Education, 58)  The grammatici 
were loosely related to the Greek grammatikos who were responsible for the development of the 
formal study of grammar and also the formation of literary criticism as a scholarly pursuit.   The 21
grammaticus at Rome had a similar function, and began by instructing the students where their 
primary teachers left off: in the study of letters.  Bonner treats the curriculum of the grammar 
school in great detail, discussing at length the grammatical exercises and rules the grammatici 
presented to students.  From rules about the sounds of certain letters to the meter of language, to 
how to determine the gender of a noun, the grammatici presented students with a systematic 
understanding of both their native language and of Greek.  The last example above demonstrates 
the consistency for which grammarians constantly searched, and it also provides us one of many 
possible examples of the ways in which education at Rome reflected an inescapable martialness.  
 For detailed discussions of the evolution of the role, function and etymology of grammaticus, see Cribiore 21
Gymnastics of the Mind (53-56 and Chapter 7) and Bonner Education in Ancient Rome (Chapter 5).
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Bonner describes the importance attributed of learning to identify the gender of a noun.  The 
most effective (for a native Latin speaker) is to think of the diminutive of the noun.  Each gender, 
with only a few exceptions, forms its diminutive consistently with the endings us, a, or um:  “For 
example a small branch is ramusculus, so ramus is masculine” (Education 194-195).  Bonner 
concludes “the method of determination would have been useful to Roman boys, for diminutives 
were not only very numerous, but of the very essence of colloquial speech, would be, therefore, 
usually familiar to them” (Education 195).   
 This systematic method of determining a simple, yet immensely important grammatical 
necessity models the importance of order that the young student will encounter throughout adult 
life.  We can see a reflection of the importance of this type of order in Polybius’s description of 
the Roman camp:  
 Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The place for the camp 
having been selected, the spot in it best calculated to give a view of the whole, 
and most convenient for issuing orders, is appropriated for the general's tent 
(Praetorium). 
 Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend to put the 
Praetorium, they measure off a square round this standard; in such a way that 
each of its sides is a hundred feet from the standard, and the area of the square is 
four plethra. Along one side of this square—whichever aspect appears most 
convenient for watering and foraging—the legions are stationed as follows. I have 
said that there were six Tribuni in each legion, and that each Consul had two 
legions,—it follows that there are twelve Tribuni in a Consular army. Well, they 
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pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line, parallel to the side of the 
square selected, at a distance of fifty feet from it (there is a place too selected for 
the horses, beasts of burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these tents face 
the outer side of the camp and away from the square described above,—a 
direction which will henceforth be called "the front" by me. The tents of the 
Tribuni stand at equal distances from each other, so that they extend along the 
whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions (1: 481; bk. 6, ch. 27). 
Polybius goes on at length describing how the camp is measured and divided, broken into streets 
and tent areas, the end result being an extremely regular, well planned camp.  This allows any 
soldier, regardless of where in the empire the camp is located, to easily navigate and protect the 
camp (1: 493-494; bk. 6, ch. 41).  This demonstration of Roman facility that Polybius praises is 
reflected in the lessons of the grammatici.  It is easy to see the similarities if we imagine the 
distances and camp layout as endings of the Latin noun declensions and the intricate rules of 
agreement in Latin.  Even at the level of language the student was exposed to models of Roman 
efficiency that have been proven on the field. 
  With their roots firmly in Greek tradition, the Roman grammatici taught their students to 
appreciate and understand literature, mostly poetry, as a model of virtue and a noble tradition to 
emulate.  However, literature proved to be useful for more than just the models of virtue it 
provided.  Through a detailed examination of the use of Euripides’ Phoenissae, Cribiore has 
demonstrated the different ways in which the grammatici could use literature.  Besides the 
models provided by the characters (this is a use of declamation that I will examine in greater 
detail in the following chapters), Cribiore shows how a grammaticus could use a text to reinforce 
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reading and writing,  increase understanding of complex vocabulary and word usage, introduce 22
geography, and make links in the family tree of literature (which, of course, all led to the 
Homeric roots) (“Euripides” 250ff).  One of the most interesting of Cribiore’s observations 
highlights the the grammatici’s erudition and emphasis on detail.  She notes that an important 
function of the grammatici was “the treatment of historiai, which involved commenting on and 
expanding points of a text concerning people, places, and mythological and historical 
events” (“Euripides” 253 and Gymnastics 208-209).  This function demonstrates both the 
significance of detail and the importance of myth, tradition, and history.  The student learned the 
possibilities, not of the entire narrative, but rather the possibilities located in small portions of the 
story.  The potentially painful precision with which a grammaticus expounded a small episode 
may, as Cribiore suggests, have jeopardized the students’ comprehension of the overall story, but 
it reinforced particular aspects of tradition and virtue which were an integral part of education.  
This close analysis also demonstrated the interrelated nature of literature, myth, and rhetoric.  
Recalling again Poybius’s description of the Roman Army camp, once a student was able to 
navigate a passage, for example, and follow the correct via towards a desired destination 
(whether that be heroism, virtue, tradition, etc), the student would be able to, without hesitation, 
find their way through any similar passage. 
 Complimentary to the negotiation of literary texts as a means to reinforce traditional 
virtue was the ethics associated with teachers themselves.  As we have seen, the development of 
character was of paramount importance to the Roman idea of education, and as such, the 
 One of the most important functions was the understanding of the correct pauses, stops, and tempo of the poetry 22
(an especially hard task without punctuation).  See Bonner Education in Ancient Rome 221-224.  This understanding 
leads directly into the rhetorical canon of delivery.
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grammatici had to model as well as teach it.  A grammaticus became a surrogate father, replacing 
the traditional role as both educator and model, but the teacher faced an obstacle that the father 
did not: the teacher was typically of low birth.  Kaster points to the importance of the ethical 
qualities of a grammaticus as more important than the skill of teaching (Guardians 66).  The 
grammatici had to present an image of both father and good man to his students, an image of a 
character worthy of emulation and consistent with Roman tradition, and he had to overcome his 
own low birth at the same time.  It is through the detailed and specific presentation of literary 
texts and the resultant interaction with those texts that distinguished the character of the 
grammatici.  As we have seen above, a grammaticus presented students with models of character 
in literature and as the authoritative figure guarding (to borrow Kaster’s word) access to those 
figures.  In doing so, a grammaticus was able to associate his ethos with those mythic figures.   
 As education increasingly began to be specialized in the Empire, especially as rhetorical 
education generally became an education in declamation, grammatici even taught the basics of 
rhetoric and prose.  This either pleased the rhetoric teachers because students arrived at their 
schools already familiar with the preliminary exercises and ready to begin intense work on 
declamation, or infuriated them as we see Quintilian complaining that “the rhetors have 
abandoned their own sphere, and the grammatici have taken over what belongs to 
others” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 262-263; bk. 2, ch. 1, secs. 1-2).  Quintilian’s concern is that the 
grammatici had moved beyond their boundaries and into the progymnasmata (preliminary 
rhetorical exercises) and to even more advanced exercises including prosopopoeia and 
suasoriae.  Moving these advanced exercises into the grammar school delayed students who 
were ready to move on to the rhetor and therefore a higher stage of education.  As is typical of 
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Quintilian, his concern is with the student’s needs and development, not necessarily with the 
petty disputes of territory.  Quintilian’s criticism of the rhetoricians is telling though.  By 
Quintilian’s time the school of rhetoric had become a school of declamation, and the teachers not 
only taught declamation, but also declaimed on their own as a means of advertisement for their 
schools. 
The Rhetorician: The Living Voice of Virtue 
 After a thorough course of study at the level of the grammarian, students moved on to the 
school of rhetoric, which was the pinnacle of the educational pyramid at Rome.  As with the 
grammarians, the rhetoricians had much to overcome.  Faced with the prospect of teaching the 
elite members of Roman society the most important skill that the latter could possess, 
rhetoricians were under enormous pressure to present a character worthy of their students’ 
emulation.  Suetonius tells us, some, such as Manius Otacilius Pitholaus, were former slaves who 
had been manumitted because of their talent for teaching or for oratory (De Rhetoribus 3).  After 
being forcibly removed from his own town by political enemies, for instance, Gaius Albucius 
Silus came to Rome, and “there he was admitted to the house of the orator Plancus, who had the 
habit, when he was going to declaim, of calling upon someone to speak before him. Albucius 
undertook that role, and filled it so effectively that he reduced Plancus to silence, since he did not 
venture to enter into competition” (De Rhetoribus 2: 422-423; sec. 6).  It is through his own skill 
as an orator that Albucius was able to earn enough dignitas to be a successful teacher of rhetoric.   
  Quintilian devotes an entire chapter to the personal characteristics of the rhetorician: 
Boys are approaching adulthood when they are passed on to the rhetor, and they 
remain with him even as young men; that is why we must take particular care at 
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this stage that the impeccable character of the teacher should preserve the younger 
pupils from injury, and his authority deter the more aggressive from licentious 
behavior (Institutio Oratoria 1: 270-271; bk. 2, ch. 2, secs. 3-4).   
Quintilian explains what he means by impeccable character.  The rhetorician must be a father 
figure, free of vice, not given to anger, strict, and must talk a great deal about what is honorable 
(Institutio Oratoria 1: 270-271; bk. 2, ch. 2, sec. 5-8).  In short, the rhetorician must be able to 
talk about and present a character consistent with the expectations of tradition.  Quintilian 
concludes that a teacher must perform speeches daily for the students because “nourishment 
comes, as they say, from the ‘living voice’ and especially from a teacher whom, if they are 
properly taught, the pupils love and respect” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 270-273; bk. 2, ch. 2, sec. 8).   
 By performing declamations for the students the rhetorician accomplished more than 
merely providing students with examples of good speeches.  The teacher’s self-presentation 
through the performance of the rhetorical act demonstrates a character worthy of emulation.  The 
students can only be nourished, according to Quintilian, through the performative act of the 
speech not from the words of the speech as written down.  Rhetorical education is an education 
in performance and Roman performance, as we have seen in earlier, is ethical.  The teacher must 
model, through performance, the habitus informed by virtue.  This is why Quintilian requires 
teachers to not adjust a declamatory performance to their students.  In what seems like a 
complete rejection of the notion that an audience informs how a speech is presented, Quintilian 
insists that the teacher not “speak to suit his pupils judgment” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 272-275; 
bk. 2, ch. 2, sec. 13).  Rather, the teacher should perform in a manner consistent with appropriate 
conventions and watch for the students’ reactions.  Appropriate appreciation of the good things in 
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the speech are not a reflection of the teacher’s skill but an indication that the students have 
judged it correctly and therefore are learning to recognize what is good.  
 Gleason shows that in public performances declaimers in the Second Sophistic presented 
rhetorical persona that were consistent with the cultural expectations of their audiences.  
Rhetorical performance was a means of self-presentation and the skill was learned “under pain of 
physical punishment at the hands of the grammaticus and under pain of humiliation in the school 
of the rhetor” (72).  For Gleason this education taught men to act as men and to maintain a 
certain amount of decorum under stress (72).  In other words, in order to avoid humiliation, 
punishment, and to be persuasive, men were taught to manifest a persona that the audience 
would respect and to which it would respond.  However, the classroom declamations of a teacher 
could not accommodate the expectations of the audience because that audience had not been 
formally and completely initiated into the mos maiorum.  Instead, the teacher’s daily 
declamations serve as models of appropriate, living speeches that ought to be appreciated. 
 The impeccable character and demonstrated authority Quintilian requires of the 
rhetorician reinforces the role of the teacher as a surrogate father.  While the teacher’s control 
could never rival that of the paterfamilias and there was no legal or customary support such as 
the patria potestas for a teacher’s authority over students, the performance of paternity in the 
classroom could establish a very real respect for the teacher.  Quintilian’s advice that students 
respond to a teacher whom they respect and love shows the importance of this relationship.  
Cribiore paints a much less nurturing figure of the teacher, explaining that in reality teachers 
struggled to maintain their position of authority over their students and resorted to corporal 
punishment to produce results:  
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Throughout antiquity, moreover, physical punishment was the standard method 
used to correct a child who misbehaved or did not want to learn.  A schoolmaster 
wielded a stick to make pupils love him — or, at least, love his doctrine.  Through 
rigorous mental gymnastics, students were supposed to acquire good habits; 
lapses into bad habits were corrected with a beating (Gymnastics 65-66).   
Cribiore sees the violence as a means to force a love of the teacher and an obedience to the 
lessons.  However, seen as a surrogate father, the teachers’ use of corporal punishment can be 
understood as parental authority.  In choosing to send a child to school, the paterfamilias 
transfers certain authorities, including the authority to punish, to the teacher.  Through consent of 
the paterfamilias the teacher assumes the role of father.  In fact, Quintilian argues that parents 
tend to be too lenient on their children, who need the impartial and traditional discipline offered 
by a teacher in a school (Institutio Oratoria 1: 84-87; bk. 1, ch. 2, secs. 6-7).  In this way the 
teacher serves as a better father than the actual father because he is of good character and is able 
to discipline.   
 The figures at each level of education served as more than facilitators; they served as 
models of erudition, of character, and of the ancient traditions.  In short, they were physical 
embodiments of what the Romans expected from education.  As masters of language and 
literature they functioned as guardians of Roman identity.   As surrogate fathers and as models of 
eloquence, the schoolmasters embodied that which the students would one day become.  More 
importantly, these teachers did not displace the traditional education of early Roman times.  
Instead they assumed the responsibilities and roles of the traditional family education and 
enhanced that education with Greek rules and theories.  They represented the “living voice” of 
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rhetorical education and as such modeled the virtue that was expected of their students.  Through 
constant interaction with these models, students were habituated into Roman identity.  In the 
following chapters we will see how the exercises of the rhetorical school also habituated this 
virtue.  Education cultivated and recreated the habitus through the “living voice” of the teacher 
and, as the next chapters show, through constant interaction with military virtue located in 
rhetorical exercises.            
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Chapter 4: Progymnasmata: What Would Achilles Do? 
Introduction to the Progymnasmata 
 As we have seen, the Roman educational system resisted innovation, but it still evolved.  
Rather than being embraced, innovations from the Greek world were systematically made 
Roman.  Teachers became surrogate fathers, not replacing the traditional role but instead acting 
as substitutes for a father that did not necessarily have the time or technical skill to meet the 
needs of the future orator.  Tradition ruled over every aspect of life, including education, and that 
tradition even manifested itself in edicts from the censors and actions by the praetors that were 
designed to squash the first sign of innovation.  A significant part of this tradition was informed 
by the reality of warfare in the ancient world.  This chapter will show how martial tradition 
interacted within the preliminary exercises or progymnasmata.  The interaction with the military 
themes associated with the Homeric epics framed a tradition grounded in military virtue while 
allowing for the adjustment of that virtue to the needs of the Roman culture.  As Craig Gibson 
observes in his introduction to the collection of progymnasmata attributed to the sophist 
Libanius:  
Through the progymnasmata, students learned to take their knowledge of classical 
literature — its myths, heroes, and ethical values — and turn it to the service of 
argument.  The progymnasmata, then, not only show us in detail how written 
composition was taught in the Greek speaking world for more than a thousand 
years, but also illuminate one important method by which the cultured elite 
transmitted the values of Hellenism to each new generation (xxi).   
Because Roman education in the late Republic and early Empire was an education in two 
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languages, Greek and Latin, the progymnasmata in Greek served as important a purpose as those 
in Latin.  It was also an education in both Roman and Hellenistic culture, and Gibson’s 
observation above holds true for education at Rome itself as much as for the Greek-speaking 
world.  Although the exercises may at first appear to present these classical values as sacrosanct, 
the progymnasmata actually allow for a dialogue between tradition and contemporary 
perception.  This chapter engages with this tension between what has been considered the 
inflexibility of the mythic tradition and the possibility for a flexible interplay between the present 
and an apparently sacrosanct past.  Bakhtin’s description of the epic is useful here, as it presents 
an accepted view of the inflexibility of epic and tradition in a culture.  This chapter’s treatment 
of the progymnasmata works against this understanding to show that even under the overbearing 
and almost tyrannical oppression of tradition, students experienced subtle ways in which to 
interact with a tradition that cannot ever be completely static.   
 Scholarly treatments of the progymnasmata have tended to focus on the their restrictive 
and stifling nature.  Marrou makes little reference to the exercises.  He even explains that the use 
of these exercises suggests that rhetorical education appeared to have lost its original aim of 
preparing orators for real life (202).  Bonner points to the utility of these exercises as preparation 
for declamation and for their influence on the practice of writing (Education 254).  Even in 
antiquity the exercises were considered simple enough for grammarians to teach.  It is in 
Quintilian’s indignation at the thought of the progymnasmata being a permanent part of the 
grammar school that reveals the possibilities of these exercises.  As Ruth Webb has observed, the 
progymnasmata are “most interesting to us when seen in this light, as part of a wider process of 
the formation of the rhetorically literate individual, and if we look at the surviving handbooks not 
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as sets of rigid ‘rules’ or definitions of fixed types of discourse, but as the archaeological remains 
of part of a broader educational process” (290).  While Webb is concerned with the place of these 
exercises in the formation of a “rhetorically literate individual,” I will show how the rhetorical 
performance of these exercises contributes to an individual who was literate in military virtue as 
well as rhetoric.  Through enabling a dialogue with an epic past that formed the sense of military 
virtue, the progymnasmata helped cultivate a rhetorically literate leader, whose virtue included 
values and traditions associated with military practice, training, and tradition. 
 Prior to beginning the progymnasmata, students in the school of the grammaticus focused 
on reading and understanding literature both as means to better grasp language and as a way of 
recalling and memorializing the epic past.   As students progressed into the rhetorical school  23 24
they confronted these preliminary exercises that required them to actually compose prose works 
of their own.   Other than a brief discussion in Quintilian (Institutio Oratoria 1: 280-301; bk. 2, 
ch. 4), there are no surviving detailed descriptions of the progymnasmata in Latin.  However, 
since education in the Roman world was bilingual, the Greek progymnasmata were taught 
alongside the Latin counterparts.  This dissertation will use the Greek progymnasmata of Theon, 
Hermogenes, and Aphthonius collected by George Kennedy and the comprehensive collection of 
the progymnasmata of Libanius edited by Craig Gibson.  Kennedy dates Theon’s 
progymnasmata to no earlier than the late first century BCE (Progymnasmata 1).  Hermogenes, 
an apparent genius at declamation, wrote his work on the exercises in the middle of the second 
 See Chapter 3 of this dissertation for a discussion of the lessons of the grammaticus.  23
 Again, this was the traditional and accepted place for the progymnasmata.  However, we have seen that by the 24
time of the empire and due to the demands of declamation, these exercises were more commonly located in the 
school of the grammarian. Quintilian expresses his discontent with the practice of moving the progymnasmata into 
the school of the grammaticus (Institutio Oratoria 1: 262-265; bk. 2, ch. 1, sec. 1-7).
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century CE, while the Sophist Libanius wrote and taught in the fourth century CE along with his 
student Aphthonius.  Graduated according to difficulty, these exercises began with short, simple 
compositions and progressed to more complicated speeches.  The most common progression 
was: fable, narration, anecdote, maxim, refutation, confirmation, common topics, encomium, 
invective, comparison, speech in character, description, thesis, and introduction to law (Libanius 
xxi).  
 As we have seen, the star around which all the lessons of the grammar school orbited was 
the canonical literature of the epic.  And so Quintilian’s natural progression into the 
progymnasmata is still a part of the inescapable gravity of Homer in Greek and Virgil in Latin.  
Military action is central to these epics, and the study of these texts, even parts of them, provides 
students with exposure to codes of honor and behavior that are integral to the habitus informed 
by military virtue.  Quintilian recommends that the study of the progymnasmata be an extension 
of the lessons of the grammaticus (Institutio Oratoria 1: 280-281; bk. 2, ch. 4, sec. 1).  In his 
discussion of the responsibilities of the grammaticus he concedes that even simple exercises in 
chreia, fable, and narrative be taught in the grammar school as long as the teacher provides the 
argument (Institutio Oratoria 1: 209-213; bk. 1, ch. 9).   Kaster sees the grammaticus as a 
“guardian of language and tradition.”  He explains: “The grammarian joined those who preserved 
the boundary between order and chaos.  The weight of the burden can be gauged by comparing 
the grammarian with the other custodes: the military commander on the frontier (limes) of the 
empire, or the provincial governor” (Guardians 18).  The protection of order from chaos takes 
the form of the correct interpretation of texts, with order being located in an interpretation that is 
consistent with tradition and chaos found in an interpretation that is disruptive.  Cribiore explains 
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that this correct interpretation was the responsibility and a manifestation of the authority of the 
teacher (Gymnastics 130).  Because of its unchanging characters representative of firm, 
culturally accepted truths and its place in an absolute and unreachable past, epic lends itself 
nicely to one, culturally correct interpretation.  Achilles will always be Achilles.  He will never 
surprise a reader by acting out of character.  However, when placed in the context of a school 
exercise, Achilles character can be the subject of play. 
 Bakhtin uses these characteristics of the epic to help develop a theory of the novel.  He 
frames the theory of the novel in contradistinction to the epic and its characteristics.  He sees the 
epic as characterized by three features: 
1).  a national epic past — in Goethe’s and Schiller’s terminology the “absolute 
past” — serves as the subject of the epic 
2).  national tradition (not personal experience and the free through that grows out 
of it) serves as the source of the epic 
3).  an absolute epic distance separates the epic world from contemporary reality, 
that is, from the time in which the singer (the author and his audience) lives (13). 
These features describe a genre that is easily put to the service of establishing a correct 
interpretation.  To Bakhtin it is the insurmountable distance that the epic as a genre creates that 
keeps it inaccessible.  Epic is always historical; it is also more than historical because history, or 
the historical time, is always valued above the present.  “The epic absolute past is the single 
source and beginning of everything that is good for all later times as well” (15).  Nothing in the 
present can be as good as that which came before it, as its ancestors in the epic past.  Military 
virtue, however, inspires action that is consistent with the epic past.   
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 This past is protected by tradition which exists in the space between the epic past and the 
present.  Bakhtin uses the word “national,” but it is rather a cultural tradition that informs and 
directs the evaluation and interpretation of the epic.  The actual facts or historical events are not 
important, but instead, what is important according to Bakhtin is epic’s “reliance on impersonal 
and sacrosanct tradition, on a commonly held evaluation and point of view — which excludes 
any possibility of another approach — and which therefore displays profound piety toward the 
subject described and toward the language used to describe it, the language of tradition” (17).  
Kaster’s presentation of the grammarians guardians of language and tradition demonstrates this 
same piety.  But this can only exist because epic, as explained by Bakhtin, denies any possibility 
of alternate evaluations or interpretations that disrupt or deny the tradition in which the epic is 
immersed and by which it is constructed.  However, the progymnasmata allowed for and even 
sometimes required subtle, but nonetheless, alternate evaluations or interpretations. 
 Bakhtin presents an absolute epic distance that cannot be traversed.  Because the epic 
establishes and valorizes “firsts,” that is because epic establishes that “all really good things (i.e., 
the ‘first’ things) occur only in the past,” (14) anything that could be heroic or epic in the present 
must be separated by this absolute epic distance.  It is protected by a boundary of tradition, 
through which no contemporary can penetrate.  Bakhtin does allow for present action to be 
considered epic, but only if it is seen or imagined as seen through the eyes of some future 
observer (14).  The “first” must have tradition separate it from the second, third, fourth, etc.  It is 
this understanding of epic that is implicit in discussions of classical education, especially those 
discussions that are concerned with the study of literature and its use in other exercises.  Kaster’s 
grammarian’s can be custodes who are serving the same function as a military commander or 
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provincial governor precisely because they know the boundary on which they are making their 
stand: the tradition that establishes and maintains epic distance.   
 While there may be no physical way to negotiate the absolute epic distance that Bakhtin 
describes, one can traverse it rhetorically.  Quintilian specifically recommends that grammarians 
who teach the early progymnasmatic exercises supply their students with arguments because 
those students are not yet mature enough to complete the full exercise on their own.  But by the 
time students are ready to begin the school of rhetoric they are also ready to begin acting instead 
of merely receiving.  Military virtue is realized through action and as a significant part of the 
habitus; it is cultivated through rhetorical education.  The progymnasmata allow students to 
rhetorically negotiate the boundary of absolute epic distance and act on the past while remaining 
in the present.  In doing so the student is able to realize a sense of virtue through rhetorical action 
in the present, which is a manifestation of military virtue, and to interact with the models of that 
virtue that inhabit the epic past.  This leads to the interplay between history and the habitus. 
 According to Bourdieu, “the habitus — embodied history, internalized as second nature 
and forgotten as history — is the active presence of the whole past of which it is the 
product” (56).  The habitus acts on history as much as it is enacted by the past.  The interplay 
between the past and the individual, according to Bourdieu, is what enables institutions.  Because 
the habitus is informed by history and acts on that history, it is the means by which “individual 
agents partake of the history objectified in institutions” (57).  It allows institutions to be fully 
realized  There exists the ever-present potential for the traditions located within institutions to be 
lost to the past, to become “dead letters.”  It is the active interaction with the past that both 
rescues tradition from becoming dead letters while at the same time it influences and inevitably 
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adapts that tradition to the present.  Without the active interplay located within and enacted by 
the habitus, the traditions Bakhtin sees walled off in the epics would become dead letters, 
irrelevant to the present. 
 The institutions that Bourdieu sees as perpetuated by the habitus are physical: a 
monarchy, church, or financial system (57).  What Bakhtin sees as protected and sacrosanct are 
cultural traditions established by the epic past.  The former are always at risk of becoming “dead 
letters” while the latter are written on every living person in a culture as well as on its 
institutions.  In other words it appears as if individual agents can interact with institutions while, 
because of absolute epic distance, those same agents can always only be spectators to the cultural 
traditions located in the epic.  However, in moving from the exercises of the grammar school to 
the progymnasmata, students transcend the boundary and become actual actors in the epic past 
instead of merely spectators inhibited by epic distance.  The progymnasmata enable the very 
traditions they use as subject matter in that they allow for the interaction between the habitus and 
history.   
Chreia and a Conversation with the Past 
   According to Theon, the exercise in chreia, or anecdote, is a brief saying attributed to 
some specific person (Kennedy Progymnasmata 15). This differs from the maxim in the 
attribution; a maxim is a universal saying that is remembered for its own sake.  Both have their 
place in tradition, but one has its place only because of itself, the other for both the wisdom and 
for the person to whom it is attributed.   Anecdotes could be used in a variety of ways, including 
inflecting the saying, restating the anecdote, refuting or confirming it, or commenting on it.  This 
is the exercise that Theon singles out as contributing to the cultivation of good character in 
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students because they are exposed to the “moral sayings of the wise” (Kennedy Progymnasmata 
4).   
 These sayings, though, could be considered inaccessible or separated from the present by 
something similar to absolute epic distance.  Because the exercise requires a student to interact 
with the saying (and therefore the person to whom the saying is attributed), this distance can be 
rhetorically traversed.  Aphthonius uses as an example this anecdote: “Isocrates said the root of 
education is bitter but the fruits are sweet” (Kennedy Progymnasmata 98).  He then provides 
samples of each of the different required responses, including praise, paraphrase, cause, contrary, 
comparison, example, testimony, and epilogue.  Through the act of composing each of these 
responses, students meet Isocrates and traditional wisdom in the contact zone between the 
present and the past.  This interaction both changes the meaning of the anecdote as well as 
maintains the tradition of which the anecdote is a part. The paraphrase, for example, turns the 
plant metaphor into a work metaphor: “One who longs for education, he is saying, begins with 
the toils, but yet the toils end in an advantage.  The wisdom of these words we shall admire in 
what follows” (Kennedy Progymnasmata 98).  We can see a subtle yet undeniable shift in 
meaning if we consider that the initial anecdote is attributed to a teacher and the paraphrase to a 
student.  At the moment of the composition, the student’s habitus, which of course is informed 
by years of schooling, is partly structured by the labor of being a student.   Isocrates offers the 25
idea that out of that which is not necessarily appetizing, with cultivation and the right 
ingredients, grows something sweet and valuable.  It is a metaphor of patience and cultivation, of 
nurturing and growing.  The student responds to Isocrates, not by denying the value of his 
 For the intensity of daily student life, see Cribiore Gymnastics of the Mind Chapter 4.  25
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wisdom or the traditional acceptance of his anecdote, but rather by framing the discussion in his 
own terms, terms drawn from the habitus.  The result is a paraphrase that reflects the toil of 
education that ends in what one can only hope is an advantage.  The anecdote’s place in the 
tradition of education is secure, but its meaning and understanding is slightly altered. 
 There is a marked difference between the above paraphrase and the one provided as an 
example by Aphthonius’ teacher Libanius.  Other than the obvious more mature style, the 
following paraphrase betrays the habitus of a teacher more than that of a student: 
For when that man [Isocrates] saw the young fleeing from hard work out of fear 
and taking into account the initial sweat but not looking ahead to the benefit from 
it, what does he do?  By setting the end alongside the beginning, and the pleasure 
alongside the pain, he made students more vigorous by means of the pleasure 
rather than more idle by means of the pains.  “For education,” he says, “has a root, 
but it has fruits, and while the bitterness is associated with the former, the greatest 
pleasure is linked with the latter (Libanius 65). 
This paraphrase maintains the gardening metaphor that implies the nurturing patience that a 
teacher has for both the process of education and for the students.  Libanius uses the anecdote to 
provide a lesson to his students, offering them a means of communicating better.  The teacher 
cannot help but impart a new lesson in a paraphrase of the old.  He elaborates on Isocrates’ 
eloquence by bringing attention to the rhetorical strategy employed and the result of that strategy.  
We can see through the language an interaction between the present and the past, between the 
habitus of the person engaged in the progymnasmatic exercise and the traditional wisdom that is 
the subject matter of the exercise.  Through this interaction Isocrates’ wisdom is affirmed and 
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Libanius influences that wisdom with his own subjectivity. 
Refutation and Confirmation: Interacting with Epic Figures 
 The examples of chreia above demonstrate how the interaction of the subjectivity of the 
student and the wisdom of the past form a subtly new tradition.  And when the subject of the 
progymnasmatic exercises deals with mythic traditions, the cultivation of character becomes at 
once more subtle and more significant.  Instead of merely conveying an accepted or traditional 
truth, the myths located in the epics and in other literature are, as Bakhtin observes, the very 
fabric of cultural identity.  This is especially true for the elite class, the members of which claim 
for themselves those traditions immortalized and made sacred in the texts.  Yun Lee Too 
summarizes the role of education in antiquity as “implicated in the structures of power, and 
specifically in training the rulers to be rule and the ruled to be ruled” (13).  There is a tendency to 
see this as stagnant and suffocating.  In other words, it is easy to see epic and the traditions found 
in epic as Bakhtin does — as impossible to influence and change.   
 Webb, in her treatment of the progymnasmata, explains that there was a “practical 
advantage of using familiar epic and legendary figures as the raw material for these 
exercises” (302).  Webb suggests that students’ familiarity with such epics and legends allowed 
them to learn and demonstrate rhetorical skills.  In other words, using these culturally accepted 
stories and characters reduced the number of variables students needed to manage so they could 
focus on rhetorical skills.  She does go on to say that the progymnasmata did imprint cultural 
values on a student’s mind (310), but even then those values appear stable and unchanging.  As 
Bakhtin says, epic distance secures this and by excluding any possibility of activity and change, 
“the epic world achieved a radical degree of completeness not only in its content but in its 
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meaning and its values as well” (17).  According to Bakhtin’s formulation of epic distance, the 
student qua subject cannot interact with the values associated with the epic world; rather they are 
rigidly transmitted via the sacrosanct cultural traditions captured in the epics themselves. 
 However, the function of epic in these exercises is infinitely more complex than this.  
While it is true that education served as a site of reproduction of the mos maiorum and also as a 
site of the reproduction of the power of the elite class, the interaction with the mythic figures and 
the values they represented offered through the progymnasmata produced a habitus that was 
always informed by the present as well as the past.  The exercises in confirmation and refutation 
required a student to engage with a typically fictional and mythic situation and then confirm or 
refute its plausibility, probability, appropriateness, expediency, consistency, etc.  This exercise, 
more than most others, seems to confirm Plato’s suspicion in the Gorgias that because rhetoric 
can make the weaker argument the stronger that it is empty.  Webb points to the example of 
confirmation and refutation of the plausibility of Locrian  Ajax’s rape of Cassandra as support 26
for the idea that the stories themselves are there to be manipulated (302).  Aphthonius explains 
that both refutation and confirmation deal with the “middle ground” or with that of which we are 
unsure (Kennedy Progymnasmata 101, 103).  Because this exercise allows for both the 
agreement and disagreement with tradition as presented by literature, it demonstrates how 
students are able to interact rhetorically with epic tradition and in a way create their own versions 
of that tradition.   
 There is no consensus among the poets as to whether Ajax raped Cassandra during the 
sack of Troy.  Apollodorus says "And then Locrian Ajax, seeing Cassandra clinging to the 
 As opposed to Ajax, son of Telamon, who figures more prominently in the Iliad.  26
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wooden image of Athena, violated her; therefore they say that the image looks to heaven” (The 
Library 2: 236-239; bk. Epitome, ch. 5, sec. 22-23).  Both the poet Lycophron (Alexandra 
350-351; line 360) and the poet Triphiodorus (The Taking of Ilios 628-629; line 645) suggest that 
the rape occurred while Euripides (Trojan Women 20-21; line 70) and Virgil (Aeneid 1: 342-343; 
bk. 2, lines 402-406) describe Ajax as forcefully removing Cassandra from Athena’s temple.  
There is room, albeit little room, for both a refutation and a confirmation of the accusation that 
Ajax raped Cassandra.  The student must argue from knowledge that is culturally certain, that is, 
from information presented in the epics about the character of those involved, and then apply that 
to the argument at hand.     
 Both the confirmation and the refutation recorded by Libanius betray the traditional 
understanding of gender which was characteristic of the Graeco-Roman world and the particular 
habitus that created and maintained power in that world.  In both responses Cassandra appears as 
a character whose gender confines her to the passive role of receiver who can do no more than 
beg the goddess Athena for protection once her city is overrun by the Greeks.  In fact, as the 
analysis below will show, whether or not a sexual act occurred is not at issue at all.  Instead, what 
is at issue in both the confirmation and refutation is whether Ajax’s actions in some way led to 
Athena directing her wrath towards Menelaus and the Greeks as they attempted to return home.  
Instead of addressing the act of rape then, the interaction with the epic past is an interaction with 
those who made decisions before and after the rape.  Did they make the right decisions or did 
their decisions cause the hardships that followed?  By addressing those questions, the participant 
in the progymnasmatic exercise engages the epic past through an analysis and understanding of 
the traditional conceptualization of the habitus informed by military virtue as it is embodied by 
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these men. 
 The refutation begins by expressing the possibility that Ajax was not capable of 
committing the act to begin with: 
First, then, one would be surprised if Ajax — the leader of the Locrians, who led 
so many ships, commanded so many cities, and was honored among the Greeks 
for his virtue and for never falling victim to anything disgraceful — was so 
stricken upon seeing a girl that he immediately went mad (Libanius 115).   
In the Illiad, Locrian Ajax demonstrates his aretē by being the swiftest (next to Achilles) of the 
entire Greek host.  He is able to kill the most fleeing Trojans because of this (Iliad 2: 104-105; 
bk.14, line 506) and only loses a footrace to Odysseus because of the intervention of Athena 
(Iliad 2:548-549; bk. 23, line 740).  He demonstrates excellence in his own actions which then 
makes him a leader to whom his subordinates respond.  His aretē  translates into the potential for 
other virtuous action.  The conclusion that refutation draws is that, as a tested and virtuous 
leader, Ajax could not possibly succumb to the base passions of the flesh.  The argument asks 
that if the passions of war had not made him mad, then is it plausible that seeing this woman 
instantaneously did?  But the refutation even grants that, contrary to his character, if Ajax did 
indeed violate Cassandra in the temple, that action was not necessarily in conflict with his 
character. 
 Libanius next discusses the reactions of several of the leaders among the Hellenes to the 
news of the act.  It is obvious, goes the argument, that wronging a deity comes with a price.  But 
Agamemnon, leader of the Greeks, Odysseus, and even wise Nestor did not act immediately to 
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punish Ajax.   Instead they wait until the prophet Calchas explains to them that Athena is angry 27
(Libanius 117).  The men cannot acknowledge that any wrongdoing occurred; the wrongdoing 
must be explained by another aspect of tradition: the prophet.  In refuting the accusations leveled 
against Ajax, the speaker looks not to the action itself, but to the character of those who were 
involved in the action.  This draws that character into the present to be interrogated by the 
student and then to be rhetorically presented in support of the argument.   
 The same thing occurs in the confirmation, in which Libanius does not deny for one 
instance that Ajax was so enamored by Cassandra that he violated her.  Instead this is presented 
as natural and unavoidable.  The confirmation again betrays the gender roles that were generally 
accepted in the ancient world. Cassandra is present in the story as the recipient of Ajax’s love, 
but here, instead of being in control of that love, Ajax is driven by it.  This love is a force 
powerful enough to overcome the fear of the gods.  The confirmation explains this force: “Well 
then divinity conquered divinity, Love trumping Athena — or rather, the respect owed to the 
latter was vanquished by the arrows of the former” (Libanius 135).  The speaker, however, 
cannot question Ajax’s character for this, because that character is still demonstrative of aretē.  
Instead, we find excuses for the act, such as Ajax convinced himself that because the Trojans had 
lost the war that Athena had therefore abandoned the city (Libanius 135).  Even the other Greek 
leaders are not held culpable because they were overcome with the joy of their victory, the 
thought of plunder, and their upcoming voyage home (Libanius 135).  In the eyes of the Greek 
leaders, Ajax’s actions meet the heroic culture’s emphasis on entitlement.  As a victorious 
warrior, Ajax is due certain rewards and his transgression against Athena is overshadowed by the 
 This is in contrast to the immediate punishment of Palamedes, who is stoned to death after being framed for 27
treason by Odysseus (Apollodorus The Library 2: 179-179; bk. Epitome, ch. 3, sec. 8)
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Greek’s zealous celebration of victory. 
 This interplay between the epic past and the speaker is telling.  Instead of a confirmation 
that attributes blame or responsibility to Ajax, Libanius’ example concedes that the acts did occur 
and at the same time explains those acts by using the same character to which the refutation 
points as reasons to doubt the veracity of the accusations.  Character, as it is embodied by these 
figures and as it is structured by the habitus, is consistent in both responses.  What changes is 
merely the application of that character.  In the refutation the character resists the act; in the 
confirmation, the character embraces the act as a part of heroic culture.  This demonstrates how 
the progymnasmata have the potential to shape and be shaped by the habitus.  The traditional 
idea of character remains constant, but is open to interaction.  The student can question that 
character while still accepting it.  For example, by pointing to the blindness that the Greek 
leaders suffered during their victory celebration, the speaker is able to confirm the traditional 
understanding of rewards in heroic culture and therefore reaffirm the heroic habitus while 
bringing into question whether that understanding could potential have negative consequences.  
At the end of the exercise the understanding of tradition has been both confirmed and altered. 
Prosopopoeia: Bringing Life to Tradition 
 In the examples of chreia, confirmation, and refutation above we can see how these early 
exercises work towards building habits and dispositions that sustain the habitus.  David Fleming 
explains: 
The relevance of the classical program resides, I believe, not in the actual 
exercises themselves (those fourteen assignments in rhetorical form) but in the 
very idea behind this cycle of exercises, the attempt to make of rhetoric not just a 
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theory or art or an historical and cultural artifact or a sociocognitive process but 
rather a complete and developmentally attuned curriculum in written and spoken 
discourse, a multicourse program of language instruction whose end product is 
neither a text nor a skill nor some body of knowledge but a set of deep-seated 
verbal habits and dispositions oriented to public effectiveness and virtue (114).   
When read in conjunction with the discussion of the importance of military virtue in Roman 
culture, Fleming’s observation above illustrates the importance of the influence of that virtue on 
and from the habitus.  The Roman understanding public effectiveness and virtue require the 
habituation of military virtue, and the idea of progymnasmata was, in part, to develop this public 
and virtuous character.  As we have seen, the basic exercises allowed a student the opportunity to 
traverse the border between the absolute epic past and the present and to be habituated to 
traditional concepts and subtly influence those concepts at the same time.  The action in which 
military virtue is realized occurs in this interplay.  Students were able to realize, through this 
action, a sense of agency in this interaction with the epic past.  In the more advanced exercises, 
such as prosopopoeia, the students not only interacted with the absolute epic past, but were 
afforded the opportunity to take their place in that epic past.  Military virtue informed the habitus 
and was realized in the act of becoming. 
 The exercise of prosopopoeia is a speech given in the character of someone other than the 
actual speaker.  While there were some teachers who made a distinction between  prosopopoeia 
and ethopoiia, Quintilian and Theon make no reference to the latter and categorize all speeches 
delivered in a character other than that of the speaker as prosopopoeia.  To help a student 
understand the character of another, Theon advises that one consider the age, nature, status, 
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activity, state of mind, and culture of the personae assumed (Kennedy Progymnasmata 47-48).  
By analyzing and understanding the implications of each of these aspects of character, a student 
was able to develop a sense of the person imitated and then was able to choose the correct words 
and presentation for the given situation.  
 The exercise in prosopopoeia came in two main varieties.  First, general prosopopoeia 
asked a student to become a generic person who was addressing a particular issue.  For example, 
what would a general say to soldiers on the night before a battle or what words would a coward 
say upon seeing that a picture of a war had been painted in his house? (Kennedy Progymnasmata 
47, Libanius 405).  The other variety provided a particular character and situation, typically from 
the epic tradition, and asked the student to provide the words of that particular character.  It is the 
latter on which this section will focus, because it is in the act of becoming those particular 
characters that military virtue is both realized and habituated. 
 The meticulous choice of figures for these exercises betrays the habitus that they 
cultivate.  Achilles, Agamemnon, and Ajax are common figures for students to absorb and 
reflect, as are Hector and Odysseus.  It is in war that the character of these figures is developed 
and on which their aretē depends, and so it is in war that the exercises are set.  Successful 
performance of prosopopoeia didn’t require an imitation of the historic or epic figure. Quintilian 
attributes Cicero’s success in composing speeches for others (a “genuine” form of prosopopoeia) 
to his ability to become those figures: 
Did he not consider the fortune, position, and career of each one of them, and 
produce an image (personam) of those to whom he was lending (dabat) his voice, 
so that they seemed to speak better than themselves, but still to be themselves? A 
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speech which is out of keeping with the speaker is just as bad as one which is out 
of keeping with the subject to which it ought to have been adapted (Institutio 
Oratoria 2: 138-141; bk. 3, ch. 8, secs. 50-51). 
The Latin persona can be translated as character, person, or in a more archaic sense as a mask.  
The speaker literally conceals the face with a mask created by the speech itself.  In addition, the 
Latin verb dabat, (a form of do) commonly translates as to give or to lend.  However, the verb 
carries with it the connotation of surrender or of offering rather than a sense of a giving a gift 
(which is the Latin verb dono), for example.  Read literally then, this passage characterizes 
prosopopoeia as surrendering one’s voice to another’s character and in doing so creating a mask.  
Here Quintilian goes so far as to suggests that the orator is able to absorb the character of the 
person to whom the words are surrendered and then to reflect an image that is better, in certain 
ways, than the original.  Of course Quintilian is talking about a professional orator who is 
lending mature skills to people who are unable or ill-equipped to speak for themselves.  In the 
school, however, the continual absorption and reflection of characters that are representative of 
tradition habituates that same tradition in those who participate in the exercises. The epic figures 
lend their character to those who do not have one of their own yet and the students surrender 
their voices to those figures of the epic past.   Again the absolute epic past is in contact with the 28
student’s present, informing and developing the habitus.   
 These exercises frequently involved a heroic figure in a military scene.  It is the setting of 
the speech along with the character of the figure that cultivate the habitus.  A theme in Libanius’ 
collection requires the student to compose the words Achilles would say when the Greeks are 
 The lending of a virtuous character, or its bestowal of a from a past figure to a person in the present is the theme 28
of several declamations, one of which I treat in detail in Chapter 5.
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being beaten (367).  This theme is located in what Webb calls the “closed, fictional universe, 
with predictable values and roles for characters” (304).  However, in bringing Achilles to life, in 
becoming the character of Achilles, students were able to act in ways consistent with the values 
and traditions into which they were being socialized.  Habituating virtue was more than merely 
reading about virtuous people or actions, it required acting in a way consistent with the accepted 
virtue and in a way consistent with those who had already demonstrated that virtue.  Much like 
tracing their letters on wax tablets, the students traced the virtuous actions of these epic heroes 
by discursively bringing them to life. 
 The theme above brings Achilles to life and frames the plight of the Greeks as a result 
both of Achilles’ virtue as much as Agamemnon’s lack of that virtue.  In absorbing and reflecting 
only what is noble about Achilles the response also illuminates that which should not be 
absorbed.  The Greek misfortune is attributed to Agamemnon’s lack of control (as opposed to 
Achilles’ refusal to continue fighting with the Greeks).  This manifests itself in two ways, first in 
his inability to resist taking Briseis from Achilles and second in his continued lack of respect and 
concern for anyone other than himself.  Achilles is guided by a traditional hierarchy of virtue.  
He represents the pinnacle of that virtue, having demonstrated an aretē that far surpasses any 
other of the Achaeans.  The response grounds Achilles in this hierarchy, listing his 
accomplishments, including capturing twenty-three cities, labors on land and sea, and delivering 
a large amount of spoils to Agamemnon.  His aretē is capped by the assertion that he did all of 
this even though he “had no quarrel with the Trojans” and instead the feats he performed came 
out of a “love of glory and out of a wish to show favor to those who had been abused” (Libanius 
369).  The war was a means for Achilles to demonstrate his aretē, to be an exemplar of human 
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excellence; having done that, he believes that he has earned the respect according to the 
traditional hierarchy.    
 This particular exercise, however, draws out an inconsistency between obedience to 
authority and adherence to traditional mores.  By performing Achilles, a student must see the 
world as Achilles does.  The student must accept that traditional hierarchy of virtue that demands 
respect and must reject that which does not adhere to that hierarchy.  Here is where we can begin 
to see the interplay between the habitus and tradition in a way that is informed by performing 
this particular mythic figure.  According to Cribiore, “the schooling system has always been a 
agent of social, cultural, and political continuity, serving as a tool for maintaining the social order 
by placing people in appropriate niches in society” (Gymnastics 9).  It would follow that the 
progymnasmata served this purpose as well, or at least as well as the lessons of the grammar 
school.  And the exercises do, if the absolute epic past remains sacrosanct.  
 As we have seen, the Romans had a very clear and very strict concept of authority.  The 
patria potestas established the power of a father as all but absolute within the family.   A family 29
member was compelled by law and tradition to obedience and obedience to the paterfamilias 
became a virtue in and of itself.  The relationship between father and family extended culturally 
to the relationship between those who possessed power or influence and those that followed, so 
that commanders became known as fathers to their soldiers and the Emperor Augustus came to 
be know as the “father of his country (patris patriae)” (Suetonius Divus Augustus 1: 214-215; ch. 
58, sec. 1).  Obedience to the state and to figures of authority was as traditional at Rome as it was 
 In the following chapter I discuss in detail how the authority of the paterfamilias is both supported and challenged 29
in declamation.  
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at Sparta.   Agamemnon, as leader of the Greek contingent against Troy, holds this role in the 30
Iliad.  For all of his shortcomings, he still retained the authority of overall commander, and it is 
towards this figure that Achilles’ wrath is directed.  In rhetorically performing Achilles, a student 
must challenge the authority of Agamemnon, an act that is not consistent with the habitus 
cultivated in the schools, but that is consistent with the hierarchy of virtue established in the 
absolute epic past. 
 The result of this interplay is a redefining and refining of what constitutes authority and 
virtue.  The speaker challenges Agamemnon on several fronts.  First he is challenged on his 
inability to control himself, an inability that leads to the misfortune of the Greeks.  Control of the 
self is a vital aspect of the military virtue that I have been developing, and a lack of self control 
leads not just to misfortune for the individual, but misfortune for those over whom the individual 
exercises control.  Second, the speaker tacitly challenges Agamemnon’s adherence to the 
culturally established mores, particularly the hierarchy of virtue.  It is not that Agamemnon 
should concede control or power to Achilles, but that he should recognize and respect superior 
aretē.  Agamemnon’s blatant disregard of this culturally established protocol bring his authority 
into question and also results in failure of the Greeks.  Thus the speaker, while performing 
Achilles, points to a failure of Agamemnon’s leadership, but a leadership defined by the 
speaker’s cultural understanding and not that of the epic past.  The speaker is able to rhetorically 
negotiate the boundary between the epic past and the present and this negotiation is made visible 
through the categorization of Agamemnon as a culpable leader, but whose culpability lies in his 
lack of military virtue. 
 For a detailed account of obedience at Sparta, see Nigel Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue and Jean Ducat, 30
Spartan Education.  
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 On the other hand, the speaker reflects that which is culturally good in Achilles.  That is, 
the speaker performs Achilles’ respect and support of the ancient traditions.  This is why the 
speaker can say without any fear of reproach that he is happy to see the the Greeks suffer defeat, 
even at the hands of a cowardly and lucky Hector (Libanius 369).  Achilles’ act of withdrawing 
his support of the Greeks is a defense of traditional values.  Libanius, in the character of Achilles, 
says: “He [Agamemnon] has treated me like a brute, while they [the rest of the Greek contingent] 
have remained silent. For this reason they are routed, they are slaughtered, and they fear Hector 
just like one of the arrows from heaven” (Libanius 369-371).  In other words, the Greeks suffer 
because they failed to uphold tradition by ignoring Achilles’ aretē.  This rhetorical performance 
builds in the student an understanding of the importance of these traditions and also embodies 
these traditions.  They come to life in the performance of the exercise, but they come to life in a 
body already inscribed with different cultural values and traditions.   
The Work of the Progymnasmata 
 Fleming suggests that we see a distinctions between the progymnasmata as exercises and 
the idea of the exercises.  To Fleming the idea is one of continually and systematic education that 
develops disposition and habits, something that could be applied to education today.  I have 
shown how the progymnasmata develop not only these rhetorical habits, but also enhance and 
cultivate the habitus informed by military virtue.  Rhetorical education and performance, as my 
treatment of these exercises has shown, allowed a subtle, but nevertheless apparent, interaction 
with the traditions and cultural identity of the epic past.  Through the interplay between the 
individual and the epic past, the progymnasmata allow students to become cultural agents who 
shape understanding of ancient traditions.  
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 Practice in the progymnasmata provided students with the rhetorical skills necessary to 
move on to the more advanced declamations in more ways that one.  Besides honing the 
technical skills of composition and besides arming the student with accepted cultural meanings 
that could be inserted into a variety of speeches, the progymnasmata provided the students the 
opportunity to interact with and influence the very idea of character and virtue that was born in 
the epic past and that is protected by tradition.  The performance of the exercises and the subject 
matter of those exercises instilled a deep respect for the traditions of the past while subtly 
influencing those traditions and in the process continued to form the character of the students.  In 
the next chapter I will explore how declamation in Latin continued to mold and influence this 
character by presenting and supporting the idea of military virtue. 
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Chapter 5: Defending Character: The vir fortis in 
Declamation 
Roman Declamation as Exercise and Performance 
 As we have seen, students in the Roman schools were enveloped by traditions as 
represented in literature and myth.  In the grammar schools the grammatici introduced students 
to the study of literature as the study of the epics.  In the early phases of rhetorical education, the 
progymnasmata brought tradition and epic characters into the present and allowed the student the 
opportunity to interact with the military virtue represented in those traditional stories.  In the 
previous chapter I demonstrated how this interaction with the epic past habituated a traditional 
and heroic sense of military virtue in students.  As students moved on to the culminating 
exercises of the rhetorical education, the declamations, they brought with them a connection 
between rhetorical performance and these examples.  This connection continued in declamations. 
But rather than being located in the epic past, the declamatory themes positioned military virtue 
in common and contemporary contexts.  This allowed students to examine this virtue as it existed 
and was embodied in their own time and place. 
 The Roman practice of declamation presents an intriguing academic problem.  On the one 
hand, declamation can be interpreted as a vaporous, over-the-top performance of pure rhetorical 
skill.  In the introduction to his translation of the Elder Seneca’s Controversiae, Michael 
Winterbottom asserts that the development of declamation under the Empire was, in part, a result 
of the decline of real oratory in the law courts and assemblies (ix).  He points, in a sarcastic 
manner, to the practice as a means of education: “Boys were trained to argue about ancient rights 
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and the government of the Roman empire by exercises on pirates and the battle of 
Thermopylae” (xiii).  Winterbottom’s skepticism is echoed by other scholars whose focus is 
Roman education.  Marrou sees in school declamations a “taste for paradoxes and 
improbabilities” and “remote questions of conscience, imaginary laws” (268), and Bonner sees 
the controversia as a means to develop a sense of stasis and lines of argumentation (Declamation 
12ff).  These positions on declamation, which tend to focus on the place and use of declamation 
in an educational environment, portray the practice as empty of any real significance and as a 
mere fact of the educational system.  Gunderson appropriates Shakespeare to summarize this 
understanding of declamation: it is recited by an idiot and it signifies nothing (Declamation 5).   
 On the other hand, more recent studies of declamation have pointed to the practice as 
both a means of performance and of self-presentation.  Instead of dwelling on the practice as it 
functioned (or failed to function) within education, such scholars as Maud Gleason, Eric 
Gunderson, and Neil Bernstein focus on the professional and public spectacle that was 
declamation.  Gleason’s Making Men demonstrates how the professional declamatory 
performance provided an opportunity for orators to fashion a self-image and then perform that 
image over and over again.  For Gleason these performances existed in an important cultural 
space, an agonistic space that provided a test of excellence (159-160).  The cultural space that 
Gleason describes is not for students.  Rather is existed for mature, accomplished orators who 
were willing to brave the contest in an attempt to perform a particular virtus.  In Staging 
Masculinity, Gunderson portrays these performances as functioning in a similar way, but views 
declamation and performance through a psychoanalytic framework.  Bernstein presents 
declamation as a site of the play between power, authority, and elite identity within the safe space 
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of fictitious themes and staged performances.  The more recent scholarly attention paid to 
declamation tends to examine how it functioned as a means of the perpetuation of certain power 
relations. 
 Suetonius says that Cicero continued to declaim well into his old age, that Pompey 
declaimed during the civil war, and that Marcus Antonius and Augustus both declaimed during 
the war at Mutina (De Rhetoribus 2:414-415; sec. 1).  These school exercises must have provided 
these leaders with something useful other than the opportunity to fashion an image of themselves 
or to reinforce the habits of proper argumentation.  To these individuals declamation was a 
private affair and not the public spectacle of the rhetorical teachers who were attempting to 
demonstrate their skill and the potential skill of their students.  What did declamation offer these 
grown, established, and politically consequential public figures that they continued to perform 
even while they were fighting wars?  Do these exercise then offer the same benefit or 
opportunity to students within the rhetorical schools?  These questions inform the discussion of 
declamation and its relationship to military virtue that follows.  Because leadership and rhetoric 
at Rome were so dependent on the character of the speaker — a character that demonstrated the 
necessary virtus and auctoritas — those who possessed (or strove for) auctoritas had to 
constantly work to both maintain and demonstrate that character.  In declamation, military virtue 
served much like a mask.  Similar to the persona that Quintilian described, military virtue as 
experienced through declamatory performance provided an acceptable character to which 
students and established public figures lent their voices.  Declamatory performance then alters 
the habitus and discursively transforms speakers into that which their audience expects. 
 Declamation is the practice of composing and reciting speeches that are not meant for 
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real oratorical situations.  That is, declamation is an exercise created for the teaching of oratory.  
Marrou traces the practice of declamation to the Greek schools, asserting that declamation, as a 
Roman practice, only existed because of the Greeks (286).  Declamation is typically divided into 
two types, suasoriae, or declamations on an historical theme or topic, and controversiae, which 
are comprised of mock-judicial speeches composed and delivered as if in the law court.  Of the 
two, the controversiae are often the most criticized for being too distant from reality.  Even in 
antiquity, the outlandish themes and characters received an enormous amount of criticism.   A 31
student, presented with a theme, would be required to compose and perform a speech addressing 
the theme and then face the teacher’s critique of the performance.  More advanced students 
would even perform for an outside audience of parents and friends, much like a modern day 
recital.  Cribiore shows that, in Libanius’s school, students presented and were corrected in front 
of the entire student body, adding to the stress and demonstrating the importance of a solid 
performance (Libanius 201-202).   
 Gleason sees the function of declamation as, in part, a means of self-fashioning.  In this 
sense, declamation is and only can be performance.  However, she adds that performance alone 
was far from enough to establish a reputation; declamatory performance required agonistic 
encounters: “For a rhetorician who aspired to preeminence, professional quarrels were not a 
luxury but a necessary medium for self-advertisement.  Feuding sophists found indignation an 
unfailing stimulus to wit and a useful catalyst in the construction of a public 
personality” (Gleason 28).  Inherent within the agonism of declamatory performance is a 
 Bonner attends to numerous criticisms of declamation, which range from the superficiality of declamation, the 31
lack of restrictions on the facts surrounding the themes, the artificiality of declaiming before an audience and not a 
judge (Declamation 72ff).  
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demonstration and manifestation of virtus.  Upon successfully performing a declamation, the 
self-fashioned excellence of the sophist is realized through a recognition of virtus.  Cicero, 
according to May, performs his auctoritas and virtus in actual court cases, but a similar 
performance occurs in the practice of declamation, especially declamation as professional 
spectacle.  Even in the school environment though, a successful performance earned the student 
what Bourdieu calls symbolic capital.  Students gained the admiration of their peers and a 
reputation as a future orator through these performances. 
 Declamatory performance allowed a student to demonstrate an evolving virtus that would 
fully manifest itself in public life.  During imperial times, this performance became one of the 
only means by which virtus was demonstrated.   But, if declamatory performance provided an 32
opportunity to demonstrate virtus, the logic of the exercises themselves also habituated a sense of 
the military virtue discussed in chapter 2.  Quintilian suggests that declamation, especially 
suasoriae that require the declaimer to assume a different character (a more advanced version of 
the prosopopoeia discussed in the previous chapter), changes the way a speaker thinks.  “Did 
Cicero think in the same way or assume the same personality when he wrote for Gnaeus 
Pompeius and Titus Ampius and the others?” (Institutio Oratoria 2: 138-139; bk. 3, ch. 8, sec. 
50).  Constantly interacting with personalities, constantly playing with the ethos of great figures 
of the past in school exercises leads to a habituation of those personalities and characters.  In 
other words, this interaction structures the character of the student in a way that is consistent 
with accepted traditions.  To demonstrate this, we need to move away from the performativity of 
 See McDonnell, Roman Manliness for an in depth, historical examination of the decline in aristocratic 32
participation in martial activities.  The absence of opportunity for martial display and performance is replaced by 
rhetorical display and performance, which demonstrates a similar virtus.  
!122
declamation and attempt to read the themes and sample responses to those themes.  Gunderson 
seeks to establish a sociology of declamation in which we understand Roman society by 
understanding declamation.  He points out that “declamation thus encourages the objectification 
of the social logic of Rome on the part of the participants within that logic” (Declamation 233).  
In other words, declamation allowed Romans to play with social and cultural issues to determine 
the best (and culturally appropriate way) of resolving those issues.  As a method of habituation of 
military virtue, however, these exercises limited the freedom of play of that specific aspect of 
particular themes.  While students were free to use pirates, prostitutes, and other stock characters 
as they wished, the sacrosanct vir fortis remained always an embodiment of military virtue and 
therefore a consistent and immovable legacy of the mos maiorum.    
In his introduction to the Controversiae, the Elder Seneca observes the decadence of the 
first century of our era and attributes it to the “feeble and spineless” generation he sees.  He asks 
if any of them is “sufficiently a man (vir)”  (1: 8-9; bk. 1, ch. pref, secs. 8-12).  What he then 
offers his sons, in this collection of declamatory themes and responses, is a method of avoiding 
the trappings of this perceived feebleness.  Seneca implies that by meditating on these 
declamations and by perhaps declaiming on the themes, his sons will fulfill their potential as 
viros or men.  This Latin word vir, instead of the more common and neutral homo, carries with it 
military connotations, as it also translates to soldier, foot soldier, or brave man.  It is with this 
connotation that a stock character in declamatory themes, the vir fortis, provides an embodiment 
of the traditions of the mos maiorum for declaimers to examine, inspect, and ultimately to accept 
as ideal.   
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The Figure of the Vir Fortis in Declamation 
 Along with the other stock characters (pirates, tyrants, prostitutes, violent fathers) and the 
themes that accompany them — themes that Gunderson calls “ridiculous” but important because 
they “produce authority and authenticity at Rome” (Declamation 21) — the vir fortis appears as 
the object of an advocate’s case or as the identity assumed by the student.  Bonner explains that 
the sordid and sexual themes of some declamations appear to force declamatory exercise into a 
degenerative state, especially when coupled with flamboyancy of style (Declamation 41).  
However, the opposite could be said for declamatory themes involving the vir fortis.  According 
to declamatory practice, this character is a person whose conspicuous gallantry during war earns 
a public reward.  Typically these rewards deal with the law.  For example in the theme of 266 of 
the Declamationes Minores, a man who becomes a hero (fortiter fecit) asks for a retrial for an 
earlier conviction of treason.  In 253 of the Declamationes Minores, the vir fortis asks for the 
trial at which he was accused of adultery to be cancelled.  In Seneca, one theme involves a law 
that exempts a person who has earned the title vir fortis three times from further military service 
and whose father disinherits him for volunteering to serve a fourth time (Controversiae 1: 
176-177; bk. 1, ch. 8. sec. 1).  In all of these cases, the specific virtue earned through courageous 
military action stands elevated, even against the law and any previous action.  It is this elevation 
that positions the vir fortis as a character to be studied apart from the other stock players in 
declamation.  Each of these others, including the paterfamilias — who traditionally possessed 
unmatched and unquestioned authority — is subject to and reliant on the law.  Bernstein sees this 
subjugation of traditional authority as a way to demonstrate the rhetorical nature of that authority 
(17-18).  To Bernstein the character of the violent father, for example, merely serves as an 
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instance of established authority that must be reconciled with that same authority’s need to be 
rhetorically constructed and reinforced. The vir fortis, on the other hand, has surpassed even the 
authority of the laws of Rome and is entitled to request exemption from those laws.  As the 
Master (the anonymous author of the Declamationes Minores) discusses in a sermo, “Here we 
are accustomed to say that no reward can be found which is not in conflict with some law, and 
that the power (potestatem) of heroes (virorum fortium) is great because it transcends all laws 
(quia supra omnia iura sit) (Declamationes Minores 1: 184-185; ch. 266, sec. 1). 
 The vir fortis is a pure instance of the Roman concept of libertas.  As Valentina Arena 
observes, libertas, simply defined and as understood by the Romans, exists in contradistinction 
to the state of slavery (14ff).  Arena’s work shows that liberty is the state of an individual who is 
not under the dominium (direct control or subject to the will) of someone else.  While this sounds 
like a simple definition, the concept of dominium is rather complex.  Dominium is more that 
merely control; instead it is the utter dependency of the slave (or non-free person) on the will of 
the dominus.  According to Arena, this is why laws in the late Republic were products of the 
assemblies and not the Senate, because the laws, which regulated the people, were initiated 
through the people’s own dominium and not that of others (67ff).  This subjugation to the will of 
another is the defining factor of slavery.  In essence, a slave could be free to make his own 
choices, but that freedom is based only on the caprice of the dominus and can be revoked or 
suspended at any time.  Rewards that are granted to the vir fortis free that individual from the 
will of the lawmaking body and therefore the people; the vir fortis is free from even the 
dominium of the state.  The actions of the hero, while directed towards maintaining the libertas 
of the state, also serve a means of obtaining personal and unequaled libertas.  
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The Hero Without Hands: Virtue, Action, and Responsibility 
 Even though it was part of a fictitious theme, the military virtue of the vir fortis was 
sacrosanct precisely because it was virtus as defined by tradition.  Specifically, it was 
demonstrated through military action.  Even fictitious military action renders realized and useful 
military virtue that can be used and appropriated by the student.  The student becomes 
accustomed to interacting with and demonstrating this virtue while reinforcing it as a 
manifestation of auctoritas and potestas (via the elevated status of the vir fortis in relation to 
written, established laws).  Gunderson explains that authority to the Romans was physically 
represented by the hands.  Manus literally means both hand and authority and our English word 
manumission is taken from the Latin manu mittere which means released from the hand and 
refers to a slave or son being released from a master’s authority (Declamation 60).  The 
following controverisa appears in Seneca’s collection:  
The Hero Without Hands 
 Whoever catches an adulterer with his mistress in the act, provided that he 
kills both, may go free.  A son too may punish adultery on the part of his mother. 
 A hero lost his hands in war (Vir fortis in bello manus perdidit).  He caught 
an adulterer with his wife, by whom he had a youthful son.  He told the son to do 
the killing.  The son refused.  The adulterer fled.  The husband now disinherits the 
son (Controversiae 1:105; bk. 1, ch. 4).   
Gunderson sees this particular theme as another in a long line of themes about mutilation, 
dismemberment and deferred and challenged authority.  Other than passing comments about the 
faded authority of a great soldier, he pays little attention to the functioning of the vir fortis in the 
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theme and recognizes only the sympathy that the declaimers evoke through the character of the 
hero (Declamation 75-78).  The vir fortis, however, and the military virtue this father still 
embodies, plays a much more significant role in the theme. 
 The wounded vir fortis should be an embodiment of military virtue.  His scars, in this 
case the lack of hands, are the traditional marks of valor.  However, unable to satisfy his marital 
obligations and unable to exercise the authority granted to him by the law, the theme presents the 
hero-father as impotent.   The father even apparently lacks the traditional authority as 33
paterfamilias because the son, even though he is obligated by the patria potestas to follow his 
father’s orders, refuses to obey his father’s order to kill the adulterers.  The military action that 
demonstrated a virtus that earned him the title vir fortis (and what one would assume a 
significant amount of auctoritas) actually robbed him of it.  The theme situates this particular vir 
fortis in circumstances in which he is physically unable to perform his traditional and ideal role.  
As an ideal, the Roman soldier is the ultimate embodiment of masculinity; and as father and 
soldier, this particular vir fortis both represents and defends the mos maiorum.  The law that 
grants the power of a man to kill an adulterous couple is a law that defends the traditional 
masculinity and authority of the husband.  As Bonner’s study reveals, even after this law was 
modified, the power of life and death of an adulterous couple still resided with the woman’s 
father, her paterfamilias (Declamation 120).  The vir fortis in this case loses his hands in service 
to the state (and therefore the traditions of the state) and is faced with another opportunity to 
continue that service, an opportunity he cannot realize because of his previous injuries.  He 
therefore turns to his son, his legacy and a future and potential masculine figure whose 
 Bonner provides the history of this law, which provided the legal authority for a man to slay an adulterous couple. 33
(Declamation 119-120).
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traditional place would also be to defend and uphold the mos maiorum, to take his place and act 
in a manner that demonstrates his potential to become a vir fortis.  The father presents his son the 
opportunity to demonstrate his own virtus, and the son fails.  He is disinherited, not only from his 
father’s estate (and the spoils of his victories) but also from the habitus informed by military 
virtue.  The father earned the title vir fortis but the son is incapable of an action that would 
achieve the same end. 
 The double failing of the son (in his responsibility and role as a son and as a man) serves 
to highlight the character of the vir fortis.  This is a figure who has not failed to function in a 
traditional role; instead, he is the very embodiment of that role.  The vir fortis willingly 
surrenders the physical representation of his auctoritas to protect the idea of that authority.  A 
declaimer is forced to confront and play with the ethos of the vir fortis, not just because a 
wounded soldier is a trope that plays on the emotions of an audience, but also because the very 
heart of the case rests on the idea of that ethos and its relationship to the state.  In other words, 
the case itself forces a contemplation of military virtue.   
 We can see this in the responses to “The Hero Without Hands” that Seneca collects.  The 
fragments that argue for the vir fortis tend to highlight ethos while contrasting the father’s ethos 
with the son’s.   After implying that there is a connection between the father’s traditional role and 
the son’s responsibility to take over that role, Porcius Latro suggests that there can be no familial 
relationship between the son and the vir fortis:  “Are you a hero’s son? — you cannot draw a 
sword.  — Even in my maimed state I could only be taken  — in at home” (Controversiae 
1:106-107; bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 1).  Latro is using a traditional Roman conceptualization of character 
here.  Cicero captures the Roman understanding of character as matters of inheritance, choice, 
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fortune, and natural bias (De Officiis 118-123; bk. 1, sec. 116-120).  Of inheritance Cicero 
explains: 
They, whose fathers or forefathers have achieved distinction in some particular 
field, often strive to attain eminence in the same department of service: for 
example, Quintus, the son of Publius Mucius, in the law; Africanus, the son of 
Paulus, in the army. And to that distinction which they have severally inherited 
from their fathers some have added lustre of their own; for example, that same 
Africanus, who crowned his inherited military glory with his own eloquence. 
Timotheus, Conon's son, did the same: he proved himself not inferior to his father 
in military renown and added to that distinction the glory of culture and 
intellectual power (De Officiis 118; bk. 1, sec. 116). 
Good sons like Scipio Africanus inherit the distinction of their fathers and add to that distinction.   
Cicero continues to explain the duty of young men: 
It is, then, the duty of a young man to show deference to his elders and to attach 
(nitatur) himself to the best and most approved of them (optimos et 
probatissimos), so as to receive the benefit of their counsel and influence. For the 
inexperience of youth requires the practical wisdom (prudentia) of age to 
strengthen and direct it. And this time of life is above all to be protected against 
sensuality and trained to toil and endurance of both mind and body, so as to be 
strong for active duty in military and civil service (De Officiis 124-125; bk. 1, sec. 
122). 
A youth must be supported by the “best and most approved “ role model possible.  Traditionally, 
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as we have seen with the example of Cato the Elder, this role model is the father and an even 
better and more socially approved role model is a father who is also a vir fortis.  A son would 
most certainly be prepared for military and civil service if attached to this model.  So, when 
Latro holds that the son who fails to kill his adulterous mother in the place of his disabled father 
cannot be the son of a vir fortis, he is arguing from this traditional understanding of character.  
Latro speaks in the father’s voice: “I have hands, I called my son”  (Controversiae 1:106-107; 34
bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 1).  The father assumed that his son would act in a manner consistent with his 
own character, in the manner of a vir fortis.  When the son fails in this regard, the father’s the 
response is not disbelief at the act, but a denial of the familial relationship. The son’s failure of 
character can only be explained by denying his relationship to the vir fortis. 
 The character of the vir fortis can be transferred to the state.  Cestius Pius, Seneca recalls, 
replaces the son with the Republic.  Pius also establishes that the vir fortis could not have a son 
(and therefore a replacement for his own hands), and so he finds a substitute:  “I invoke you, 
Republic, you have my hands”  (Controversiae 1:106-107; bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 2).  The disabled 35
soldier has given his hands to the state and he asks for the state to serve as a foster son.  If the vir 
fortis cannot find the ideal character in his son, then he has to look for it in the traditions he 
served.  Fulvius Sparsus takes the idea of service and uses it as another discriminator between 
the character of the son and that of his father: “Young man, now comes the time for your military 
service”  (Controversiae 1:108-109; bk. 1, ch. 4, sec. 3).  Again the requested act takes on a 36
 Habeo manus vocavi filium34
 Te, re publica, invoco, quae manus meas possides35
 Adulescens, venit tempus militiae tuae36
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military and virtuous color.  Killing the adulterers is akin to defending the state in that it protects 
the mos maiorum.  The son is called upon to reenact the military virtue of his father and he fails 
to do so.  The declaimer is forced into recognizing the father’s military virtue by addressing its 
absence in the son. 
Claiming Military Virtue: Arms and Hero 
 In the previous theme, the son’s fault is in failing to carry on the tradition of military 
virtue established by his father.  The declaimers recognized and exploited this as a fault, and in 
other themes the eagerness to reenact military virtue was lauded.  In the following theme recored 
by Seneca the question of how far one should go to perpetuate military virtue is at issue: 
The Victor who Used Weapons Taken from a Tomb  37
Violation of a tomb is to be actionable. 
While a certain city was at war, a hero lost his weapons in battle, and removed the 
arms from the tomb of a dead hero. He fought heroically, then put the weapons 
back. He got his reward, and is accused of violating the tomb (Controversiae 1: 
446-447; bk. 4, ch. 4). 
In this theme the military virtue of the dead vir fortis is reenacted by the man who used his 
weapons.  The question is whether the action that demonstrated military virtue takes precedence 
over the desecration of the tomb.  In defending the action, the common line of argument is that 
the new hero was infused with the power of the old hero through his arms.  The declamation 
recorded by Seneca has the weapons recognize the virtue in the new hero: “I had scarcely 
touched the weapons: they followed me” (Controversiae 1: 446-447; bk. 4, ch. 4) and the 
 This theme also appears in the Declamationes Minores 369 with the slight alteration that the man who took the 37
arms from the tomb did not originally lose his own.  
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response in the Lesser Declamations describes the arms as “the tools of courage (virtutis 
instrumenta)” that aided not one hero but two (Declamationes Minores 2:364-365; ch. 369, sec. 
3).  In taking these weapons, the new hero allows them to act as they should, as extensions of 
virtus.  Instead of an act of sacrilege, the hero is carrying on the tradition of virtue that the dead 
vir fortis began and which is in contradistinction to the son who fails to follow his father’s 
example. 
 The actions of the new vir fortis are presented as consistent with the traditions of military 
virtue.  The act of taking the weapons cannot be for personal gain:  “We both lent what the other 
lacked: he gave a man arms, I gave the arms a man (ille viro arma, ego armis virum). — The 
state (res publica) gained much, the hero lost nothing” (Controversiae 1: 446-447; bk. 4, ch. 4).  
The new hero acts in a way that is consistent with traditional expectations and in contrast to the 
failed son of the previous declamation.  Instead of selfishly refusing his responsibility, his actions 
are consistent with the needs of the state and of tradition.  The response in the Lesser 
Declamations emphasizes the same impetus for the action: 
These are the tools of courage (virtutis instrumenta), not the yields of a crime; 
with them I deserved a reward.  If I had not taken them, you would not accuse me; 
you would have no laws.  I took them, I confess, but for the public survival.  Are 
you surprised?  I would thrust back the enemy with the falling masonry of the 
tombs themselves (Declamationes Minores 2: 366-367; ch. 369, sec. 4).   
He goes on to establish an even closer connection between the established, virtuous actions of 
the past and the continuation of that traditional virtue.  Recalling Polybius’ comments about 
Roman funeral services we can see in this declamation the action that the historian claims is 
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inspired by that spectacle.  Polybius says that the veneration of dead heroes at Rome cannot help 
but inspire in the youth a desire to emulate their actions (Histories 1: 503; bk. 6, ch. 53).  In this 
declamation that desire is enacted by the new vir fortis who arms himself with the objects that 
were on display during the funeral and in the tomb, objects representative of the virtue of the 
past.   
 Even the prosecution of the new vir fortis has to engage with traditional military virtue.  
Again, this demonstrates that this character is different from those other stock characters in 
declamation.  The prosecution, as Seneca recalls, frames the entire argument in the fact that the 
new hero lost his own weapons and therefore lacked a full sense of military virtue.  By losing his 
weapons, the new hero could never have been a hero to begin with.  Here again it is useful to 
recall the story of Cato’s son in Plutarch.  Upon losing his sword in combat, Cato’s son does not 
take the nearest weapon, but instead searches for his own.  In recovering his own weapon, Cato’s 
son demonstrates the military virtue that his father cultivated in him from birth.  The loss of his 
own weapon and the subsequent commandeering of the weapons from the tomb negate the virtue 
of the new hero in this declamation.  In either case, in the argument for or against the new hero, 
the declaimer must interact with and address the military virtue represented by the vir fortis.   
The Responsibilities of a Soldier: Becoming a Hero by Defending Tradition 
 This virtue is embodied (and assaulted) in the Miles Marianus, the third of the Major 
Declamations ascribed to Quintilian.  The declamatory theme is rather simple: “During the war 
against the Cimbri, one of Marius’ soldiers killed his superior officer, a man related to Marius, 
for attempting to inflict an unnatural sexual act upon him.  The soldier is tried before the general 
on the charge of murder” (Major Declamations 27).  The speech on behalf of the soldier 
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describes his actions as representative of the military virtue I have been discussing.  After first 
swearing that the soldier would not have killed the tribune had the latter only intended to kill 
him, the advocate states that the soldier, if found guilty, “will march without hesitation to his 
execution, as prepared to die for his self respect as he was to kill for it” (27).  Gunderson 
explains that the soldier’s act prevented the humiliation that is the result of being the recipient of 
homosexual penetration (Declamation 154), and Bernstein’s attention pinpoints the attack on and 
subsequent rebuilding of authority within the declamation (25-28).  The combination of these 
two presents the military virtue of the soldier.  Legal authority, the authority to which soldiers 
were constantly reminded of their obligation (Polybius 1: 489-490; bk. 6, ch. 37), punishes the 
physical assault of a superior with death.  The soldier was instinctively willing to accept this 
death sentence in order to prevent a penetration.  The advocate links this willingness to die for a 
traditionally right cause with the character that constitutes Rome’s power: “we have triumphed 
more times because of our character than our physical strength” (Major Declamations 34).  The 
tribune’s assault was a threat to Roman tradition as much as barbarian invasion was a danger to 
Rome itself, and the soldier’s defense of both is lauded as virtuous.  He embraces the authority of 
the most fundamental tenets (those devoted to masculine dominance) of the mos maiorum, as 
Gunderson’s reading shows, and protects those above all else, including the written laws 
themselves. 
 Marius’ soldier, then, was not protecting himself when he killed the tribune but was 
protecting Rome; he embodied the virtue of a soldier by risking his life for the sake of his 
country.  There is no irony in Horace’s line: “Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori” (Odes 144; 
bk. 3, ode 2, line 13).  Rather modernity and Wilfred Owen introduce it much later.  His actions 
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allow the advocate to rhetorically (re)present a military virtue that is part of the foundation of 
Roman tradition and culture.  It defends the mos maiorum as much as it is a part of the mos 
maiorum; and it is, in part, through the practice of declamation that students are exposed to and 
come to accept this virtue as commonplace and right.  Bernstein asserts that by exploring the 
contours of the act presented by the speech on behalf of the soldier, by speaking the unspeakable 
and by then naming it, the exercise (re)presents the soldier as a vir fortis, or hero (183).  The 
advocate even requests that if Marius doubts the soldier’s story and defense, that he delay 
judgment until the next battle, during which the imperator would witness for himself the vir 
fortis in action. 
 The case of the Miles Marianus presents the declaimer with not just the soldier as vir 
fortis, but the imperator Marius as another embodiment of military virtue and a historical (almost 
mythic) vir fortis himself.  The figure of Gaius Marius preserved by Plutarch is one of almost 
complete martial virtus.  The historian describes the physical appearance of Marius by pointing 
to a statue of the general: 
As for the personal appearance of Marius, we have seen a marble statue of him at 
Ravenna in Gaul, and it very well portrays the harshness and bitterness of 
character which are ascribed to him. For since he was naturally virile and fond of 
war, and since he received training in military rather than in civil life, his temper 
was fierce when he came to exercise authority (Life of Gaius Marius 9: 466-467; 
ch. 2, sec.1).    
Plutarch sees Marius’s character, harsh, bitter, and fierce as important traits in this successful 
military commander and they are a result of nature as well as training.  It is important for 
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Plutarch to note that Marius’ success and potential are recognized by another mythic general, 
Scipio Africanus.  Plutarch records Scipio’s thoughts concerning the young, junior officer under 
his command: 
When the talk after supper had to do with generals, and one of the company 
(either because he really wished to know or merely sought to please) asked Scipio 
where the Roman people would find any such chieftain and leader to follow him, 
Scipio, gently tapping Marius on the shoulder as he reclined next him, said ‘Here, 
perhaps.’ So gifted by nature were both men; the one in showing himself great 
while still a young man, and the other in discerning the end from the beginning 
(Life of Gaius Marius 9: 482-483; ch. 3, sec. 3). 
Marius becomes a figure in his own right by being recognized by another vir fortis.  He performs 
actions in front of his commander and his own troops that earn for him a recognition of that all 
important character.  His later accomplishments, his consulships and triumphs, are all further 
demonstrations of this initial recognition.  Plutarch praises Scipio for the ability to discern a great 
figure at so early a stage.  As I established earlier, it is an aspect of military virtue to judge well, 
and Scipio demonstrates that prudential judgment, the use of practical reason, doesn’t necessarily 
have to be directed towards action.  Rather, it can also be used to recognize character.  Scipio 
embodies military virtue in his recognition of Marius’ potential to embody the same. 
 It is to this manifestation of prudence that the declaimer must appeal.  It is illuminating to 
examine how Plutarch presents the historical episode on which this declamatory theme is based.  
Plutarch establishes that Marius earned the respect and admiration of his soldiers, in part, 
because of justness in judicial decisions (Life of Gaius Marius 9: 496-497; ch. 14, sec. 1).  The 
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details of the case remain the same, although both the soldier (Trebonius) and the potential rapist 
(Gaius Lusius) are named.  After describing the events, Plutarch says this of the trial: 
Here there were many accusers, but not a single advocate, wherefore Trebonius 
himself courageously took the stand and told all about the matter, bringing 
witnesses to show that he had often refused the solicitations of Lusius and that in 
spite of large offers he had never prostituted himself to anyone. Then Marius, 
filled with delight and admiration, ordered the customary crown for brave exploits 
to be brought, and with his own hands placed it on the head of Trebonius, 
declaring that at a time which called for noble examples he had displayed most 
noble conduct (Life of Gaius Marius 9:498-488; ch. 14, sec. 5). 
In a scene similar to the one in which Scipio recognizes the young Marius as a vir fortis, the 
imperator names Trebonius as a hero.  In an act similar to what Althusser describes as 
interpellation, Trebonius is recognized and welcomed into the ranks of the brave, martial men.  
Althusser describes interpellation as the means by which ideology hails individuals as subjects. 
In other words it is a process by which subjects are created as subjects within and by ideology 
(Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses 1504).  Here Trebonius’ goal is to be hailed and 
therefore constituted as a particular subject, the vir fortis.  The soldier discursively shapes 
himself in order to be hailed as the subject he wishes to be.  His action could either be considered 
a cold-blooded murder of a superior or a courageous defense of the Roman ideal of manliness 
and virtue.  He must rhetorically present the latter and in doing so fashion himself into a 
character worth of being hailed. 
 The task of the declaimer is the same: to present the soldier in a way that the fictional 
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Marius will recognize him as a vir fortis.  Therefore the declaimer must present the soldier’s 
actions as being consistent with the military virtue that constitutes the conceptualization of the 
vir fortis.  This requires the declaimer to turn over and play with the ideas that compose military 
virtue and then discursively construct a character that will be recognized by another vir fortis.  
The model declamation establishes the link between Marius and the soldier early, questioning 
whether any soldier of Marius could act only in service of himself (Major Declamations 27).  
Marius, as the model of military virtue for this legion and vir fortis, cannot have failed to 
inspired in his soldiers the same virtue he embodies and enacts.  The declaimer actually makes 
reference to this later in the declamation, asserting: 
 Although we were in a time of bitter warfare, they embraced it as a golden 
opportunity to be lucky enough to complete their basic military training under 
your tutelage, to see every day the example of your god-like virtue, to have your 
encouragement for their hard work, and to have you witness it (Major 
Declamations 29).    
While this may sound like a bit more than flattery, the advocate places Marius in the role of 
witness and therefore judge of hard work.  Virtuous behavior, hard work, and military training as 
combined in the bodies of the soldiers are not genuine unless they are recognized by Marius.  
Bernstein sees the pleas of the advocate as appeals to Marius to repair a rupture of authority that 
occurred when the soldier killed the tribune (Major Declamations 28ff).  But in order to repair 
this rupture, the soldier must serve in lieu of the dead tribune as a new officer, one that 
demonstrates the character of the vir fortis, not the character of a would-be homosexual rapist.  
He must be discursively constructed in a way in which another vir fortis would recognize him 
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and interpellate him.  This serves as an example then of how entwined a declaimer becomes with 
the idea of military virtue and how encountering the vir fortis within the world of declamation 
provides opportunities for a student to interact with ideal Roman character. 
 The Miles Marianus is one of the few declamatory exercises in which the actions of the 
hero are discussed as part of the case because the case itself constructs the soldier as a vir fortis.  
Typically declamations involve the character of the vir fortis, not the actions that let to the title.  
Unlike the actions of other players (prostitutes, defiled daughters, pirates, violent fathers, 
disowned sons) that must be explained, the actions that led to becoming a hero are sacrosanct 
within the declamations.  What remains is only the hero’s character.  It is the necessary 
interrogation of the character (ethos) of the vir fortis that provides an opportunity for the 
cultivation of a sense of military virtue, not the actions that led to the title.  A student is given the 
opportunity to examine every aspect of character pertinent to the case and to use the aspects that 
would prove most prudent.  The values of military virtue embodied by the vir fortis (service, 
courage) are reinforced and recalled through the act of declamation.  As Gunderson shows, 
declamation is “generative of the very object that one might believe to have been merely 
cited” (Declamation 41).  In other words, by interacting with the military virtue vir fortis, even 
artificially, the student learns to accept it as a legitimate and powerful part of tradition.  
The Naturalness of Military Virtue and the Compulsion to Serve 
 Another Senecan controversia plays with the naturalness of military virtue.  The theme 
states: 
Three Times a Hero 
Anyone who had acted heroically (fortier fecerit) shall be exempted from military 
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service. 
A father tries to stop a man who has acted heroically three time and wants to fight 
a fourth time.  The son refuses; he disinherits him (Controversiae 1: 176-177; bk. 
1, ch. 8). 
The theme presents the son’s compulsion towards war as something almost unnatural.  Who, one 
could ask, chooses to be in danger even the when state does not require it?  This controversia is 
consumed with the question of character and the obligations associated with that character.  
Seneca says as much when he discusses the division of the case:  “The fact that he acted bravely 
so often doesn’t bring him greater rights—merely greater credit” (Controversiae 1: 184-185; bk. 
1, ch. 8, sec. 7).  Here Seneca dispenses with the reward traditionally granted to the vir fortis 
because the case is not about the reward’s conflict with the law.  Instead, the declaimers even 
disregard the question of the inheritance and tend to argue either for or against the son’s further 
military action.  The question becomes a matter of the son’s obligation, either to his father and 
the patria potestas or the state and his own accomplishments. 
 Kaster suggests that declamation served as a means for young Roman elites to understand 
how to recognize and address ruptures in the cultural fabric of Rome.  Kaster explains: “It then 
becomes the declaimer’s job to put the surfaces back into some sort of acceptable, more or less 
conventional order — which is precisely the role for which the declaimer is being 
trained” (“Controlling Reason” 328).  For Kaster, Roman education was an education in the 
reasoned approach to confronting crises of culture.  In the case above, there is an apparent crisis 
between two important tenets of the mos maiorum, the son’s desire to serve the state and his 
obligation under the patria potestas to obey his father.  Following Kaster’s understanding of the 
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declaimer’s role, the student must find a way to reconcile this crisis and demonstrate the 
consistency of the cultural traditions.  Mento argues for the father along these lines: “The state is 
ashamed to employ a soldier with so many scars.  Such virtue (virtutem) should not fall without 
an heir.  You must marry.” (Controversiae 1: 178-179; bk. 1, ch. 8, sec. 3).  Here, the state and 
the father are seen as one in the same and the son is reminded of his future as a paterfamilias.  
The argument subtly invokes the Ciceronian assertion that Rome’s strength lies in its virtuous 
young men.  The father pleads with the soldier to serve the state by providing future men of the 
same character who will take his place.  Another similar division requires that the soldier be kept 
safe to serve as a model for the youth (Controversiae 1: 186-187; bk. 1, ch. 8, sec. 9).  In this 
way the father’s request and the needs of the state are the same and there is no cultural crisis.   
 Albucius Silus used this argument for the case of the viri fortis “men who have been 
defeated (victi) three times go on soldiering” (Controversiae 1: 180-181; bk. 1, ch. 8, sec. 4).  
There is a shame in not being an active part of service to the state.  Publics Asprenas captures the 
hero’s character the best and his argument is worth quoting at length: 
 It is you I obey, father, you who use to say we become immortal by the glory we 
win, you who used to kiss my wounds when I came back from battle.  Do you 
think that I can suddenly switch to obeying these new and different precepts?  It is 
not so.  The emotion that was the first to enter our minds is the one that holds 
sway over us.  Luxury, avarice, sloth, envy, fear cannot be unlearned — and every 
day all these things are either reproved or punished, so tenacious are we even of 
our vices.  Believe me father, I cannot control myself when the familiar noise of 
battle has burst out.  It thrills me to attack the enemy, to scatter the opposing ranks 
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with the sword.  It is this energy, this spirit that has decorated your house with 
three sets of spoils from the enemy (Controversiae 1: 180-183; bk. 1, ch. 8, sec. 
5).   
This argument demonstrates a meta-awareness of the function of declamation in the rhetorical 
schools.  It presents the character of the soldier as both natural and cultivated by the father’s 
precepts.   Recalling the education that Cato provided to his son, an education that led to the 38
younger Cato’s success in war, the declaimer here describes the creation of a vir fortis and the 
character that the vir fortis embodies, a character that in this case drives the soldier to disregard 
the orders of his father. 
 Bourdieu explains how the habitus is created: 
The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence 
produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured 
structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles 
which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively 
adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an 
express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them (53).  
The habitus is a systematic conditioning, not necessarily a conscious one, that organizes 
practices.  The father’s actions early in the soldier’s life, in concert with the already established 
Roman cultural admiration of military virtue, structured his character in such a way that he is 
 The relationship between the actions of a hero and the father’s influence are explored in depth in Minor 38
Declamation 278, the theme of which presents a hero who had been exposed by his biological father and 
subsequently adopted.  The declamatory law awards 10,000 to the father of a hero and the exposer contests the 
award of the money to the adoptive father.  This declamation presents the crisis of nature vs nurture and forces a 
resolution based again on tradition.  The argument for the adoptive father is successful because that father formed 
the character of the hero.  
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incapable of acting contrary to his character.  His compulsion to go to war again and again is a 
manifestation of the military virtue inherent in the habitus that Cicero describes: “For there is 
really no other occupation in which human virtue approaches more closely the august function of 
the gods than that of founding new States or preserving those already in existence” (De Re 
Publica 28-29; bk. 1, sec. 12).  Through comparing the preservation of the state to the function of 
the gods Cicero casts military service as mythic.  Demonstrating military virtue through action 
has resulted in the accumulation of significant symbolic capital, enough that the soldier is even 
ironically exempt from the actions to which the habitus directs him.  
 While declamatory themes rarely involve actual war or the acts that take place in war, the 
personae of the hero qua hero provides a character with which the students constantly interact 
and this interaction leads to the continued production of the habitus.  This interaction, especially 
between the ethos of the vir fortis and the competing forms of authority, demonstrate to the 
student the hierarchy of values and virtues at play within Roman tradition.  They constitute the 
cultivation of the habitus informed by military virtue.  Constantly turning over these characters 
and assuming their identities also provided practice in self-presentation, an aspect of professional 
declamation that Gleason in Making Men describes in detail.  She points to another moment of 
meta-awareness in a speech delivered by the sophist Favorinus to defend a statue of himself.  In 
the speech, Favorinus explains that his education and rhetorical skill has made him, a Gaul and a 
natural eunuch, a model of both manliness and Greekness.  Gleason explains: 
He had become an international celebrity in the Roman Empire as a virtuoso 
exponent of Greek culture.  Implicit in this vision of Greek culture that he 
represents is the assumption that self-transformation is possible through rhetorical 
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training, that diligent practice in the art of improvisation in a very traditional 
medium will result in the alteration of one’s habitus (17).    
Gleason suggests that Favorinus actually alters the habitus and discursively transforms himself 
from a Gallic eunuch into a Greek male, but only because this is what the audience expects him 
to be.  If declamation is a fictional narrative, the telling of a story, then Wayne Booth’s 
description of the implied author helps to illuminate the difference between the self-presentation 
of the sophist Favorinus and the production of the habitus through interaction with the vir fortis.   
 To Booth, the implied author is the self inevitably inferred by an audience.  He explains: 
However impersonal he may try to be, his reader will inevitably construct a 
picture of the official scribe who writes in this manner — and of course that 
official scribe will never be neutral towards all values.  Our reactions to his 
various commitments, secret and overt, will help to determine our response to the 
work …. Just as one’s personal letters imply different versions of oneself, 
depending on the different relationships with each correspondent and the purpose 
of each letter, so the writer sets himself out with a different air depending on the 
needs of particular works (The Rhetoric of Fiction 71).   
Both Booth and Gleason’s explanations of the self in narrative are Aristotelian in their 
presentation of the author/speaker.  Ethos is something created and embedded in the narrative 
and has no bearing on the real or genuine self of the author.   Gleason takes this a step further to 39
claim that the chronic presentation of this implied self actually can enact a transformation that 
 Booth explains this in terms of an audience’s appreciation of a narrative:  “A great work establishes the “sincerity” 39
of its implied author, regardless of how grossly the man who created that author may belie in his other forms of 
conduct the values embodied in his work.  For all we know, the only sincere moment of his life may have been lived 
as he wrote the novel” (The Rhetoric of Fiction 75).
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alters the habitus.  In each case though, there is a conscious effort on the part of the creator to 
present an image of themselves.  The rhetorical student who engages in declamation, while they 
may rhetorically present a self consistent with the needs of the case, also are confronted with 
models of character and are forced to recognize and accept certain conceptualizations of 
traditional virtue. 
  John Lobur makes an interesting observation as he discusses tyranny in declamation.  He 
positions the vir fortis as the anti-type of the tyrant (in place of a good king, who, as he observes, 
doesn't exist in the declamatory world) (165).  Military virtue is therefore conceptualized in 
contrast to the vice of tyrannical authority, and the vir fortis is a character that directly opposes 
the tyrant.  If there is no good king to model virtue within these exercises, then the model of 
military virtue, the vir fortis, is left to stand alone as the character of a correct, Roman male (and 
as I will show in chapter 7, military virtue and those that embody it are suited for what served as 
a Roman conceptualization of leadership).  The opposition of the character of the vir fortis and 
that of the tyrant further distances the former from any sort of critique.  As mentioned above, the 
vir fortis is already elevated above the law, so the figure momentarily embodies pure Roman 
libertas by not even living under the dominium of the state.  As the binary opposite of the tyrant, 
the vir fortis stands as a defender of libertas.     
 Seneca’s concern at the beginning of the Controversiae is that Roman men had stopped 
being sufficient men.  Seneca praises his sons’ desire to learn from the great declaimers of the 
past, and offers his collection as not just a transcription of their words, but more importantly a 
record of their strategies (Controversiae 1: 6-9; bk. 1, ch. pref, secs. 6-7).  Declamation served as 
a means to develop orators, leaders, and elite Roman citizens.  The vir fortis and military virtue 
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as conceptualized in these declamations served as the models and examples to create and 
cultivate those citizens.  Through constant interaction with the concept of military virtue the 
students in the rhetorical school were habituated into its practice and became part of its 
reproduction through rhetorical performance.  This reproduction, as the next chapter will show, 
occurred not only through performance, but by the very conceptualization of rhetoric in treatises.  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Chapter 6: The Orator is a Warrior: Metaphor in Rhetorical 
Theory 
 Until this point I have examined how rhetorical education at Rome contributed to the 
cultivation of the habitus informed by military virtue.  As the previous chapters have shown, 
teachers, texts, and the student compositions themselves all served as means of performing this 
traditional concept and as we move from practice into theory, military virtue changes in its 
manifestation.  The treatises that formed rhetorical theory in the Roman world contained 
conceptualizations of the military and of military virtue that worked towards establishing the 
domain of the subject as well as its ends.  The cultural meanings associated with the military are 
appropriated by the rhetorical theorists of the first century BCE to the first century CE through 
the use of metaphors describing oratory and the orator.  Rather than developing and perpetuating 
military virtue among the elite, the conceptualization of rhetoric as martial connects oratory with 
military virtue at the level of understanding.  Rhetorical action becomes military action and the 
orator becomes a general whose efforts are directed towards service to the public.  This 
conceptualization helped to shape how the orator and oratory were viewed within the culture of 
Rome and also contributed to the expectations of a rhetorical education.   
 The common, classical understanding of metaphor is one of a figure of thought or speech.  
The Rhetorica ad Herennium explains: “Metaphor occurs when a word applying to one thing is 
transferred to another, because the similarity seems to justify this transference. Metaphor is used 
for the sake of creating a vivid mental picture” (342-343; bk. 4., ch. 24, sec. 45).  Quintilian, has 
a similar definition of metaphor, although he categorizes it as the most beautiful of tropes, and 
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explains that “while moderate and timely use of Metaphor brightens our style, frequent use of it 
leads to obscurity and tedium, while its continuous application ends up as Allegory and 
Enigma” (Institutio Oratoria 3: 426-427; bk. 8, ch. 6, secs.14-15).  Metaphor functions as a 
figure that adds ornament to a composition but doesn’t necessarily develop or contribute to 
meaning or understanding.  This is why the cautions that Cicero and Quintilian offer with regard 
to metaphor are always associated with style.  Cicero, for example, cautions against the use of 
vulgar metaphor, especially when metaphorical expression “hits our senses” (De Oratore 2: 
128-129; bk. 3, sec. 163) or advises taking the edge off of a harsh metaphor by introducing it (De 
Oratore 2: 128-129; bk. 3, sec. 165).   
 The work of George Lakoff and Mark Johnson introduces a new way of understanding 
the work that metaphors accomplish.  Instead of serving as ornament, they see metaphor as 
functioning both at the level of cognitive understanding and culture.  As they explain: “Our 
conceptual system thus plays a central role in defining our everyday realities” (3).  Crucial to 
their work is the idea that human thought processes are largely metaphorical and therefore that 
our conceptual system is structured and defined by metaphors (6).  Zoltán Kövecses explains that 
conceptual metaphors work by forming our understanding of one conceptual domain in terms of 
another conceptual domain.  The metaphorical linguistic expression is drawn from the source 
domain and applied to the target domain.  The understanding derived from the application of the 
language of the source domain onto the target domain is called a conceptual metaphor (4).  For 
the purposes of this dissertation the source domain is the military and martial action and the 
target domain is rhetoric.  The conceptual metaphor that is constructed from the application of 
martial language on rhetoric is that rhetoric is martial, that rhetorical virtue is military virtue, and 
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that rhetorical action is martial action.   
 More than just structuring understanding, metaphors influence and shape how humans 
experience and act in the world.  Lakoff and Johnson point to the metaphor Time is Money to 
demonstrate how that conceptual metaphor determines how those human beings who live and 
understand the world through a Western, capitalist culture can only experience time as 
conceptualized as money (9).  Once this conceptual metaphor structures how the world is 
experienced, it is very difficult to experience it or act in any way contrary to that structure.  This 
leads to the conclusion that cultural values form a significant influence on metaphorical systems.  
Lakoff and Johnson observe that “not all cultural values coherent with a metaphorical system 
actually exist” but “that those that do exist and are deeply entrenched and consistent with the 
metaphorical system” (22-23).  The cultural values demonstrated through the military virtue I 
have been discussing are deeply entrenched in the metaphorical system and structure the cultural 
understanding of rhetoric and rhetors. 
 Because metaphorical systems conceptualize one domain in terms of another, these 
systems are necessarily exclusionary.  That is, in using a particular source domain to 
conceptualize a target domain, all other source domains are excluded from structuring the 
understanding of the target (Lakoff and Johnson 10-13).  In fact, any attempts to break with the 
conceptual metaphoric system tend to result in misunderstanding because the system conceals so 
well.  Because cultural values are consistent with the metaphorical system, the sources that are 
revealed typically reflect the dominant cultural views and those that are hidden are typically 
those sources which reflect identities that are inconsistent with those dominant cultural views.  
Because of the connection with Greek heroic culture, conceptualizing rhetoric and virtue as 
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martial necessarily engages concepts of masculinity.  One must at least wear a mask of 
masculinity because the metaphoric system that shapes the understanding of rhetoric as a means 
of expression and that is apparent in rhetorical theory, relies on traditional concepts of 
masculinity.  What is concealed then, in this system, is the idea that rhetoric or virtue (or as we 
will see in Chapter 7, leadership) could be conceptualized as feminine or nurturing instead of 
masculine and agonistic. 
 There were examples of great female military leaders in antiquity.  Boudica was a 
respected adversary of the Roman Army in the British Isles in the first century CE.  Herodotus 
records the accomplishments of Artemisia during the Persian Wars, and his presentation of her 
demonstrates how even these female leaders, in order to be successful, had to perform and 
represent masculinity.  Artemisia was Queen of Caria, a Persian province located in modern day 
Turkey.  She joined Xerxes in his war against the Hellenic alliance, commanding five ships (The 
Persian Wars 3: 400-401; bk. 7, sec. 99).  Not only was she a capable naval commander, but she 
also proved to be one of Xerxes’ trusted advisors, but only because she was able to demonstrate a 
masculinity necessary to be considered capable of martial prowess.  The Greek Herodotus, 
steeped in the masculine tradition of the epics, attributes to her these words of advice to Xerxes: 
Tell the king, I pray you, Mardonius, that I who say this have not been the 
hindmost in courage or in feats of arms in the fights near Euboea. Nay, master, but 
it is right that I should declare my opinion, even that which I deem best for your 
cause. And this I say to you—Spare your ships, and offer no battle at sea; for their 
men are as much stronger by sea than yours, as men are stronger than women 
(The Persian Wars  4: 64-65; bk. 8, sec. 68).   
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It is only right for her to advise the king because she has proven herself a man instead of a 
woman.  She has fought courageously, more than some of the men in the army.  Herodotus also 
has her demonstrate the physical difference between men and women, subjugating the latter 
under the former while at the same time performing her own strength.  Herodotus completes this 
performance of masculinity in describing Artemisia’s daring escape during a sea battle.  The 
historian explains that upon being hopelessly pursued by an Athenian ship, Artemisia rams and 
sinks another Persian vessel in order to escape.  Not knowing that this was a friendly vessel, 
Xerxes says “My men have become women, and my women men” (The Persian Wars 4: 86-87; 
bk. 8, sec. 88).  Her demonstrated military prowess and courage enact a transformation, depicting 
Artemisia in the only way that could be acceptable, as masculine.  To conceptualize something as 
martial is to conceal the feminine and reveal the masculine.  The metaphoric system that draws 
on the antique cultural understanding of war and the military only allows this type of structuring.   
 Metaphors then create a reality rather than contribute to or enhance the description of an 
existing reality (Lakoff and Johnson 144).  The case of Artemisia illustrates how that reality is 
created in Herodotus.  Lakoff explains that this work, though, is primarily unconscious.  In the 
Political Mind, he explains that we know and understand the world through metaphors because 
our early experience shapes our neural pathways in such a way that we cannot help but 
conceptualize certain domains in terms of others.  He explains, for example, that we know and 
accept the primary metaphor “Affection is Warmth” because at a young age, we feel the 
sensation of warmth through body heat when we are held (84).  It is only the abstract domain, in 
this case affection, that is mapped because warmth is known and publicly experienced, whereas 
affection is not (84).   
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 The domain of the military in antiquity is more complex than feeling warmth while being 
held, but national myth, tradition, and the reality of life at Rome brought the military into the 
everyday lives of most citizens.  More importantly, the military was a reality and expectation for 
most aristocratic males.  The military service and prowess of their ancestors was thought to be a 
part of their character.  Kövecses explains that agents sometimes pattern their actions after a 
particular source domain (61).  To explain how metaphors influence the interpretation of history, 
he uses the example of the Mormon’s movement west, which they conceptualized as an Exodus.  
There is a combination of the subtle, unconscious cognitive conditioning that Lakoff discusses as 
well as the more active shaping of the discourse of rhetoric that Kövecses explains in the 
metaphors located in these rhetorical treatises.   
 There are three different ways in which martial metaphors function within these Roman 
rhetorical treatises.  First, because of the overwhelming emphasis on judicial oratory, martial 
metaphors conceptualize rhetoric as adversarial or agonistic.  Lakoff and Johnson use the 
metaphor Argument is War in their book to demonstrate how metaphors influence both how we 
understand a domain and how we act with regards to that domain.  By examining this metaphor 
they are drawing on a very old and traditional understanding of argument, but their treatment 
does not address any particular cultural understanding.  When the agonism revealed through this 
metaphoric system is viewed alongside the concept of military virtue that I have been 
developing, it is clear that these metaphors do more.  To enter into an agonistic encounter with 
another person the orator must perform and possess military virtue to be successful.   
 The second way in which martial metaphors function is to elaborate on how one is 
prepared for this agonistic encounter.  Rhetoric provides the weapons and the training in those 
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weapons that an orator uses in these encounters.  There is a constant tension in rhetorical studies 
between those gifts bestowed on the orator by nature and those skills acquired through art.  When 
conceptualized as weapons provided to a soldier, aspects of rhetoric that are taught in school, that 
is those aspects that could be considered part of an art, become subservient to the natural abilities 
of the person.  The character and abilities of the orator become the significant factors in 
performance, success, and morality and rhetoric as a field of study has no ethics apart from the 
orator.  Recall the vir fortis whose character and actions, not whose weapons, earned reward and 
distinction.  The particular weapons were essential to success as we have seen through the 
example of Cato’s son who risked everything to regain possession of his weapons.  However, 
virtue is demonstrated through actions, not by weapons. 
 The third use of the martial metaphor conceptualizes the orator as a military commander. 
The fundamental principal underlying and informing the entire Institutio Oratoria is the 
humanist notion that the perfect orator must be a good man (vir bonus).  Clarke observes that 
Quintilian’s work, more than others who used this formulation, focuses on the orator and not 
oratory (115ff).  Oratory is a means of demonstrating the virtue of the orator, not of obtaining it.  
This is similar to the idea that war is the means of demonstrating the courage and fortitude of a 
vir fortis, not as the place where those virtues are created.  Early in the Institutio, Quintilian 
compares generals to philosophers in order to demonstrate this inherent goodness of character: 
“because they [generals] have always preferred to do right rather than to profess it” (Institutio 
Oratoria 1: 58-59; bk. 1, ch. proem, secs. 14-15).  It is in the general’s action that character is 
revealed, not in the philosopher’s contemplation of character, and this analogy begins the 
combination of military virtue (in this case embodied in the general) with the orator and oratory.  
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The orator as military commander is a persistent metaphor throughout the Institutio Oratoria 
which serves to reinforce the definition of the orator as a vir bonus by using the cultural 
acceptance of the military commander as embodying certain lauded virtues. 
Adversarial Metaphors 
 Hawhee has demonstrated how in ancient Athens the notion of aretē was situated in the 
agōn.  Because aretē, according to Hawhee, was always a state of becoming, and therefore only 
realized in the quest, the agōn provided the location in which one could demonstrate the results 
of that quest.  This is why one victory could not secure aretē for the athlete or rhetor because 
aretē was derived from “productive strife” and was therefore continual (22-27).  Hawhee 
explains the one aspect of the connection between athletics and rhetoric as a function of theorists 
and practitioners conceptualization of rhetoric: “Their art infused by agonism derived from and 
connected with athletics, orators would continue as Olympians of a certain kind, living agonism, 
questing after aretē, and incorporating athletic terminology and situations into their art and 
speeches” (30).  Gleason points to the same need for competition as a means of demonstration of 
skill: 
For a rhetorician to aspire to preeminence, professional quarrels were not a luxury 
but a necessary medium for self-advertisement.  Feuding sophists found 
indignation an unfailing stimulus to wit and a useful catalyst in the construction of 
a public personality.  If they had had no rivals, they would have created them to 
define themselves (28).   
Both Gleason and Hawhee point to the necessity of agonism to rhetorical display.  The agonism 
may take different forms, to realize aretē, Greeks needed a venue to demonstrate the “productive 
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strife” they had endured in order to perform excellence. 
 The Roman sense of agonism as it applies to rhetorical performance differs from the 
Greek in the same way that the Roman sense of military virtue differs from aretē.  As Hawhee 
sees it, aretē is conceptualized as a game, and although Greek athletics were extremely serious 
and contained significant private consequences, they were nonetheless games with no public 
stakes.  In conceptualizing rhetoric as martial, the Roman notion of military virtue adds a sense 
of public interest to the conflict.  Virtue is demonstrated not just in the preparation and not just in 
victory, but also in the reasons for the conflict itself.  Quintilian claims that “a good man (vir 
bonus) will of course prefer to defend rather than prosecute, but he will not have such a horror of 
the very word ‘accuser’ that he cannot be persuaded by public or private duty to call a person to 
account for his actions in life” (Institutio Oratoria 5: 254-255; bk. 12, ch. 7, sec. 1).  Cicero also 
sees the defense as the more honorable cause.  He advises that one should only prosecute when 
“in the interest of the state, or to avenge wrongs (as the two Luculli, for example, did) or for the 
protection of our provincials (as I did in the defense of the Sicilians, or Julius in the prosecution 
of Albucius in behalf of the Sardinians)” (De Officiis 218-219; bk. 2, sec. 50).  The choice of 
cause reveals something about the character and virtue of the orator, and defense of a citizen by 
an advocate is an extension of the defense of citizens by a soldier.  One must not just engage in a 
conflict, but one must also engage on the right side of the conflict, the side that allows for a 
demonstration of military virtue. 
 Sides of an argument have strengths and weaknesses and the Roman conceptualization of 
the agonistic encounter recognizes and addresses these strengths and weaknesses.  Before 
discussing how the martial metaphor reveals this particular aspect of Roman rhetorical theory, it 
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will be useful to illustrate the concept of strength and weakness.  The idea that an orator could 
make the weaker argument appear the stronger was disturbing to some philosophic schools and 
this is one of Plato’s concerns in the Gorgias.  Christopher Tindale makes a useful distinction in 
sophistic thought in his explanation that the sophists did not merely make the weaker argument 
appear the stronger, but they actually were able to make it the stronger (19-22).  This could 
happen because truth, to the sophists was conditional; that is something was true if people were 
convinced that it was true (Tindale 27-29).  Therefore, to make the weaker argument the stronger 
was a demonstration of aretē or excellence at speaking.  This follows Hawhee’s 
conceptualization of rhetoric as a competition that is a means of demonstrating skill and not as 
eristics.   
 To conceptualize argument as martial, however, is to change the nature of an adversarial 
relationship.  Instead of a demonstration of skill, a martial confrontation is the calculated use of 
violence directed towards the protection of the public interest.  It is a conflict in which there is a 
right side and a wrong side, as described above, and it is a conflict in which sometimes the 
wrong side is stronger.  Cicero describes how strength dictates tactics with a martial metaphor in 
De Oratore.  Antonius discusses his actions when faced with an adversary whose argument is the 
stronger: 
I make it a practice, if some matter presses rather too forcibly upon me, to retire, 
but in such a manner as not to look as if I were running away even with my shield 
slung behind my back, much less after throwing it away, but to exhibit a certain 
seemliness and dignity in my delivery, and to execute a retreat that looks like a 
fight; and when I come to a halt to stand on my guard in such a manner as to 
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appear to have given ground for the sake of taking up a certain position, not for 
the sake of escaping the enemy (De Oratore 1: 422-423; bk. 2, secs. 294-295). 
The sophistic conceptualization of argument would have Antonius demonstrate skill by making 
his side the stronger.  He even recognizes this by claiming that there are those who would 
ridicule him for not attempting to make his argument the stronger (De Oratore 1: 422-423; bk. 2, 
sec. 294).  The metaphor is a response to this criticism and frames the conflict in terms of serving 
the public instead of personal interest.  Antonius preserves his side of the argument by not 
attacking the stronger position, but instead giving way and allowing that stronger position to 
show weakness.   
 The source domain for this metaphor frames argumentation in terms of a battle, and more 
specifically in terms of the decision to give battle.  In the Gallic Wars, Caesar describes his 
caution in engaging in a battle with the Belgae because of the superior numbers of the enemy.  
Instead, the imperator delayed the Gallic forces while searching for a weakness to exploit.  Once 
he determined that the terrain was favorable to a battle and that his side was strong enough, he 
entrenched his forces and coaxed the Belgae to attack those defenses (Gallic Wars 100-103; bk. 
2, sec. 9-10).  While immediately giving battle would have appeared more courageous and had 
the Romans won the day would have demonstrated superiors skill, the consequences of losing 
the battle were more significant than the benefit of attempting to attack the stronger side.  The 
source domain of battle frames argument as having greater stakes than just the reputation or 
demonstrated skill of the individual.  Antonius, for example, is willing to be overly cautious in 
the attempt to not do any damage to his client’s case (De Oratore 1: 422-423; bk. 2, sec. 295).   
 Conceptualized as battle, the target domain of rhetorical encounter bears the 
!157
responsibility of the well-being of the public and this is why we see metaphors that establish the 
agonistic nature of rhetorical encounter use the source domain of battle instead of the source 
domain of gladiatorial contests in the arena.  Recall the aristocratic contempt for gladiators 
discussed in chapter 2.  On the one had, gladiators were under the dominium of their owners and 
so were not citizens and did not possess libertas.  On the other, their actions in the arena, 
although martial in appearance, were more like athletic competitions than warfare because the 
outcome of the contest had no bearing on the interests of the public.  Pierre Cagniart holds that 
the gladiatorial and other arena based metaphors in Seneca the Younger’s Stoic writings compare 
“the courageous attitude of the gladiator and his resolute stand against death to the ideal attitude 
of the wise man confronted with adversity and death.  Courage and endurance, self-control and 
self-reliance are some of the goals of the student of Stoicism, and these qualities were often well 
illustrated in the amphitheater” (616-617).  These metaphors also demonstrate the accusation that 
the wise man, in his quest for perfection, ignores the greater public interest.  They reveal the 
personal struggle against personal adversity, which is why we find little to no gladiatorial 
metaphors in rhetorical treatises. 
 The concept of military virtue that I have been developing puts the characteristics that 
Seneca finds useful in comparing to the wise man into the service of the public and not into the 
service of the individual.  Battle, instead of gladiatorial combat, exists as the primary site of the 
demonstration of this type of virtue.  Quintilian makes this distinction of virtue clear in his 
description of Isocrates:   
Isocrates is an orator of a different kind, neat and polished, better suited to the 
wrestling school (palestrae) than to the battle-field (pugnae). He aimed at all the 
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graces of style, and he was right to do so, because he had trained himself for the 
lecture room, not for the courts. (Institutio Oratoria 4: 292-293; bk. 10, ch. 1, sec. 
79). 
Quintilian does not criticize Isocrates, but the metaphoric association of the courts with the 
battlefield does reveal a public significance that does not exist in the wrestling school.  Cicero 
makes a similar observation, however he sees the whole of the epideictic genre as “the proper 
field of the sophists, as we have said, and is fitter for the parade (pompae) than for the battle 
(pugnae)” (Orator 336-337; sec. 42).  In each case the agonistic nature of the rhetorical 
encounter is revealed, but along with it is the understanding that the rhetorical encounter also 
must involve more than mere eristics.  Instead it must include a clear demarcation of sides, one 
of which represents the interests of the state. 
Arming Metaphors 
 The agonism associated with rhetorical encounters is framed as an encounter between the           
public interest and some threatening enemy by the source domain of battle.  This particular 
conceptualization does add an ethical dimension to oratory by establishing right and wrong sides 
of an encounter.  The “right side” is the side that apparently supports or defends the interests of 
the public while the wrong side directly attacks or subverts those interests.  Recall the 
declamation involving the three-time vir fortis.  In that case the opposing arguments each were 
presented as on the side of the public interest, and therefore the “right side.”  The second type of 
martial metaphor in the rhetorical treatises complicates the ethical dimension of oratory by 
conceptualizing rhetorical skills as weapons that are wielded by the orator.  This metaphor 
distances the teaching of rhetoric from the character of the orator.  However, because arms in the 
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hands of the soldier assume the character of the soldier, this metaphoric relationship still 
demonstrates the influence of military virtue on rhetorical theory. 
 The common critique of rhetoric, beginning at least with Plato in the Gorgias, is that            
rhetoric does not aim at truth, but instead flattery.  One of Plato’s charges against Gorgias and the 
sophists in general is that they direct their students towards the pleasant instead of the good, or 
towards flattery instead of truth.  In other words, there is no inherent good in rhetoric and instead 
rhetorical skills can be used for immoral purposes.  Garver sees Aristotle’s Rhetoric as a response 
to this charge.  After observing that there is a tendency to equate intelligence, honesty, and 
concern with eloquence, he points to the mistrust of eloquence when these inferences turn out 
wrong.  He explains: 
My examples might suggest that someone’s rhetorical abilities indicate nothing 
further about the person, the way someone’s talents as a poet or physician say 
almost nothing about the person’s abilities to make practical ethical decisions.  
Aristotle, however, does not endorse that debunking attitude; rather, he is on the 
side of the equally common opinion that, especially when it is a question of 
rhetorical ability concerning practical matters, that ability seems to be some sign, 
albeit highly fallible, of valuable moral qualities (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 11).   
Garver demonstrates that prudence is a necessary part of rhetorical ability, and it is the exercise 
of good, practical reason that infuses rhetoric with ethics.   
 The conceptualization of rhetorical skill and experience as weapons to be wielded by the              
orator may, at first, seem to remove culpability from rhetoric for any misuse and also put 
dangerous tool into the hands of less than ethical people.  By conceptualizing rhetoric as a 
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weapon, however, instead of a tool, Quintilian points to the danger of this understanding.  “Never 
let a sword be made for a soldier; a robber may use it” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 373-373; bk. 2, ch. 
16, sec. 6).  Quintilian measures consequences of the weapon in terms of the person who uses it.  
Is the weapon used by a soldier more beneficial than it is dangerous when used by a robber?  
Quintilian implies that it is worth the risk of a robber using a sword because without soldiers the 
public interest would suffer even more.  Here the weapon is created to serve the public in the 
hands of a soldier and so its creation is both honorable and valuable.  The cultural significance of 
weapons is clear in the declamatory theme involving the robbing of the tomb discussed in 
chapter 5.  The stolen weapons were representative of the virtue of the dead hero and were used, 
not in a robbery or other crime, but in defense of the state.  Weapons are symbols of virtue and as 
such are designed to be used in battle. 
 Cicero conceptualizes the education of the orator in this way, as an arming for battle.  In           
choosing the weapons with which to be armed, future orators must understand that for which 
they are preparing: “But let them consider what they want; whether it be for sport or warfare that 
they mean to arm; for the requirements of a pitched battle are not those of a sham fight or our 
own training-ground.  For all that, the management of arms in mere sport has its value for 
gladiator and soldier alike” (De Oratore 1: 260-261; bk. 2, sec. 84).  The weapons have a 
purpose and must be chosen according to the needs of the situation.  It is not the end to which the 
use of the weapons is directed that is similar for the gladiator and the soldier, but instead, the 
similarity lies in the choice of and training in those weapons.  The soldiers’ weapons and the 
gladiators’ weapons may have similar appearance and the training ground of the soldier and the 
gladiator may be similar, but each prepares for a different application.  The soldier prepares for 
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battle and the implications of that source domain discussed above while the gladiator trains for 
the arena and for sport.  It is in the preparation for the use of the weapon then that marks the 
difference between the soldier and the gladiator.  Beyond the service to the public discussed 
above, the difference between the training ground or arena and a battle described in this 
metaphor is in the unpredictability of battle.  When a gladiator prepares for the arena, he is 
preparing for a fictional and performed action  while the soldier in battle encounters an 40
unknown and unpredictable environment.  The weapons of rhetorical skill are more than tropes 
and figures, more than commonplaces and enthymemes; rhetorical weapons then include mental 
flexibility prudence. 
 Quintilian describes how the orator uses these weapons to deal with the unexpected with            
another arming metaphor: 
But whether it is in reply, or for some other compelling reason, that we have to 
speak on the spur of the moment, an orator on whom theory, study, and exercise 
have will never find himself trapped or caught off his guard. He is always armed 
and (as it were) in battle order, and his oratory will no more fail him in a Cause 
than his power of speech in daily domestic matters. He will never shirk the burden 
on this account, so long as he has time o get up the Cause; for he will always have 
everything else at his command (Institutio Oratoria 5: 278-281; bk. 12, ch. 9, 
secs. 20-21). 
The orator is armed with the necessary weapons to meet any situation, even those which are 
 For the predictability and “rules” of gladiatorial sport, see M.J. Carter “Gladiatorial Combat: The Rules of 40
Engagement.”  Carter explains that gladiatorial combat was an exciting, rule-bound contest of martial excellence: a 
demonstration of bravery in the face of death, and of discipline and skill with arms” (101).  This is consistent with 
the view of professional declamation in the early empire, an understanding of rhetoric that Quintilian is working 
against.  
!162
unexpected or spontaneous.  Quintilian uses the metaphor of an ambush to describe how one 
should attempt to surprise an opponent during a case (Institutio Oratoria 3:130-131; bk. 6, ch. 4, 
sec. 14).  He explains that careful planning includes concealing certain ideas during the main 
argument in order to ambush an opponent later in the trial.  The consummate orator, however, the 
orator who has all weapons available, will always be able to defend against these unexpected 
ambushes.   
 The weapons of oratory extend far beyond even the prudence and flexibility discussed 
above.  Cicero conceptualizes the functions of the orator as weapons of the public leader: 
For me too it is a source of deep pain that the state feels no need of those weapons 
of counsel (consili), of insight (ingeni), and of authority (auctoritatis) which I had 
learned to handle and to rely upon — weapons which are the peculiar and proper 
resource of a leader (praestantis viri) in the commonwealth and of a civilized and 
law-abiding state (Brutus 22-23; sec. 7).   
The weapons here are the rightful property of those who are leaders because it is they who have 
the responsibility of defending the state.  Counsel, insight, and authority are weapons that at one 
time the state viewed as necessary for its survival, much like the sword is necessary.  More 
importantly though, those same weapons, much like the horse, are the property of the aristocratic 
elite, as it is they who are armed and to whom the defense of the state falls.  The source domain 
of the arming metaphor draws on the traditional role of the elites as possessors of weapons and 
of warriors.   
 Polybius explains that the Roman legion was divided into four ranks, the Velites, Hastati,           
Principes, and Triarii.  These ranks were distinguished by the age of the members and were 
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armed differently.  For example, the Velites, the youngest and poorest, as Polybius explains, were 
armed simply with sword, spears, and a shield while the other three ranks, which consisted of 
more wealthy citizens, were more well equipped (Polybius 1: 476-478; bk. 6, ch. 22).  The detail 
with which the historian describes the arms of the Hastati, Principes and Triarii is significant.  
The sword (gladius) of these ranks, for example, “has an excellent point, and can deal a 
formidable blow with either edge, because its blade is stout and unbending” (Polybius 1: 477; bk. 
6, ch. 22).  The Velites’ sword receives no such description.  The weapons and armor 
distinguished wealth and class, and so to conceptualize certain elements of rhetoric as weapons 
and their acquisition to the arming of a solider also suggests a welcoming or recognizing of the 
orator as a member of the elite.  In using those same weapons, the orator fulfills the 
responsibility accepted by and required of elite Roman men. 
Orator as Commander Metaphors 
 The fundamental principal underlying and informing the entire Institutio Oratoria is the           
humanist notion that the perfect orator must be a good man (vir bonus).  Clarke observes that 
Quintilian’s work, more than others who used this formulation, focuses on the orator and not 
oratory (115ff).  Much like war is the means of demonstrating the courage and fortitude of a vir 
fortis, not as the place where those virtues are created, oratory is a means of demonstrating the 
virtue of the orator, not of obtaining it.  Early in the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian uses the 
example of generals as compared to philosophers to demonstrate this inherent goodness of 
character:  
At some point, some [philosophers], disdaining the effort of speaking well, 
returned to the business of forming character and establishing rules of life, and 
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kept for themselves what would be, if the division were possible, the more 
important part; they laid claim to a very presumptuous name, wishing to be 
regarded as the only “students of wisdom” (studiosi sapientiae) — a distinction 
which neither the greatest generals nor the most famous statesmen and 
administrators have ever claimed for themselves, because they have always 
preferred to do right rather than to profess it” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 58-59; bk. 1, 
ch. proem, sec.14-15).   
This passage illuminates two important ideas that Quintilian develops throughout the work.  
First, it establishes the idea that oratory, as much as philosophy, cultivates character.  Second, the 
distinction he makes between the philosopher and the general is one of action, and thus of 
military virtue.  It is in the general’s action that character is revealed, not in the philosopher’s 
contemplation of character and this analogy begins the combination of military virtue (in this 
case embodied in the general) with the orator and oratory.  The orator as military commander is a 
persistent metaphor throughout the Institutio Oratoria which serves to reinforce the definition of 
the orator as a vir bonus by using the cultural acceptance of the military commander as 
embodying certain lauded virtues and skills. 
 Quintilian stresses the need for flexibility as he discusses the parts of a speech at 2.13.  To 
emphasize this he turns to a military metaphor.  He identifies prudent planning as a “specially 
important feature of the orator” because it allows flexibility.  He then casts the orator in the role 
of military advisor: 
Suppose you were to advise a general, every time he draws up his troops for 
battle, to keep the line straight, advance the two wings, and position the cavalry 
!165
on the flanks.  This may indeed be the best plan, when it is feasible; but the nature 
of the terrain will force a change. … The character of the enemy will also force a 
change, so will the nature of the immediate danger.  The battle will sometimes be 
fought in a line, sometimes in a column, with the auxiliaries or the legions 
(Institutio Oratoria 1: 340-341; bk. 2, ch. 13, sec. 3-5).  
Quintilian is not only criticizing the overly formulaic and rule oriented rhetoric of handbooks, 
but he is also demonstrating the need of the orator, as well as the general, to exhibit prudentia, or 
the virtue of practical wisdom.   
 Robert Hariman has characterized prudence as the “the mode of reasoning about 
contingent matters in order to select the best course of action” (“Theory Without Modernity” 5).  
To Hariman and others, like Garver, prudence is not only an intellectual faculty but also an 
aspect of character and a part of the moral virtues (Aristotle’s Rhetoric 236-237).  For Robert 
Cape, Cicero articulates a prudence that is manifest in an active civic life (61).  An embodiment 
of this character and this virtue is the military commander, who Quintilian metaphorically links 
to the orator.  In the above metaphor, the general is capable of making the prudent decisions 
regarding the arrangement of troops, while the inexperienced orator who relies only on the rules 
he has learned is not capable of the same effective decisions. 
 Take, as an example of this type of prudentia, Julius Caesar’s defeat of Pompey during 
the civil war in 47 B.C.E.  After anticipating Pompey’s intent to isolate a section of his line, 
Caesar “hastily withdrew individual cohorts from the third line and out of these constructed a 
fourth line, stationing it opposite the cavalry [Pompey’s], explaining what his object was and 
reminding them that the day’s victory depended on the valor (virtute) of these cohorts” (Civil 
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Wars 324-325; bk. 3, sec. 89). , Nathan Rosenstein explains that the construction of a fourth line 
was contrary to Roman tactical doctrine, as the legions typically trained and fought in three lines 
(95).  Caesar, however, recognized the disposition of the enemy, the strength of the enemy 
cavalry compared with his own, the terrain, and the over confidence of his opponent, and 
demonstrating his prudentia, was able to effectively meet and defeat the threat.  Rosenstein 
attributes Caesar’s greatness as a military commander to such improvisations as well as his well-
trained legions (95).  It is precisely this demonstration of prudentia, though, that Quintilian links 
to his orator as well.   
 Later in Book 6, Quintilian directly requires this sort of prudence from the orator.   He 41
links judgment and strategy together, claiming that the only difference between the two is found 
in the matters with which they deal.  Judgment deals with matters that are known and strategy 
with matters that are hidden (Institutio Oratoria 3: 136-137; bk. 6, ch. 5, sec. 3).  Strategy is 
bound to prudence, and Quintilian says: “Good sense without learning is more important than 
learning without good sense (plusque vel sine doctrina prudentiam quam sine prudentia facere 
doctrinam). Good sense is the virtue which enables us to adapt our speech to places, times, and 
persons”  (Institutio Oratoria 3: 140-141; bk. 6, ch. 5, sec. 11).  For the canon of arrangement, 
this means choosing (using and not using) those items discovered by invention and arranging 
them in the order that is most effective for the given rhetorical situation.  To carry the metaphor 
of 2.13 into 6.5, the orator’s prudence and strategy is that of a general arranging legions on the 
field, anticipating and meeting the situation as it is, not as it should be.  Quintilian sees this as a 
 Cicero conceptualizes prudence as a weapon used by the orator: “Antonius what I may call a marvelous and 41
almost unrivaled and godlike power of genius seems, even without the protection of this legal knowledge, to be able 
easily to guard and defend itself with the rest of the armoury of practical wisdom (prudentiae)” (De Oratore 1: 
118-119; bk. 1, sec. 172).  
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natural ability of a good character, not as something within an art.  Prudence, as a virtue then, is a 
part of the more broad military virtue.   
 At 6.4 Quintilian refers to altercation as “the fiercest battle.”  He elaborates by claiming 
that “nowhere else, one might say, is there so much hand-to-hand fighting (mucrone 
pugnari)” (Institutio Oratoria 3: 124-127; bk. 6, ch. 4, secs. 4-5).  Mucrone also translates as tip, 
edge, or sword point, and so carries with it the connotation not only of hand-to-hand combat, but 
also combat at the front lines, where the potential to demonstrate courage and honor is the 
greatest.  After establishing this metaphor, Quintilian speaks of the necessity of a quick and 
nimble mind.  “There is no time to think” he says, “one has to speak there and then, and make 
one’s thrust almost at the same moment as the adversary makes his”  (Institutio Oratoria 3: 
126-127; bk. 6, ch. 4, sec. 8).  After placing the reader at the front lines in a fierce battle, 
Quintilian reaffirms this by suggesting that the debate requires the immediate and decisive 
action.  This ability to react to the situation, to meet, parry and riposte in the moment is echoed in 
the writings of Polybius.  The historian, when comparing the Macedonian phalanx to the Roman 
formations, attributes the success of the Roman legions to their ability to react instantaneously to 
a variety of situations (Polybius 2: 229-230; bk. 18, ch. 32).  The phalanx forces a Macedonian 
commander to act in a very restricted and predictable way, while a Roman general is capable of 
many different types of maneuvers and is able to act against and react to the movements of the 
enemy.  
 Again, the preceding metaphor requires the orator engaged in altercation to possess the 
same ability to adapt to any situation as that of a Roman commander leading a legion into battle.  
Quintilian extends this metaphor further by requiring the orator to demonstrate a courage 
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normally reserved for battle as well.  “This is not a task for a passive spirit or the thin-
skinned” (Institutio Oratoria 3: 140-141; bk. 6, ch. 5, sec. 11).  The source domain brings with it 
the cultural understanding of the military commander.  Recall the example of the young Scipio 
Africanus’ demonstration of courage recorded in Polybius as an example of personal courage that 
inspires others.  During the Gallic Wars, Caesar demonstrates this prudent courage on more than 
one occasion, but one example should suffice to illuminate the cultural understanding of this 
source domain.  During a battle with the Belgae in 75 B.C.E., one legion in particular found itself 
in dire straights.  With all of the centurions in the fourth cohort dead, with the standard lost, and 
with almost all other centurions badly wounded,  the XII Legion was about to be routed.  Caesar 42
recognized both the critical moment the legion faced as well as the potential for success: 
Taking therefore a shield from a soldier in the rearmost ranks, as he himself had 
come thither without a shield, he went forward into the first line, and, calling on 
the centurions by name, and cheering on the rank and file, he bade them advance 
and extend the companies, that they might ply their swords more easily.  His 
coming brought hope to the troops and renewed their spirit; each man of his own 
accord, in sight of the commander-in-chief, desperate as his own case might be, 
was fain to to his utmost (Gallic War 122-123; bk. 2, sec. 25). 
The physical presence and prudent demonstration of courage of the commander fetches victory 
from almost certain defeat.  This is the cultural understanding of the military commander at 
Rome.  To demonstrate the courage necessary to be in the front line is to assume the character of 
the vir fortis and the task of oratory is one in which this same character must be displayed.  
 Caesar specifically points to Publius Sextus Baculus, the chief centurion, as the bravest of the brave (fortissimo 42
viro) as being wounded so gravely that he could not stand on his own.  
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Garver explains that courage, as a virtue, is pointless when divorced from an external end 
(Aristotle’s Rhetoric 242) and so when one demonstrates courage in oratory it must be directed at 
something other than the mere display of courage.  It must be collective and political, and since 
the vir bonus exhibits a military virtue, then that collective and political end must be for the sake 
of the state and the mos maiorum.   
 Not surprisingly, the twelfth book of the Institutio Oratoria contains the most martial 
metaphors because it is in that book that Quintilian discusses the possibilities of the mature 
orator.  Building on the idea of courage above, he illustrates the difference between a commander 
and a soldier.  A commander must be brave, but must also be able to manage the enormous task 
of leading an army: 
You might as well think that a man is a good general (forte imperatorem) who is 
brave and energetic in battle, a master of all the skills required in the fight, but 
ignorant of levying troops, mustering and equipping forces, providing for 
supplies, and selecting a campsite; after all, wars have to be prepared before they 
are waged. Yet that is just what an advocate would be like, if he left most of the 
elements of victory to others (Institutio Oratoria 5: 240-241; bk. 12, ch. 3, sec. 
5-6). 
Here the source domain of the military commander is extended beyond the courage that it takes 
to succeed in battle to the preparations prior to war being initiated.  Planning and managing 
become just as important to the “good general” as bravery and skill with weapons.  Again, our 
source is Polybius for a detailed description of the raising and equipping of legions in the 
Republic.  Once elected, the two consuls were required to enroll legions and to equip and train 
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those legions (Polybius 1: 474-481; bk. 6, ch. 19-26).  Thus raising and equipping the army was 
as much a political function as a military function, especially given the tradition of electing all 
subordinate leaders within the legions.  Even more, since for their term the consuls exercised 
authority akin to the patria potestas over their legions, the commander becomes a father figure.   
 The orator as military commander metaphors within the Institutio Oratoria shape the           
understanding of what type of orator Quintilian is working towards.  Arthur Walzer has 
demonstrated that Quintilian proposed a solution to the ethical problems of rhetoric by 
combining a Ciceronian ideal orator with the Stoic ideal of the Wise Man (38).  In examining the 
conceptualization of the ideal orator as a military commander, I have demonstrated how that 
combination can be understood in terms of military virtue.  While Walzer’s formulation suggests 
that the ideal orator (as Wise Man) will be involved in public affairs because he has a moral 
obligation to bring others to love virtue (Walzer 30), the orator as commander metaphor 
demonstrates the responsibility felt by the elite Roman male to defend both the state and its 
traditions.  This difference is demonstrated in a martial metaphor found in the Stoic writings of 
Seneca the Younger.  Shadi Bartsch points to Seneca’s use of a battle metaphor to demonstrate 
the power of the individual philosopher:  “Seneca’s metaphors in this realm [military action] 
allow for the same refiguring of an essentially passive and intellectual practice on the part of the 
Stoic student as an act of martial resistance and self-defense” (203-204).  The individual 
achievement of the Senecan metaphors is directed toward self-preservation; it is the individual 
against fortune,  whereas the orator as commander metaphors in Quintilian constantly draw on 43
the public responsibility of the elite Roman male.   
 For Seneca and the Stoic resistance to the whims of Fortune and its conceptualization as a martial metaphor, see 43
Elizabeth Asmis “Seneca on Fortune and the Kingdom of God”
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A New Understanding of “Argument is War” 
 The martial metaphors found in Roman rhetorical treatises shape the understanding of the           
orator and the orator’s role at Rome.  As May observes, an ambitious Roman had to demonstrate 
“by means of his own actions” that he had a character deserving of respect (7).  Cicero, as a 
novus homo, as May’s work demonstrates, had to acquire the appropriate levels of auctoritas, 
gratia, and dignitas through his work while embodying the same as an orator.  The  use of 
military metaphors and the subsequent conceptualization of military virtue within Roman 
rhetorical treatise reveals the specific character to which an orator should strive.   
 The three metaphors discussed in this chapter work to shape a particular cultural           
understanding of rhetoric and of the orator.  Although rhetorical encounters were conceptualized 
as agonistic by the Greeks, the agonism understood in Hellenic culture revolved around the 
notion of aretē.  As Hawhee has shown, because of the emphasis on personal human excellence 
and the demonstration of this by participation in the agōn, athletics were the metaphor of choice 
to conceptualize rhetoric and rhetors.  Drawing on their own cultural understanding of virtue, the 
Romans conceptualize the agonism of rhetorical encounters as battle instead of athletics and in 
changing the source domain also change the understanding of rhetoric.  Battle is directed at the 
preservation of the public interest rather than the demonstration of human excellence.  Although 
it is possible for one to demonstrate human excellence, for example through personal heroism, in 
battle, it is not the purpose of battle to provide a venue for that demonstration.  Rhetorical 
engagements, as conceptualized in Roman treatises by martial metaphors, always have at their 
core the public interest. 
 Rhetorical skill is conceptualized as weapons to be used by the orator in these encounters.            
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At first this appears to further the idea that rhetoric is morally neutral.  However, the source 
domain of a weapon, as opposed to a tool, draws on the purposes for which weapons are created.  
While tools may be morally neutral, weapons are crafted for soldier and therefore are designed to 
be used in defense of the state.  Weapons also are the cultural marker of class and status; they are 
the property of the elite male and constitute a portion the habitus.  Since the habitus is 
intertwined with military virtue and therefore is directed towards the right side of conflict, 
weapons do have a character of their own.  Weapons are the cultural marker of those who by 
their nature and position are obligated to protect the public interest and to overlay this meaning 
on the target domain of rhetorical skill is to present it as morally good, not morally neutral. 
 These weapons are controlled and implemented by the military commander.  The orator as           
commander metaphor emphasizes not only the bravery and military prowess of the individual, 
but also reveals the importance of prudence to the orator.  The military commander is the cultural 
embodiment of prudence and as a source domain for the conceptualization of the orator, the 
commander provides the demonstration of the unified virtues.  The commander even embodies 
the very essence of rhetorical performance in that it is through discursive as much as physical 
means that he achieves military ends.  Polybius, Plutarch, and even Caesar himself pay particular 
attention to the speeches that commanders give their troops before and during the battles.   Cast 44
in the mold of the that which the Romans respected above all others, the military commander, the 
orator rises out of the Institutio and out of Roman culture as a perfect model of a leader. 
 Caesar is clear that his words of inspiration made a significant impact on his legions.44
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Chapter 7: Rhetoric as Leadership at Rome 
 In the previous chapters I have attempted to trace the discursive production and 
cultivation of military virtue in rhetorical education and in rhetorical theory.  The connection 
between the action required to demonstrate military virtue and the discursive reproduction of that 
virtue is located in the rhetorical performance.  School exercises provided a training ground for 
the action a future orator would face in public life and, much like the Spartan agōgē, these school 
exercises were designed to test students to the extremes of both their skills and their intellectual 
capacity.  Rhetorical theory conceptualized rhetoric as martial and therefore shaped the 
understanding of oratory in both the minds of the orators and their audiences.  This 
conceptualization also combined the figures of the military commander and the orator on a deep, 
cultural level so that an understanding of one necessarily led to an understanding of the other.  
Because both figures, in the ideal, represent the habitus informed by military virtue and because 
that habitus was the traditional structure of leadership in Roman culture, the rhetorical education 
that I have examined and the theory that informed that education provided a very particular form 
of education in and theory of leadership.  Rather than rhetoric being understood as a means to 
lead, rhetoric becomes leadership and at the same time leadership becomes rhetoric.  Rhetoric 
develops the capacity to command, the self-confidence to lead, and the prudence necessary to be 
effective and each of these attributes are drawn from and rely on martial influence on rhetorical 
theory and education.   
 Caesar provides us with a simple, yet illuminating, understanding of the function of a 
leader.  In a discussion of Cotta’s performance during the Gallic Wars, Caesar is very critical of 
the former’s decision to abandon the baggage train in an attempt to establish a defensive position 
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and with the threat of imminent attack.  This criticism of Cotta’s tactical decision, however, is 
preceded by praise of Cotta’s overall performance as a general and solider: “in addressing and 
encouraging the troops he did his duty as a commander, in action his duty as a soldier” (Gallic 
War 276-277; bk. 5, ch. 33).   The ability to inspire the soldiers is, even before tactical prowess, 45
the primary duty of a military commander.  As J.E. Lendon observes, this definition of the duties 
of a commander is a result of the importance of the spirit (animus) and courage (virtus) in 
antique combat.  Lendon traces the influence of Greek military thinking in Caesar’s 
Commentaries and demonstrates how that influence is fundamental to the picture of generalship 
that emerges in Caesar’s writings.  Being aware of the psychological disposition (animus) of 
one’s own forces and those of the enemy is extremely important to success in combat (Lendon 
296ff).   Just as important is the ability to address the troops’ animus.  For example, in defeat a 46
leader must rhetorically revive fallen animus.  Lendon points to speeches that attempt to explain 
the defeat in terms of fortune or over-boldness or encomiums that invoke previous victories as 
discursive means to raise the spirits of a defeated army (299).   
 The second important function of a commander is to demonstrate and maintain the virtus 
of the army.  Recall that to the Romans virtus is demonstrated in combat, not in individual 
conflict.  Lendon observes that virtus is reputation,  earned and re-earned through combat and 47
unlike animus, which is dependent on the moment, it is a permanent part of an individual and of 
 in appellandis cohortandisque militibus imperatoris et in pugna militis officia praestabat45
 Lendon recognizes a three-fold model of animus in Caesar’s writings that resembles the three types of styles 46
found in Cicero and later in Quintilian.  Each level of animus must be addressed by the commander in the 
appropriate manner.  Much like the orator attempts to do with an audience, the military commander must manage the 
animus of the army in order to achieve the desired result.  
 Integral to this concept of reputation is a masculinity that is tied to the heroic tradition. Virtus is the result of battle 47
and demonstrates excellence in the eyes of a real or imagined public.  In the realm of virtus, the constant 
preoccupation of the soldier is with what people will think (Lendon 310).
!175
an army (313-314).  As such, the commander can both rely on the established virtus of the army 
and appeal to that same virtus as a means of addressing animus.  Tactical decisions are made 
based on the virtus of a particular unit and the application of virtus at the appropriate place and 
time is the deciding factor in battle.  
 The picture of the leader that Caesar paints in the Commentaries is one where rhetorical 
skill and leadership are one in the same.  Speeches to soldiers before, during, and after a battle 
are as important as the tactical decisions the leader makes because these address the animus of 
the army.  Virtus is something that individuals and armies perform and this performance is 
integral to success.  The general that Lendon sees as developed in Caesar’s writing is one who is 
deeply connected with the traditions of Roman culture, and serves not only as a defender of that 
culture as the miles Marianus does, but also as the ideal of that culture.  Lendon concludes that 
“the victories of a great Roman marshall, of a Julius Caesar, may not find their full explanation 
in terms of strategy, tactics, or morale, but also in cultural terms, in deep habits of thought and 
structures of emotion” (325).  Inherent in the general is the public figure who accurately 
conforms to the requirements of the habitus, who possesses and demonstrates military virtue, and 
who is obligated by his nature and skill to serve the state.  In other words the leader, in the ideal, 
is the “vir bonus decendi peritus.” 
 M.L. Clarke and George Kennedy have commented that the “vir bonus dicendi peritus” 
as formulated by Quintilian could be no one other than the emperor (Clarke 119 and Kennedy 
The Art of Rhetoric 397).  This observation, of course, is informed by the very limited 
opportunities for anyone other than the emperor to make any real political difference, through 
oratory or otherwise.  Kennedy points out that Quintilian’s treatise is “much what one might have 
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expected from a teacher of rhetoric who inherited a rich tradition and lived under an autocratic 
government” (The Art of Rhetoric 509).  The common consensus that oratory suffered under the 
Empire is based on the apparent lack of opportunity to influence or persuade.  Even in forensic 
matters the emperor could exercise complete control.  However, the military metaphors found in 
Quintilian demonstrate the capacity for others to achieve the potential of the vir bonus and to 
therefore act as responsible and effective agents at Rome in the first century CE.  Thus, the 
question of agency within rhetoric necessarily precedes a discussion of training in leadership 
because to learn to lead one must first have a sense of agency.   
 Michael Leff draws attention to a particularly useful humanist quality of Quintilian’s 
rhetoric, the recognition of the agency of both the orator and the audience.  Questioning the 
accepted view that classical rhetoric casts the orator as a totalizing and all-powerful agent, Leff 
argues that classical emphasis and reliance on tradition requires a self that is constructed through 
social interaction (“Tradition and Agency” 218-219).  This interaction forms an individual agent, 
but one who is shaped and informed by the community and its traditions.  To understand this 
relationship is to better understand how to be an orator and how to persuade.  Quintilian 
describes his perfect orator as “the man who can really play his part as a citizen, who is fit for the 
management of public and private business, and who can guide cities by his counsel, give them a 
firm basis by his laws, and put them right by his judgments” (Institutio Oratoria 1: 56-57; bk. 1. 
ch. proem, sec. 10-11).  It is hard to ignore the implications of leadership inherent in this 
description.  Not only is the orator formulated as a citizen, as a member of the community, but 
also as a manager, guide, and judge.  The orator’s function is to lead fellow citizens through wise 
and good counsel, but as a citizen, the orator is always dependent on the community for a sense 
!177
of self and of agency.   
 This understanding of agency necessitates a relationship between leader and led.  
Although the orator comes from the community, as a person fit for management, the orator 
stands apart from that community.  By his nature, prudence, and eloquence the orator is elevated 
to a position of authority and leadership.  The orator’s agency is directed towards the public, 
specifically to control or guide the community.  There can be no agency for a leader without a 
body of people to lead.  One critique of this is that eloquence or practical wisdom is always 
available for personal gain and that this is often in conflict with the public good.   As we have 48
seen though, the presence of military virtue and its association with oratory and orators prevents 
this conflict from being considered at Rome.  Military virtue links ethics, morality, and 
leadership and directs the use of rhetoric towards the preservation and defense of the community 
and its traditions. 
 In order to understand the inseparability of rhetoric and leadership to the Romans, it 
would be useful to understand the modern resistance to the connection.  Due to the 
Enlightenment reliance on reason as the only correct form of deliberation, rhetoric and leadership 
have been separated and the presence of military virtue in rhetoric has been concealed.  This 
concealment occurs, in part, because of the Enlightenment contempt for tradition.  As Alisdair 
MacIntyre has shown, the Enlightenment understandings of rationality resist tradition because 
tradition is particular to a culture or moment in history and, as Bourdieu’s habitus demonstrates, 
is constantly altered through interaction (After Virtue 361).  In The Political Mind, Lakoff 
 See Eugene Garver “Can Virtue Be Bought?” for a detailed discussion of this problem.  Garver works towards 48
articulating how “virtue can be an art of appearance without being an art of deception” (378).  In doing so, Garver 
examines how rhetoric is both the faculty of making oneself heard and of judging other’s opinions rationally.   
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explains that political discourse based on Enlightenment thinking is all but ineffective in the 
twenty-first century.  He summarizes the person who believes in the eighteenth-century 
understanding of reason: 
You will think that all you need to do is give people the facts and figures and they 
will reach the right conclusion.  You will think that all you need to do is point out 
where their interests lie, and they will act politically to maximize them. … You 
will not have any need to appeal to emotion — indeed to do so would be wrong 
(11). 
The figure of a leader that is realized through this understanding of the human mind is an 
extremely limited one.  The leader’s only function is to communicate unadorned facts to the 
rational minds of the public and any attempt to deviate from that function is viewed as a cruel 
and calculated deception.  Under this view of the mind, leadership and rhetoric must be separate 
because if they were not, the leader would not appeal to reason alone. 
 Even attempts to reconcile leadership and rhetoric tend to artificially combine the two.            
Leroy Dorsey attempts to go beyond the question of what is “rhetorical leadership” by asking 
what makes a successful rhetorical leader.  Dorsey’s answer is that “rhetorical leadership comes 
from the demonstration of, at any given moment, the artful balance of superior decision-making 
skills and the exhibition of the requisite character.   Even this answer implies that leadership can 49
exist without rhetoric.  If there is “rhetorical leadership” then there is some sort of non-rhetorical 
leadership.  David Zarefsky demonstrates how American presidents shape public opinion through   
 It is important to understand that the “requisite character” that Dorsey discusses is informed by a postmodern 49
plurality.  It is the character presented and received at a given moment, not the Roman understanding of a permanent 
character that is based on traditional ideals.  
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ceremonial rhetorical performances that are not traditionally associated with politics.  However 
Zarefsky begins by observing “It is probably going too far to assert that all presidential 
leadership is rhetorical.  Yet rhetoric is intimately involved in its exercise”  (23).  To others, like 
Timothy Cook, rhetoric is the recourse of a leader who is lacking legal authority.  These positions 
present rhetoric as something that is involved with leadership or is valuable only when legal 
means are not available, and in doing so deny that leadership and rhetoric are inseparable.   
 Contrast this with the leadership of Augustus during the first years of the new Roman           
Empire.  John Lobur has shown how even as Emperor, Augustus find it necessary to gain and 
maintain the consensus necessary to exercise legitimate power.  Lobur explains: 
In traditional Roman aristocratic culture, consensus was the primary standard 
against which the elites measured themselves in their administration of war and 
peace.  The political leader who outperformed others in managing the state was 
considered, by the consent of all, a princeps,  a (or the) leading citizen.  50
Incompetence, degeneracy, or fraud, on the other hand, were deprecated, and 
tyranny or kingship, inimical to the Roman tradition, was equated with oppression 
(13).   
Consensus underlies and bestows auctoritas, and one could not earn auctoritas or consensus 
without rhetorical performance.  Consensus is determined by successful action in war and peace 
and recall that action in war, particularly for the leader, is rhetorical.  Auctoritas, consensus, and 
therefore legitimate and successful leadership was always inherently rhetorical to the Romans.  
 Varro explains that the Latin word princeps has its origins in military formations: “the principes ‘first-men’ as 50
those who from the principium ‘beginning’ fought with swords; these words were less perspicuous later, when 
tactics had been changed” (De Lingua Latina 1: 84-87; bk. 5, sec. 89).
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There was no need for the leader to make up for a lack of legal authority with rhetorical 
performance because authority at Rome was always rhetorical.  
 Tradition informs any sense of authority at Rome.  Consensus is found in action in the 
traditional aristocratic fields of the military and politics.  Auctoritas, derived from consensus and 
always gendered masculine, is understood as power of the paterfamilias granted by the tradition 
of the patria potestas.   As Leff explains:  51
Tradition entails a different conception of agency and self.  In place of the isolated 
self of modernity (or the alienated self of some version of post-modernity), 
tradition constitutes a self through social interaction and as part of an ongoing 
historical development.  Both the individual agent and the tradition achieve and 
change identity through a reciprocal circulation of influence (“Tradition” 218).   
The agency realized by a leader is one in which the leader can appropriately perform tradition 
and this performance is rhetorical.  As May, Gleason, and Gunderson have shown, rhetorical 
performance at Rome enabled individuals to demonstrate identities that conformed to the cultural 
expectations.  In Caesar’s praise of Cotta above we can see how rhetoric is found at the very 
heart of leadership.  Commanders lead because they are able to address their soldiers 
appropriately; they are able to say the right things at the right time and their sense of self and of 
agency is derived from this relationship with their audience. 
 As an example of this, consider the pater patratus or the chief of the fetiales (herald-priests).  The pater patratus 51
served many important functions in foreign affairs including declaring war and negotiating peace treaties (see Varro 
De Lingua Latina 1: 82-83;  bk. 5, sec. 86).  If Rome was to provide tribute to an enemy, it was the pater patratus 
who exercised patria potestas over fellow citizens.  Only by a person possessing patria potestas could a citizen be 
given into slavery (See Cicero De Oratore 1: 124-127; bk. 1, sec. 181 for a brief discussion of the result of this 
action).  
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Commanding the Body and Leading Corps 
 To manage, guide, and judge, and to successfully construct a self out of the traditions of 
the community, the Roman orator had to embody leadership through rhetorical presence and 
practice.  The military virtue associated with leadership and found within rhetorical education 
betrays a deep and ever-constant search for a mythic masculinity.  Every generation, it seems, 
condemned younger generations for losing or surrendering this aspect of Roman identity.  Seneca 
the Elder expresses concern for men acting too much like ladies (Controversiae 1: 8-9; bk. 1, ch. 
pref, secs. 8-9), Cicero is concerned with manly gestures like throwing out the chest (De Oratore 
2: 176-177; bk. 3, sec. 220), the author of the Ad Herennium explains that sharp exclamations are 
“suited to feminine outcry” not manly discourse (194-195; bk. 3, ch. 12, sec. 22) and Quintilian 
would keep the effeminate gym-rats who are covered in oil away from his pupils (Institutio 
Oratoria 1: 242-243; bk. 1. ch. 11, sec. 15).  Gleason’s work illuminates the extent to which 
orators were trained to present their bodies as masculine as a part of their rhetorical education.  
To Gleason manhood was rhetorically constructed and was won through rhetorical performance 
(159).  But training in deportment served another function as well: it molded the body of the 
future leader into a culturally accepted form that was recognized as capable of leadership.  
 There is a connection between commanding one’s own body and commanding a body of 
soldiers that opens up leadership beyond the apparent male boundaries established by tradition 
and heroic myth. Incorrect bodily deportment, as the author of the Ad Herennium says, has the 
potential to impress on the audience an unflattering or ineffective sense of the orator (200-203; 
bk. 3, ch. 15, sec. 26).  However, correct use of the body (and by this I mean the limited, Roman 
sense of correct use) reveals a character suited for leadership.  The first acts of leadership from 
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some of the greatest Roman generals were bodily acts.  Polybius explains that the act that 
solidified Publius Scipio Africanus as a military and political leader was saving his father’s life 
in battle: 
He was at the time seventeen years of age, this being his first campaign, and his 
father had placed him in command of a picked troop of horse in order to ensure 
his safety, but when he caught sight of his father in the battle, surrounded by the 
enemy and escorted only by two or three horsemen and dangerously wounded, he 
at first endeavored to urge those with him to go to the rescue, but when they hung 
back for a time owing to the large numbers of the enemy round them, he is said 
with reckless daring to have charged the encircling force alone. Upon the rest 
being now forced to attack, the enemy were terror-struck and broke up, and 
Publius Scipio, thus unexpectedly delivered, was the first to salute his son in the 
hearing of all as his preserver (2: 3-4; bk. 10, ch. 3). 
In this case, the young and inexperienced Africanus’ speech is not able to persuade his soldiers to 
attack.  His recourse, however, is the rhetoric of his own body.  Through bodily action, by 
placing his own body in danger, he inspires the rest of his soldiers to attack.  In this case, the 
rhetorical use of the body accomplishes what words alone could not and this courageous use of 
the body was not incidental or accidental according to Polybius, but instead Africanus “freely 
exposed himself to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety 
on him.  And this is not the conduct of a general who trusts to luck, but of one who has a clear 
head” (2: 3-5; bk. 10, ch. 3-4).  He accepts that he must use his body in a certain way to serve the 
state and defend tradition, much like Marius’ soldier.  Gunderson explains that in rhetorical 
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theory “the body comes to act as an irreducible index of the truth that one is a ‘good 
man’” (Staging 18).   
 To Quintilian, the body as represented by gesture obeys the mind (Institutio Oratoria 5: 
118-119; bk. 11, ch. 3, secs. 65-66).  That is, the mind controls all bodily deportment and 
therefore correct use of the body represents a good mind.  Polybius’ comment on Scipio 
Africanus’ calculated and rhetorical use of his body supports this.  Quintilian’s treatment of the 
rhetorical use of the body goes much further that this though.  In the rather lengthy discussion of 
gesture in the eleventh book of the Institutio Oratoria, Quintilian demonstrates the harmony 
towards which the orator strives in consciously matching gesture to speech.  The gifted orator 
resists habitual bodily movements that are out of character with the words of the speech.  In other 
words, the orator commands body, voice, and words in order to meet the needs of a given 
situation.  Similar to Leff’s explanation of agency in humanistic rhetoric, the orator cannot force 
the body to work in a way that is not consistent with the meaning of the speech or that is not 
consistent with traditional expectations of the body.  Although it may be a natural movement, for 
example, Quintilian advises against shrugging or hunching the shoulders “because this shortens 
the neck and produces a Gesture of humiliation and servility, suggesting hypocrisy, because 
people use it when they are pretending to flatter, admire, or fear” (Institutio Oratoria 5: 126-129; 
bk. 11, ch. 3, sec. 83).  Contrary to this hunching, he advises relaxed shoulders and sweeping 
gestures, especially for lengthy, but smooth, passages (Institutio Oratoria 5: 128-129; bk. 11, ch. 
3, sec. 84).  Command of the body becomes the ability to overcome a natural inclination in order 
to meet the expectations of the audience and establish a harmony between voice, body, and 
speech. 
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 Contemporary treatments of the body tend to focus, as Jack Selzer has noted, on making 
the body and the material the center of subjectivities (7).  In changing the frame of reference for 
subjectivity from the mind to the body, these treatments typically make the natural appear 
unnatural, or at least they tend to challenge the seemingly traditional or natural.  By emphasizing 
the body and the material, these postmodern treatments have de-emphasized the mind and have 
therefore concealed the leadership embedded in rhetoric.  By recovering the aspects of rhetoric 
illuminated through military virtue we are able to better understand rhetoric as leadership.  
Cicero, for example, holds that the orator’s use of the body is aimed at making the unnatural 
seem natural and rhetorical training is aimed at the perfect combination of mind and body (De 
Oratore 2: 176-179; bk. 3, secs. 222-223).  To learn to control the body and voice in a way that is 
becoming is to demonstrate leadership of the self and therefore the capability of leadership of 
others (De Oratore 2: 178 ff; bk. 3, sec. 224 and Institutio Oratoria 5: 85-183; bk. 11, ch. 3).  
Quintilian ends his discussion of delivery by contrasting the delivery of an actor and of an orator.  
Delivery “needs to be under control, lest in our eagerness to pursue the elegance of the 
performer, we lose the authority (auctoritatem) of the good and grave man (viri boni et 
gravis)” (Institutio Oratoria 5: 182-183; bk. 11, ch. 3, sec. 184).  Exercising control over one’s 
own body —presenting it in the appropriate way at the appropriate time—is demonstrative of the 
character of a leader and Quintilian’s conceptualization of the vir bonus. 
 Controlling the disposition of an army is similar to the rhetorical control over one’s own 
body, especially in making the unnatural seem natural.  As Varro’s etymology demonstrates, 
particular words used to describe groups of soldiers have their roots in the language of the body.  
For example, the maniple (manipulus) (or smallest military unit in the Roman army that could be 
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individually controlled), is derived from manus (hands) (1: 84-85; bk. 5, sec. 88).  In fact, 
another meaning of the Latin manus is a group of soldiers.  Recalling the cultural significance of 
the hands as a symbol of power and masculine (and paternal) authority and the importance of the 
hands in rhetorical performance, control over a manus (or maniple) is symbolically, culturally, 
and linguistically linked to leadership and rhetoric.  The military leader demonstrates 
simultaneously rhetorical control over his own body and leadership through control of a body of 
soldiers.  
 Frontinus, in the Stratagems, observes that the skillful control over the disposition of 
one’s own forces is essential to success.  Although this seems obvious, the examples that 
Frontinus uses to demonstrate this skillful control emphasize a conscious effort to make the 
unnatural seem natural.  When faced with a particular disposition of enemy forces, for example, 
it is a natural inclination to match that disposition.  It is a reflex to place one’s own strongest 
force against the enemy’s strongest force.  Frontinus’ observations, however, demonstrate how 
resisting this natural reaction and presenting the unnatural reaction (that is placing one’s weakest 
force against the enemy’s strongest) as natural is a prudent tactical move.  Frontinus explains: 
Publius Cornelius Scipio, who subsequently received the name Africanus, on one 
occasion, when waging war in Spain against Hasdrubal, leader of the 
Carthaginians, led out his troops day after day in such formation that the centre of 
his battle-line was composed of his best fighting men. But when the enemy also 
regularly came out marshaled on the same plan, Scipio, on the day when he had 
determined to fight, altered the scheme of his arrangement and stationed his 
strongest troops on the wings, having his light-armed troops in the centre, but 
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slightly behind the line. Thus, by attacking the enemy’s weakest point in crescent 
formation from the flank, where he himself was strongest, he easily routed them 
(108-109; bk. 2, ch. 3, sec. 4).    
Frontinus emphasizes the validity of this type of control of the disposition of forces over and 
over again in the Strategems.  Although this may seem like simple deception, it is far more than 
that.  Deception or guile, recall, is not the Roman way of conducting affairs.   Scipio’s 52
arrangement of troops, the practical application of his manuum, is in harmony with the demands 
of the situation.  To use Cicero’s words, this is an example of an arrangement that is becoming.  
It is eloquence demonstrated through military action and is the result of effective leadership of a 
body of soldiers, the same leadership an orator demonstrates over the body. 
Building a Self-Confident Leader 
 In the late Republic and early Empire, rhetorical education and practice were essential in 
to establishing and maintaining the necessary self-confidence of a leader.  Quintilian explains 
this confidence in his description of the orator.  Soldiers abandoned fear of pain, toil and death 
because “duty, courage, and a vivid awareness of honor step in to take their place” (Institutio 
Oratoria 5. 210-211; bk. 12, ch. 1, sec. 8-29).  The leader, Quintilian continues, will persuade 
soldiers to replace one with the other only if the leader is convinced first (Institutio Oratoria 5. 
210-211; bk. 12, ch. 1, sec. 8-29).  In other words, the leader must have genuine self-confidence.  
Rhetorical study served the dual purpose of building confidence as well as improving the ability 
to speak.  Cicero describes this dual aspect during Crassus’s discussion of his early training 
 Roman treatments of Odysseus demonstrate this aversion to deceptions.  What the Greeks laud as “cunning 52
intelligence” the Romans would see as dishonest trickery.  
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methods: 
For my [Crassus] part, in the daily exercises of youth, I used chiefly to set myself 
that task which I knew Gaius Carbo, my old enemy (inimicum), was wont to 
practise [sic]: this was to set myself some poetry, the most impressive to be found, 
or to read as much of some speech as I could keep in my memory, and then to 
declaim upon the actual subject-matter of my reading, choosing as far as possible 
different words. But later I noticed this defect in my method, that those words 
which best befitted each subject, and were the most elegant and in fact the best, 
had been already seized upon by Ennius, if it was on his poetry that I was 
practising [sic], or by Gracchus, if I chanced to have set myself a speech of his. 
Thus I saw that to employ the same expressions profited me nothing, while to 
employ others was a positive hindrance, in that I was forming the habit of using 
the less appropriate. Afterwards I resolved,—and this practice I followed when 
somewhat older,—to translate freely Greek speeches of the most eminent orators. 
The result of reading these was that, in rendering into Latin what I had read in 
Greek, I not only found myself using the best words—and yet quite familiar ones
—but also coining by analogy certain words such as would be new to our people, 
provided only they were appropriate (De Oratore 1: 104-107; bk. 1, sec. 
154-155). 
First, it is revealing that Crassus describes Gaius Carbo as his enemy (inimicum) instead of as an 
adversary or opponent (adversarius).   The Latin word inimicus can mean both personal enemy 
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and an enemy in war.   Crassus frames the subsequent discussion of the formation of his 53
practice in a metaphoric relationship with an enemy.  He doesn’t just assume the practice of his 
enemy, but recognizes the shortcomings and improves upon them.  The primary shortcoming of 
Garbo’s practice lies in the construction of self-confidence.  When rephrasing Latin authors 
whose words have already earned praise and recognition, the orator feels a sense of failure.  
Crassus could never make Ennius or Gracchus’ words better because those words, through they 
place in tradition, are always already the best.  This type of practice illuminates the orator’s 
inferiority and subsequently is a hindrance to self-confidence.  However, as Crassus begins to 
find the best Latin words to use for great Greek words, he finds that his confidence is increased, 
not because he outperforms the Greek orators and authors, but because he is able to create 
equally impressive Latin versions.   
 Quintilian emphasizes the development of self-confidence in the orator as well.  In the 
early education of the ideal orator, Quintilian advises: 
Let it be a game (lusus); let him be questioned and praised and always feel glad 
that he has done something; sometimes, when he refuses a lesson, it should be 
given to another child, of whom he can be jealous; sometimes he should compete, 
and more often than not think he is the winner; and finally, he should be 
encouraged by rewards suitable to his age (Institutio Oratoria 1: 74-75; bk. 1, ch. 
1, sec. 20). 
 In Cicero, for example, there is no distinction between the two usages: “For we contend, for example, with a 53
fellow-citizen (civi) in one way, if he is a personal enemy (si est iminicus), in another, if he is a rival (si competitor): 
with the rival it is a struggle for office and position, with the enemy for life and honour. So with the Celtiberians and 
the Cimbrians we fought as with deadly enemies (bellum ut cum inimicis), not to determine which should be 
supreme, but which should survive” (De Officiis 40-41; bk. 1, sec. 38)
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The root of lusus (game) is ludus and as we recall from Chapter 1 the connection that Bonner 
draws between ludus as a school house and as a martial training ground.  Like Cicero, Quintilian 
frames this discussion of confidence in the same sort of martial domain.  The result of the 
“game” is self-confidence, and Quintilian suggests that this is important enough that the “game” 
should be rigged in some way as to let the child win.  Although this seems to have the potential 
to create a spoiled child who cannot understand loss, Quintilian explains the importance of 
balance: “For although the vices opposed to these good qualities—over-confidence, rashness, 
rudeness, arrogance—are all to be detested, yet no art, no study, no progress even will be of any 
use without firmness (constantiam), confidence (fiduciam), and courage (fortitudinem). You 
might as well serve out arms to the cowardly and unwarlike” (Institutio Oratoria 5: 246-247; bk. 
12. ch. 5, sec. 2).  The daring and courage (manifested as animus) necessary to be a successful 
leader and orator comes from an unquestioning belief in the self, and this confidence is 
constructed and reinforced rhetorically. 
 May sees this self-confidence demonstrated in Cicero’s consular speeches, in which 
brings the full weight of his auctoritas and dignitas to bear in his speeches and which plays such 
a significant role in his leadership during the Catalinarian conspiracy (50ff).  This self-
confidence is most apparent in Cicero’s presentation of himself as a civilian general (imperator 
togatus).  May observes that Cicero’s self-presentation during the Catalinarian conspiracy is that 
of a general leading the Republic in war (57-58).  Cicero’s oratorical leadership of the Republic 
is the same as the military leadership of a general, not just in its results, but in its execution.  
May demonstrates how Cicero links the imperator militaris and the imperator togatus through 
leadership, specifically through a leadership that is characterized by courage and animus.   
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 I have pointed to the daring self-confidence in several military leaders over the course of 
this dissertation as demonstrations of the habitus informed by military virtue and of the 
traditional expectations that structure that habitus.  The examples of Artemisia, Cato’s son, 
Scipio Africanus, and Julius Caesar illuminate the calculated demonstration of courage in battle.  
This demonstration was also a rhetorical means of presenting character and achieving victory.  
Leadership involves transferring this daring and self-confidence from the leader to those being 
led, which again is a rhetorical act.  Quintilian’s advice to allow a child to win at the game builds 
a self-confidence that is necessary for the future orator, and Caesar’s leadership reflects a similar 
approach.  Recall the importance of both animus and virtus in antique battles.  The recognition of 
these in an enemy necessarily inhibits self-confidence.  In much the same way as Crassus feels 
about his inability to improve the words of great Latin authors, an army when faced with what 
appears to be an enemy possessing superior animus and virtus, will begin to doubt itself.  Caesar 
found himself and his army in this situation early in the war with the Belgae: 
At first Caesar determined, because of the vast numbers of the enemy and their 
excellent reputation for valour (virtutis), to avoid an engagement. By cavalry 
combats, however, he sought daily to prove what the valour of the enemy could 
do and what our men could dare. Then, perceiving (intellexit) that our men were 
not inferior, he chose a ground before the camp naturally suitable and appropriate 
for forming line of battle (Gallic War 100-101; bk. 2, sec. 8).   
Here, Caesar does to his army what Quintilian later advises a teacher to do with students: he 
finds easy engagements that his army can win.  He transfers his confidence to his army and 
inspires in them an animus that is capable of victory.  This is not, however, an overconfidence 
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(the vice the Quintilian discusses), or a animus that leads to recklessness.  Caesar is quite clear 
that victory is achieved through the practical and restrained application of animus.  In the same 
battle, his soldiers wait patiently on the opposite side of a marsh for the enemy, instead of 
rushing to attack and being delayed in the marsh (Gallic War 100-103; bk. 2, sec. 9).  The vir 
bonus and the successful commander demonstrate a mature self-confidence that is informed by 
the good use of practical reason.  In other words, successful leadership is self-confidence 
tempered by prudence.  Confidence in one’s ability to make prudent decisions is a result of 
understanding the tactical or political landscape and this includes a recognizing a point of 
reference.  For Romans that point of reference is always the mos maiorum.  Lobur demonstrates, 
for example, how Octavian’s confidence as emperor and the decisions made with that confidence 
were constrained by the traditions of the republic (9-10) and Caesar’s confidence on the 
battlefield was shaped by the history and traditions of the Roman army (Rosenstein 87, 95).   
Rhetorical Prudence and Leadership 
 Chapter 6 maintained that prudentia, as conceptualized by the martial metaphors in the 
Institutio Oratoria, includes the ability to react to any given situation, and Quintilian gives 
similar advice for delivery, suggesting that each individual orator draw inspiration for delivery 
from their own nature (ex natura) (Institutio Oratoria 5: 180-181; bk. 11, ch. 3, sec. 180).  
Acting on this prudentia though, especially for a student and young orator, requires a self-
confidence that again is part of leadership, and this aspect of prudence has been neglected by 
contemporary scholarship, as John Nelson says, for the sake of relocating prudence to ordinary 
situations (232).   By examining the aspects of military virtue as a part of rhetorical virtue and 
seeing classical rhetorical education as an education in leadership, we see even postmodern 
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articulations of prudence can be viewed as an exercise of individual leadership.  In the domain of 
probabilities, in the absence (or in the case of the Romans, the non-existence) of universal 
reason, confidence in one’s prudence, in one’s ability to determine the appropriate course of 
action, is a virtue of a leader, a virtue grounded once again in the martial. 
 The current emphasis in academics seems to leave little room for a classical notion of 
prudence.  Hariman has observed that the authority of the research university has erased any 
perceived need to understand prudence, cunning, and even classical rhetoric.  He explains: “we 
have to grant that it [prudence] immediately runs afoul of basic criteria of modern rationality: 
prudence antedates the fact-value distinction; it is difficult to quantify; it is largely retrospective; 
it is necessarily parochial; it focuses too much on individual personality” (“Theory Without 
Modernity” 18).  Hariman’s description of this aversion to prudence illuminates the modern 
problem with Quintilian’s emphasis on determining delivery ex natura.  Quintilian’s emphasis on 
the attributes of the particular individual runs afoul of modern rationality.  Determining delivery 
ex natura requires a rationality informed by prudence, not by universal reason.  Practical wisdom 
and a knowing of oneself lead to delivery ex natura, not a course in composition or a textbook.  
The political scientist J Patrick Dobel’s attempt to describe “dimensions” of prudence is an 
example of the modern inability to recognize the classical understanding of prudence.   While 54
Dobel does note that modern understandings of prudence conceal its classical articulation, he still 
attempts to describe prudence as something outside of politics and culture; it remains for Dobel a 
tool to be used by a leader.  “To be politically prudent, a leader should attend to  each of the 
 Dobel’s “dimensions” of prudence are: 1. Disciplined reason and openness to experience; 2. foresight and 54
attention to the long term; 3. Deploying power; 4. Timing and momentum; 5. The proper relation of means to ends; 
6. The durability and legitimacy of outcomes; 7. The consequences for the community (76).
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seven dimensions.  Failure to account for them means a leader is guilty of negligence” (76).  This 
formulaic presentation of prudence and the requirement for a leader to attend to each dimension 
denies that prudence could be derived ex natura. 
 For the reasons that Hariman cites above and as demonstrated by Dobel’s attempt to 
create dimensions of prudence, the Roman understanding of prudentia is difficult for modern 
rationality to accept.  Steven Pender has demonstrated the link between classical notions of 
prudence and decorum.  Pender observes that to Cicero “decorum and prudence should govern 
appearance, action, and discourse” (374).  Character, ethics, and prudence are all connected 
through appearance and performance.  Appearance and performance, as by Bourdieu’s concept of 
the habitus, are informed by tradition while at the same time tacitly modifying tradition.  David 
Randall refutes the criticism that classical prudence is amoral by explaing: “Both Aristotle and 
Cicero, therefore, postulate an external standard of virtue, grounded in human nature, which 
provides the ends (and hopefully regulates the means) of prudence; classical prudence cannot 
choose its own ends” (209).  Although to modern ears this may seem arbitrary, as I have argued 
throughout this dissertation, this “external standard” is recognized at Rome as demonstrations of 
military virtue.  The ends of prudentia are therefore determined by the tradition of military virtue 
and the performance of prudentia is a performance of that particular virtue.   
 Hariman makes the distinction between two competing and apparently contradictory 
forms of prudence.  First is the Enlightenment version of prudence illustrated by Dobel’s 
discussion noted above.  This form of prudence is what Hariman characterizes as a cognitive 
activity that involves specific rules for decision-making.  The second is performative and is the 
form that Hariman suggests would be a valuable part of a current theory of prudence.  
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Performativity involves an aesthetic sensibility and requires aesthetic criteria for judgment.  
These criteria are derived from the culture and traditions in which the performance is conducted.  
Hariman explains:  
Prudential conduct includes both an act of calculation and a politically 
consequential performance, which requires effective use of a culture's conventions 
of political display to achieve the ends consistent with those conventions, 
including obtaining the external and internal goods of the political practice while 
maintaining those conventions for use by others. Prudence is not only a 
performance of rational political action-reasoning about politics-but a 
performance using the materials of a political culture-reasoning within politics 
(“Prudence/Performance” 32). 
We can see the action associated with the performance of leadership at Rome as prudential 
reasoning in this way.  In Chapter 6, I suggested that the military metaphors in rhetorical treatises 
frame the orator as a military commander and in doing so require of the orator the same prudence 
that makes a successful commander.  Hariman’s explanation of performative prudence 
demonstrates what that prudence is. 
 To revisit Polybius’ description of Scipio Africanus’ first act in combat, the young officer, 
seeing his father wounded and in danger, rushed to his assistance: 
He first tried to cheer on his own squadron to go to his father’s assistance, but 
when he found them considerably cowed by the numbers of the enemy 
surrounding them, he appears to have plunged himself with reckless courage into 
the midst of the enemy; whereupon his comrades being forced to charge also, the 
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enemy were overawed and divided their ranks to let them pass; and Publius the 
elder, being thus unexpectedly saved, was the first to address his son as his 
preserver in the hearing of the whole army.  Having gained an acknowledged 
reputation for bravery by this exploit, he ever afterwards freely exposed himself 
to every sort of personal danger, whenever his country rested its hope of safety on 
him (2: 3-4; bk. 10, ch. 3) 
This act, and the subsequent acts of bravery that Polybius describes, demonstrates the 
performative prudence that Hariman emphasizes as well as its connection with leadership.  
Scipio’s decision to act is based within the cultural frame of military virtue.  Because his courage 
is consistent with the traditional expectations, and because it is performed to achieve ends 
concomitant with those expectations, the young Scipio’s actions are aesthetic as well as 
utilitarian.  His actions are simultaneously rhetorical in that they persuade his comrades to 
overcome their own fear and join the fight.  In the case of Scipio, as well as other instances such 
as Cato’s son, leadership is articulated through prudential performance that is rhetorical. 
 The expectations associated with the elite male and as established and maintained 
through the mos maiorum, as we have seen, are considered natural.  So when Quintilian advises 
that delivery be ex natura, he is suggesting that delivery still be confined to acceptable aesthetic 
criteria (those traditional held to be acceptable). It is in the recognition of prudent action and 
leadership as performative and aesthetic that Roman rhetorical theory and education offer the 
most significant contribution to leadership.  Attention to aesthetics is not for the sake of 
ornament, but for the performance of prudence, and prudence is absolutely required of a leader.  
From the emphasis on the animus of an army in Julius Caesar to the bodily actions of generals, 
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prudence performed is leadership at Rome, and prudence performed is always judged 
aesthetically. 
 As character, ethics, prudence, and leadership are all bound together in and by rhetorical 
performance, Roman rhetorical education and theory, as they are tied to traditional 
conceptualizations of correctness and decorum, function as the developmental media for leaders.  
When prudence is seen as performative and aesthetic, for example, the early emphasis on 
appropriate Latin or the “correct” reading of the epics taught in grammar school, can be viewed 
as the development of performative prudence and therefore leadership.   As “reasoning within 55
politics,” prudence and leadership require a subject who is formed within the culture and who 
doesn’t merely understand tradition, but who (re)presents the culture.   Appropriateness is a 56
matter of correctly (re)presenting tradition and this leads to something aesthetically pleasing and 
therefore a good demonstration of prudence.  Inappropriateness is disfiguring; it mars what 
would otherwise be aesthetically pleasing.  Quintilian’s emphasis on appropriateness here could 
be taken as ornament for ornament’s sake, but he links appropriateness to invention and indeed 
places it on equal footing with content:  57
what you say is no more important than where you say it (nec plus referet quid 
dicas quam quo loco).  Indeed, all this question of appropriateness of speech (apte 
dicere) is not solely a matter of Elocution, but shares ground with Invention; if 
 See Chapter 3.55
 See Chapter 5.56
 Many current rhetorical scholars see the presence of invention as vital to the status of rhetoric as a discipline.  By 57
placing value on the discovery of knowledge, modern treatments require an inventional component to any rhetoric 
that claims to be intellectual.  Sharon Crowley, for example, has claimed that rhetorical models such as the current-
traditional model that lack invention, are intellectually impoverished (13).  My treatment here shows how important 
the other canons of rhetoric are to the intellectual and practical application of rhetoric.  As part of the formation of 
character and the cultivation of leadership, all of the rhetorical canons become equally significant.
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even words can make such a crucial difference, how much more can the content 
do so! (Institutio Oratoria 5: 10-13; bk. 11, ch. 1, sec. 7). 
The aesthetic aspect of a composition is not separate from the content, but is necessarily part of 
the content.  To demonstrate complete mastery through performance is to bring all aspects of the 
speech together in harmony with tradition.  58
 The emphasis of aesthetics in Roman rhetorical theory is related to the performative 
prudence necessary in a leader.  The practice of performance in rhetorical education at Rome 
serves the same function.  Along with cultivating military virtue (and therefore providing the 
nature from which to draw performative prudence), it is possible to see the progymnasmata and 
declamations as training in prudence and therefore leadership.   Even the traditional criticism of 
declamation, that the themes were so outlandish as to be of no practical use, is challenged by the 
dual purpose of building prudence as well as rhetorical skill.  To successfully argue an 
outrageous theme leads to a confidence in arguing the more mundane themes of the actual law 
courts.  Confidence in one’s ability to make prudent rhetorical choices then translates into the 
confidence to make prudent political and leadership choices.  Declamations provide the subject 
of a rhetorical performance as well as the traditional and cultural situation in which it is possible 
to perform prudence.  As the Campus Martius served as a place in which military skill was 
honed, the rhetorical school served as the field in which leadership was cultivated. 
  
 Cicero explains this in the first book of De Oratore: “What then is the difference, or by what means will you 58
discriminate between the rich and copious diction of those speakers whom I have mentioned, and the feebleness of 
such as do not adopt this variety and elegance of language? The sole distinction will surely be that the good speakers 
bring, as their peculiar possession, a style that is harmonious, graceful, and marked by a certain artistry and 
polish” (1: 38-39; bk. 1, sec. 50).
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Conclusion 
 I would like to return for a moment to Quintilian’s claim that the orator should draw the 
form and style of delivery ex natura and the broader claim that the vir bonus dicendi peritus 
owes as much to nature as to training.  Over the course of this dissertation, I have demonstrated 
how the nature to which Cicero and Quintilian refer is not naturally occurring.  Instead, the 
nature of the elite male was culturally constructed and was derived from the concept of military 
virtue.  This virtue itself was formed and understood through action (actual and rhetorical 
performance) and was demonstrated by action.  Of course in a male dominated culture — the 
traditions of which privileged the male role as one of dominance and power (through the role of 
the paterfamilias and laws such as the patria potestas) — this virtue would necessarily be 
gendered masculine.  When Cicero describes the natural gifts of Sulpicius and Cotta in De 
Oratore, he focuses on their correct representation of traditional male attributes “never, I think, 
did I listen to a speaker better qualified in respect of gesture, and by his very bearing and 
presence, or to one with a voice more resonant and pleasing”  (1: 92-93; bk. 1, sec. 132).  As 
Gleason and Gunderson have shown, these are performed aspects of masculinity.  Even though 
Cicero and Quintilian regard these as natural, they are only appropriate, and therefore useful on 
which to draw, because Roman tradition elevates these attributes.  
 As we have seen, Roman education worked to cultivate in students these same “natural” 
attributes.  Students were exposed to and at the same time required to demonstrate a character 
informed by military virtue.  Cicero’s explanation that appropriate gesture makes the unnatural 
seem natural takes on new meaning in the context of this educational scheme because students 
were directed towards changing their true nature in order to appear to be natural.  Character itself 
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becomes rhetorical, but more than a rhetorical presentation of character, as May’s work suggests, 
rhetorical education becomes an education in the particular kind of character necessary to be a 
leader at Rome.  More than teaching students how to meet the needs of a specific rhetorical 
situation, rhetorical education formed the character necessary to successfully negotiate the 
complex cultural landscape in which young, aristocratic men found themselves.  It prepared them 
to be leaders and guardians of the state and of its traditions. 
 Rhetoric at Rome offers a unique understanding of the relationship between rhetoric, 
leadership, and education and offers to broaden our contemporary treatment of the same.  
Because it antedates Enlightenment reason and because it is situated in the realities of traditions 
and culture, Roman understanding of rhetoric is inescapably bound to character and leadership.  
Roman character and leadership are derived from military virtue, the same virtue that was 
instrumental in both rhetorical education and in the conceptualization of rhetoric itself.  
Successful demonstrations of this virtue, those of military and political leaders as well as of 
significant orators, rely on performances that adhere to the strict requirements of tradition,  in 
other words, the successful embodiment of the habitus informed by military virtue.    
 As I have already observed, the fundamental concept of Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria is 
the idea of the vir bonus.  Quintilian’s requirement of the ideal orator is that he first be a “good 
man.”  The “goodness” of the good man, as this dissertation has demonstrated, is more than a 
particular morality.  Goodness is demonstrated through the performance of military virtue in all 
of its manifestations, and therefore it is rhetorically constructed as well.  As such, Roman 
rhetorical education and theory were designed not just to develop “speaking well” but also to 
develop the “good man.”  Future research could expand the possibilities of rhetoric and 
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rhetorical education in our own institutions.  Rhetoric can be seen as a means of creating 
effective leaders who accept and embody the traditions of the particular culture in which they are 
situated while at the same time it offers the discursive means of questioning and modifying those 
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